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 This research examines three factors – macroeconomic conditions, the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005, and inter-vivos transfers – that influence both the availability of long-term care 
services and the use of these services. The first essay explores how changes in the 
macroeconomy, specifically the 2007-2009 “Great Recession,” affect the utilization of paid and 
unpaid long-term care services. It is theoretically unclear how long-term care use should be 
affected by such downturns, as an individual’s health status, wealth, insurance coverage and 
access to care are all likely to change during a significant downturn such as the “Great 
Recession.” Using data from the 1998-2012 waves of the Health and Retirement Study, a survey 
that follows Americans over the age of 50 as they begin to transition into retirement, we estimate 
the effects of changes in the unemployment rate at both the national and county levels on long-
term care use. We find consistent evidence that overall care use declines significantly during 
downturns, with additional results suggesting that these results may be driven by reductions in 
individual wealth and improvements in individual health status. 
xiii 
 
 The second essay examines how the implementation of the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005, a policy that imposed stricter regulations about how individuals could “spend down” their 
assets to become Medicaid eligible, impacts both asset transfers and long-term care use among 
the elderly. Using data from the 1998-2010 waves of the Health and Retirement Study, I estimate 
the effects of this policy using a difference-in-difference framework. Overall, individuals seem to 
substitute from making inter-vivos transfers to holding assets in trusts in response to the 
enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act. With regard to care use, individuals seem to substitute 
from in-home long-term care to more visits to both doctors and adult day care facilities following 
the DRA, an effect primarily driven by the wealthiest and youngest individuals. 
 The third essay investigates the relationship between parent-to-child inter-vivos asset 
transfers and future informal care provision by that child. Using data from the 1998 – 2010 
waves of the Health and Retirement Study, I am able to use the timing of the transfers and the 
care use to describe this relationship. The results suggest that the receipt of an inter-vivos transfer 
during the previous two years is strongly positively correlated with that child’s likelihood of 
providing care during the previous month. In addition, I confirm a previous finding in the 
literature that child’s gender, relationship to the parent and geographical proximity to the parent 















 The continued aging of the U.S. population is expected to significantly increase the 
demand for long-term care services that help individuals with physical limitations or cognitive 
impairments. Specifically, the over-65 population is forecast to roughly double by 2060
1
 and 
roughly 70% of those over the age of 65 are expected to need some form of long-term care 
during their lifetimes
2
. In order to more accurately predict the amount of care needed to meet this 
future demand, research has been undertaken to better understand how individuals decide how 
much long-term care to use. This research contributes to this greater understanding by examining 
three different factors related to long-term care utilization: changes in the macroeconomy, the 
enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, and inter-vivos asset transfers from elderly 
parents to their adult children. Exploring these factors may help to not only improve our 
understanding of long-term use but also how the use of particular types of care may change in 
the near future.  
 The first essay, co-authored with Reagan Baughman, exploits temporal variation in the 
unemployment rate at both the national and county levels to examine how changes in the 
macroeconomy affect long-term care utilization. Increases in the unemployment rate may 
directly affect the supply of long-term care, specifically unpaid in-home care, as individuals may 
be more willing to care for their parents/relatives if they become unemployed; however, 
economic downturns may also affect an individual’s demand for such care by affecting their 
                                                          
1
 U.S. Census Bureau (2012) 
 
2
 Department of Health and Human Services (2014) 
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health status, wealth and insurance coverage, thus making it theoretically unclear how long-term 
care use should change during a recession. Using individual-level data from the 1998-2012 
waves of the Health and Retirement Study, we estimate how variation in economic conditions 
before, during and after the 2007-2009 “Great Recession” affect the use of long-term care 
services among those born before 1942. We find that use of unpaid in-home care decreases as the 
economy worsens, both in the national and county-level models. In addition, we find that the 
individual’s wealth and likelihood of self-reporting his/her health status as either fair or poor 
significantly decrease as the unemployment rate increases, implying that these results may be 
driven by improving health or a reduced ability to transfer assets to their family caregivers that 
are otherwise ‘unpaid.’ 
 The second essay examines the impact of the enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005 on long-term care use. This policy was designed to reduce Medicaid spending by limiting 
individuals’ ability to transfer away assets in order to qualify for Medicaid long-term care 
benefits. If children only provide informal care because they expect to receive such transfers or 
greater bequests, this policy may reduce the availability of care as parents are now deterred from 
making these transfers. Using a difference-in-difference identification strategy in which an 
indicator variable that equals 1 for those individuals who would need to spend down assets to 
reach Medicaid eligibility (and in turn are likely to be impacted by the Deficit Reduction Act) is 
interacted with a post-DRA indicator, I find that individuals are significantly less likely to make 
inter-vivos transfers and more likely to hold assets in trusts following the implementation of the 
DRA. In addition, they are significantly less likely to use any long-term care but more likely to 
both visit the doctor more frequently and use adult day care facilities. 
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 The third essay directly examines the relationship between parent-to-child inter-vivos 
asset transfers and informal care, specifically transfers that precede care provision. While most 
of the research concerning inter-vivos transfers and care examines whether caregivers receive 
larger subsequent transfers, relatively little research has examined whether transfers lead to 
future care. By taking advantage of the wording of particular survey questions in the Health and 
Retirement Study, I am able to examine transfers that predominantly precede care provision and 
estimate the magnitude of this relationship. The results suggest that inter-vivos transfer receipt is 
significantly positively correlated with future informal care provision across multiple models and 
specifications. In addition, these results also suggest that female children, biological children and 
children who live within 10 miles of their parent are all significantly more likely to provide care.    
 Overall, this research examines three distinct factors and their effects on long-term care 
utilization: economic conditions, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 and inter-vivos transfers that 
precede any informal care provision. By understanding how these different economic, policy and 
financial factors affect both the demand for and availability of long-term care services, my 
research may contribute to policies aimed at ensuring sufficient care is available to meet the 
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 One of the key issues facing policymakers in the United States in coming years will be 
the dramatic aging of the population. Specifically, the over-65 and over-85 populations are 
expected to grow by roughly 2.71% and 3.52%, respectively, each year through 2035 while the 
under-65 population is only expected to grow by roughly 0.38% each year during this period 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2012, also Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below).  With an aging population comes 
demand for more long-term care
4
, or services that help individuals who suffer from physical or 
cognitive limitations with everyday tasks such as bathing, dressing and preparing meals. These 
services are provided in institutions such as nursing homes
5
 but can also be provided within an 
individual’s home; in addition, in-home care may either be provided formally by paid home 
health aides or informally by unpaid caregivers, such as the individual’s spouse, children, 
relatives and friends. However, for several reasons, there may not be enough capacity to meet 
this demand. The most important contributing factor is that both institutional care and formal in-
home care are already plagued by staffing shortages and high turnover.  A report by the Institute 
for the Future of Aging Services (2007) discusses these problems as well as demographic trends 
that are likely to limit the future availability of informal in-home care.   
 The specific research question in this study is how macroeconomic downturns that 
significantly depress income and reduce employment for many families, such as the 2007-09 
“Great Recession,” affect the decision to use various types of long term care.  The broader goal 
of the project is to better understand the economic determinants of utilization of long term care.  
                                                          
4
 The Department of Health and Human Services (2014) advises that 70 percent of Americans are likely to need 
some form of long-term care after the age of 65, with 20% of these individuals expected to need such care for at 
least 5 years.  
 
5
 In the ensuing analysis and discussion, ‘nursing homes’ refers to assisted living facilities in addition to traditional 
nursing homes. Specifically, the survey question concerning nursing homes asks if the respondent currently resides 
in either a nursing home or other health care facility that provides the following services: dispensing of medication, 
24-hour nursing assistance and supervision, personal assistance, and room & meals. 
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While there is a considerable amount of research on the effects of factors such as health, 
disability and family structure on long-term care use, the causal impact of economic factors on 
care outcomes has not been as well studied.  However, it is likely that changes in economic 
factors will directly affect the availability of each type of care and indirectly affect the demand 
for these services through changes in income, asset values and wages.   
 The major challenge in studying this relationship is that the same factors that lead to 
greater demand for care, such as changes in health status, are likely to have their own effects on 
wages, income and asset accumulation.  Additionally, family members, particularly women, who 
provide informal care often reduce their labor supply in order to have time to provide this care 
(Henz 2006; Carmichael and Charles 2003), which decreases both their earnings and income.  
Therefore, it is difficult to identify the causal impact of economic factors on long term care use, 
particularly in cross-sectional data.  In this study, we will address this problem by using 
exogenous variation in economic conditions over time created by recessions to estimate the 
effects of economic factors on long-term care utilization. 
From a theoretical point of view, it is difficult to predict how exactly an economic 
downturn that decreases both overall employment and asset values might affect utilization of 
long-term care.  It is helpful to consider supply and demand factors, as well as formal and 
informal home care, separately.  The primary factor that is likely to affect the demand for long-
term care during a recession is lower income from private retirement and/or savings accounts 
that have lost value in the stock market.  All else equal, this should decrease the affordability and 
utilization of formal home care but have no real effect on demand for informal home care. In 
contrast, while the effects of a downturn on the supply of long term care are more likely to be 
direct, they are also more ambiguous. Supply of informal home care may increase during a 
7 
 
recessionary period because higher unemployment rates decrease the average opportunity cost of 
a relative’s time. Previous studies (e.g. Bryne et al. 2009; Carmichael and Charles 2003) have 
highlighted the role that the value of a potential caregiver’s time plays in determining how care is 
provided.  However, the impact of an economic downturn on the supply of formal home care is 
much less clear.  Several recent papers suggest that employment of nursing workers may actually 
increase during recessions (Staiger et al. 2012; Baughman 2013), thereby reducing shortages and 
improving stability and quality of care (Stevens et al. 2015). This effect is primarily seen in 
hospitals and nursing homes, not home health care, and would lead to an increase in the supply 
of beds for those nursing homes that were initially at or below the state minimum staffing 
threshold.   
To test these hypotheses, we will use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 
a panel survey that follows a representative sample of older Americans.  The original cohort 
respondents, born between 1931 and 1941, were first interviewed in 1992 when they were 
between the ages of 51 and 61. Initially consisting of 12,521 individuals, this cohort has been re-
interviewed every two years since 1992, with the last year of publicly available data being 2012 
(when the respondents were ages 71 to 81).  Additionally, two other cohorts were added to the 
HRS in 1998 in order to make it more representative of an older population: (1) the AHEAD 
survey cohort (ages 87 and older in 2012); and (2) the Children of the Depression Age cohort 
(ages 82 to 88 in 2012).   There are several advantages to using HRS data for this project.  First, 
it provides information on the age group in the population that receives the most long-term care.  
Second, the HRS questionnaire contains a uniquely rich set of information on older individuals 
who might need care, including health status, disabilities, income, retirement savings and 
detailed information on long term care when used.  It also collects relatively detailed information 
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for adult children and other family members who could potentially provide informal care, such 
as their residential location and employment status.   
 The method we use to identify the effect of economic conditions on utilization of long-
term care is to compare changes in utilization of three different types of care over the period 
from 1998 to 2012 that surrounds the “Great Recession” of 2007-2009.  We estimate two 
different sets of linear probability models: one set identifies a macroeconomic effect using 
variation in the national monthly unemployment rate over time and includes individual fixed 
effects while the other exploits variation in annual county-level unemployment rates and includes 
both county and year fixed effects.  Both models control for demographics, health status and 
number of children.  The reduced-form results suggest that care utilization declines as a result of 
worse economic conditions, although the mechanisms through which downturns indirectly affect 
care differ based on the level of analysis.  
2. Conceptual Model 
 Given the number of ways in which the macroeconomy has the potential to affect 
utilization of long-term care, including direct health, wealth and labor supply effects, our 
question does not lend itself to a formal theoretical model. Instead, we walk through what are 
likely to be a series of decisions that affect utilization and identify key factors related to each 
decision. 
 A starting point for thinking about the effects of macroeconomic conditions on utilization 
of long-term care is whether there is demand for care; at least initially, the most important 
determinant of demand is likely to be health status. Theoretically, based upon a Grossman (1972) 
model of health production, the effect of a macroeconomic downturn on health status is 
ambiguous. Assuming that medical care is a normal good, lower wages and asset income would 
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lead to less care and worse health. However, time is also a key input into health production (for 
example, in the case of exercise) and a lower wage reduces the opportunity cost of taking time 
away from work for health-promoting activities; in this way, a downturn could potentially 
improve health.  
 Empirical research on the health effects of recessions produces mixed results. Ruhm 
(2000) was the first to document that overall mortality falls during recessionary periods; he 
shows that better diet, higher rates of exercise and lower rates of smoking are also observed 
when the macroeconomy is weaker. Evans and Moore (2011) find that income fluctuation may at 
least partially explain this pro-cyclical trend in mortality rates; when looking at several types of 
income that affect wide ranges of individuals, the authors consistently find that mortality 
increases in the period immediately following the receipt of income. Aguiar et al. (2013) 
document an overall increase in time use for health care activities during the Great Recession, 
although they note that they are unable to separate preventive health care from care necessitated 
by illness or injury. This effect may differ by demographic group, however, as Currie et al. 
(2015) find that increases in the unemployment rate are associated with worse self-reported 
health status and higher smoking rates for mothers. 
 Two studies have focused on age-specific mortality effects of recessions. One of these 
studies, Coile et al. (2014), investigates whether or not the relationship between mortality and 
recession differs by age, finding that individuals who experience a recession in their late 50s are 
actually at greater risk of death; in addition, long unemployment spells, lack of health insurance 
and lower health care utilization are likely to be contributing to this effect as well. On the other 
hand, Stevens et al. (2015) find that the decrease in mortality during recessions is particularly 
strong for elderly individuals in nursing homes and hypothesize that this may be driven by higher 
10 
 
nurse staffing levels.  Finally, although one might expect a negative correlation between 
recessions and mental health, McInerney et al. (2013) show that while the stock market crash of 
2008 immediately decreased subjective reports of well-being, there was no significant effect of 
wealth reductions on clinical measures of depression.   
 Extrapolating from Grossman (1972) and many of the papers in the literature to the 
elderly population we are studying is not straightforward. Given that most of the individuals in 
our sample in need of care are already retired, a health-improving effect of more free time does 
not seem likely in this population. This would theoretically leave only a health-decreasing wealth 
effect, one that is not particularly well identified in literature. A better-documented phenomenon 
is lower mortality rates during recessions. 
 Conditional upon demanding some type of long-term care, the next decision might be 
whether care should be provided inside or outside of the home.  It is possible but not very likely 
that a change in macroeconomic conditions would change this preference.  The other major 
factor that could affect relative demand for in-home or institutional care might be health status, 
particularly if certain conditions (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease) were more likely to lead to nursing 
home care.  Given the evidence summarized above, it is impossible to predict the direction of 
this effect. Further, not all individuals (or their families) who have a relatively stronger demand 
for nursing home care will actually receive that care. This can be modeled in a simple consumer 
choice framework in which an individual with a given set of preferences chooses between 
nursing home care and all other consumption, constrained primarily by income and wealth. All 
else equal, negative economic shocks should reduce nursing home care by reducing income and 
wealth, shifting the budget constraint inward. 
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 The relative price of nursing home care is also an important factor.  Some individuals 
finance nursing home care with insurance (either private long term care insurance or Medicaid) 
that effectively reduces the price of nursing home care to the insured and generates both income 
and substitution effects that increase utilization.  Therefore, any change in long-term care 
insurance that comes about as a result of a macroeconomic downturn could affect utilization of 
nursing home care.  The most likely impact of recession on privately purchased long-term care 
insurance is decreased demand driven by declines in income and wealth.  Those same decreases 
in financial resources could make more individuals eligible for public Medicaid coverage; 
however, Grabowski and Gruber (2007) find no evidence that greater Medicaid eligibility results 
in greater nursing home care utilization. 
 A similar process plays out for individuals with a preference for in-home care. This 
process is slightly more complicated because both paid and unpaid (or informal) care may be 
relevant options, as may be care provided by family members versus others.  
 First, we consider care provided by relatives. In practice, most of this care is provided by 
adult children, so a key determinant of informal care will be the potential supply of care by 
children. Whether or not an elderly individual has any children, how many they have and 
whether or not the children live close to the parent will all matter for informal care utilization. 
We note that the proximity of the child may be endogenous to the health needs and demand for 
care of the parent. Conditional upon having an adult child living nearby, supply of informal care 
may also be affected by whether or not the child is working and, if so, how many hours. For 
employed children, the opportunity cost of providing care to parents is higher, and so 
employment is associated with lower levels of informal care (Heitmueller 2007; Henz 2006). 
This relationship is also consistent with a large literature on intra-family bargaining and 
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intergenerational transfers (Brown 2006, Norton et al. 2014), which suggests that poorer and/or 
unemployed children may be more likely to care for their elderly parents in expectation of 
compensation through immediate asset transfers or larger bequests. If true, children may be less 
willing to provide informal care (either extensively or intensively) during a recession, in 
particular one associated with a large stock market crash such as the Great Recession, as their 
likelihood of receiving such compensation likely diminishes.  
 Finally, there are several ways that a recession might affect demand for in-home care 
provided by non-relatives.  Given that the majority of this type of care is for pay, decreases in 
income and wealth should reduce demand for formal care (Kemper 1992).   Paid home health 
care may also be covered by public and private long term care insurance policies, so that same 
set of factors discussed above also applies here. Finally, in recent years there has not been 
adequate supply of home health care workers in many parts of the country (Institute for the 
Future of Aging 2007), so worker availability will also affect this type of care utilization.  
Baughman (2013) finds that lower-skill nursing workers select out of home health and into 
nursing home and hospital jobs during economic downturns, and this could exacerbate supply 
problems and drive up the price of formal care.  
 Unfortunately, it is impossible to make unambiguous predictions about how 
macroeconomic downturns affect utilization of each type of long-term care. However, this 
conceptual model helps us identify a set of factors through which downturns are likely to affect 
utilization patterns indirectly. First, all else equal, nursing home utilization should decrease due 
to a negative income and wealth shock; the same holds if individuals get healthier during 
recessions as predicted by Ruhm (2000).  However, there are also several factors that would be 
expected to increase nursing home utilization during a recession, including eligibility gains for 
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public programs that may offset wealth shocks and an improvement in staffing at nursing homes 
that reduces price. Second, all else equal, utilization of home care provided by relatives should 
increase due to a lower opportunity cost of providing care for adult children and wealth effects 
that reduce demand for paid home health care. However, this could be offset by several things, 
such as parents losing their homes (a site for informal care) in the housing market crash, better 
health status and lower expected bequests to adult children.     
3. Data 
 The data used in this analysis come from the 1998 through 2012 waves of the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal panel study sponsored by the National Institute on Aging 
that follows a representative sample of Americans over the age of 50. Respondents are selected 
into the sampling frame based on their year of birth (or birth cohort).  The initial HRS cohort 
consisted of individuals born between 1931 and 1941, with these individuals being between the 
ages of 51 and 61when the study began in 1992 as the original goal of the study was to observe 
the transition into retirement. Additional birth cohorts were merged into the study over time, 
including the AHEAD cohort (consisting of those born before 1924) and the CODA cohort 
(consisting of those born between 1924 and 1930). 
 All respondents are interviewed biennially and asked questions regarding their physical 
health/limitations, cognitive functioning, income, employment, wealth, family structure and 
other topics. The HRS is uniquely suited to this analysis because it includes indicators of the 
types of care that respondents receive (e.g. nursing home care or home care) as well as detailed 
qualitative information about providers of home care, such as the amount of care provided by 
each individual, the individual’s relationship to the respondent and whether or not the individual 
is paid for providing care.  
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 The sample period for the baseline analysis of the effects of economic downturns is from 
1998 to 2012, a time period chosen so that individuals are observed both before and during a 
recession in 2001, during a period of growth from 2002 to 2007, and then during and into the 
recovery from the Great Recession of 2007-2009
6
.  Across these eight waves of the survey, the 
HRS contains information for 157,590 respondents; however, because the HRS added 
progressively younger cohorts to the study over time (specifically the War Babies cohort in 
1998, the Early Baby Boomer cohort in 2004 and the Middle Baby Boomer cohort in 2010), not 
all of the respondents are suited to this analysis since some are likely too young to be demanding 
long-term care. Therefore, we focus on the three oldest cohorts, specifically the initial HRS 
cohort, the AHEAD cohort and the CODA cohort.  These cohorts yield a sample of 111,881 
observations, with our final sample consisting of 98,619 observations after dropping those who 
were missing key variables. To determine how utilization of these different types of care 
changed throughout this period, we create three indicators for the types of long-term care that 
respondents might receive. The first measures use of nursing home care, based upon whether or 
not a respondent reports residing in a nursing home
7
. The second and third measure use of formal 
(paid) home care and informal (unpaid) home care, respectively, which we create based on 
whether or not the respondent says any of their providers of home care are paid for their services.  
 The unweighted summary statistics for the additional demographic and control variables 
used in the ensuing analyses can also be found in Table 1.1. Overall, 16 percent of respondents 
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 It is not straightforward to map HRS waves onto pre, post, and during recession periods.  First, we note that 
although the recession was dated as starting in 2007, most individual effects were widely felt starting after the 
October 2008 crash in the stock market.  As Appendix Table 1.1 shows, 91.8% of respondents in the 2008 wave 
were surveyed before the crash.  Additionally, although the stock market had made a substantial recovery by the 
start of 2010, unemployment was still at 10 percent (twice its December 2007 value). 
 
7
 This measure of nursing home use likely includes both post-acute nursing home stays as well as long-term stays. 
The HRS contains information regarding when the respondent moved into the nursing home and nursing home use 




receive any long-term care, with the most common type of care being informal care (as roughly 
13 percent of respondents receiving some form of unpaid care).  Nearly 4% of the sample 
receives formal care and only 3% receive nursing home care
8
.  In terms of demographics, the 
mean age of respondents over all years is roughly 71 years and the sample is roughly 60 percent 
female.  The gender imbalance is driven by longer life expectancy of women, since there is no 
correction for attrition in the panel data in this analysis. Approximately 63 percent of the sample 
members are married or otherwise in partnered relationships, and 29 percent did not finish high 
school while 18 percent completed college or higher levels of education.  In terms of race, 83 
percent of the sample is white, compared to almost 14 percent black and 4 percent other race
9
.   
Just over 8 percent of the sample is Latino or Hispanic.  Mean income (reported for the previous 
year) in the sample is $61,289 per year and mean total assets are $512,776, with both variables 
using imputed values from the RAND Income and Wealth Imputation File to account for missing 
values. Approximately 31% of respondents in the sample report that they are in fair or poor 
health.  Finally, the average number of children of the sample respondents is 3.54, and just over 
half of the respondents have a child living within 10 miles.  
 Given that the effects of economic downturns likely affect individuals differently based 
on the type and amount of assets they hold, Table 1.2 shows the full sample mean values for all 
assets measured in the HRS as well as their distributions. Based on the sample means, the assets 
in which respondents seem to hold the most wealth are their primary residences, stock portfolios, 
IRAs and other retirement accounts. However, it is important to note that these latter types of 
assets only seem to be held by the wealthiest respondents, as both their respective 25
th
 percentile 
                                                          
8
 This latter measure likely underestimates national nursing home use since it omits individuals who are briefly in 
nursing homes between surveys.  
  
9
 The racial composition of the sample appears to be the only demographic sensitive to using sample weights; the 
weighted sample is approximately 8 percent black. 
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and median values are zero; in contrast, the poorest respondents in this sample predominantly 
seem to hold assets in only their primary residences, vehicles, checking accounts and savings 
accounts. Based on the composition of one’s assets differing drastically with one’s overall level 
of wealth, as expected, it is important to examine whether the effects of downturns on long-term 
care utilization vary with one’s level of wealth. 
 Table 1.3 shows that all three types of care become more prevalent across the 1998-2012 
period, although it does dip slightly in both 2004 and 2006. There is also substantial within-
individual variation in utilization of care, a factor that is important for our national times series 
analyses with individual fixed effects. As is shown in Figure 1.3, approximately one-third of our 
sample members report receiving informal home care at some point over the years that we study, 
but only 2.2% of sample participants receive care in all waves. The modal category among the 
rest of the sample is reporting informal care use in one or two sample waves. There is somewhat 
less within-individual variation in utilization of formal home care or nursing home care, as 
shown in Figure 1.4. Although only 15% of individuals ever use formal care, given the size of 
the sample we still have statistical power to look at these individuals, particularly because we 
observe almost all of them moving into or out of care, or both. 
 In terms of control variables, the sample becomes increasingly female, decreasingly 
married and increasingly college educated over time.  All three trends are likely to be driven by 
attrition in the sample from mortality.  Perhaps surprisingly, the fraction of the sample that is 
non-white is relatively stable over time.  The same general stability is observed in the proportion 
of respondents reporting fair/poor health and the proportion with a child living within 10 miles.  
Finally, income and assets are the only variables in which the effects of the Great Recession are 
obvious in the descriptive statistics. Before this recession, real annual income ranges between 
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$58,100 (for 2005; reported in 2006) and $64,280 (for 1997; reported in 1998).  Additionally, 
although the recession officially started in December 2007, respondents had a mean income of 
$62,360 for 2007 (reported in 2008).  Given that the majority of the sample derived income from 
a combination of fixed monthly retirement payments (Social Security, pensions) and returns on 
investments, as well as the start of the recession at the end of the year, the fact that income did 
not decrease noticeably in 2007 is not surprising.  However, the crash in the stock market in the 
last quarter of 2008 had a much larger impact.  Real annual income fell to $52,110 in 2009 
(reported in 2010) and $45,270 in 2011 (reported in 2012).  Further, total real assets, which 
peaked at a mean of $607,570 in 2006, fell to $491,780 in 2010 and $462,440 in 2012.     
4. National Analysis 
 While there are several different measures that could be used to capture the variation in 
economic activity at the national level, we use the national unemployment rate as our primary 
measure
10
. Changes in the unemployment rate will not only capture the magnitude of recessions 
but also decreases in individuals’ earnings and the opportunity cost of their time11.  
 We estimate a set of linear probability models in which the probability of a given type of 
care (Y) is a function of the national unemployment rate (UR) and a set of control variables.  The 
baseline regression model takes the following form: 
         imtititmtiimt HDURY   21                          (1) 
                                                          
10
 We also measure variations in economic conditions using Real GDP per capita, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
and the labor force participation rate. Only the models that use the unemployment rate are presented due to the 
results being the most consistent across specifications.  
 
11
 It is important to note that increases in the unemployment rate may either not affect or potentially adversely affect 
the availability of informal care, such as if a child who becomes unemployed takes time to look for another job 
(rather than provide care) or if his/her spouse enters the labor force to replace his/her earnings (i.e. the ‘added 
worker effect’). While we cannot really examine the former possibility given data limitations, we will examine the 
later in the ensuing analyses.  
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where UR varies and is matched to individual observations by month and year.  Appendix Table 
1.1 describes the variation in survey response month for each of the HRS waves we use.  An 
individual fixed effect is included to capture both observable and unobservable time-invariant 
individual characteristics while the vector D (demographics) contains measures of individual 
characteristics that may change over time, such as age and marital status.  The H (health) vector 
captures changes in health in four different ways: (1) the sum of reported problems with 
activities of daily living (ADLs)
12
, (2) the sum of reported problems with instrumental activities 
of daily living (IADLs)
13
, (3) whether the individual reports fair or poor health on a 4-point 
scale, and (4) a set of disease indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, stroke, memory 
disease, arthritis and incontinence.  Standard errors in all models are clustered at the individual 
level in order to address the heteroskedasticity caused by multiple observations per person over 
time. 
4.1 Utilization Effects 
The results from the OLS regressions can be found in Table 1.4, with the same model 
specification used to estimate the effects of the unemployment rate on five different dichotomous 
measures of long-term care: whether the respondent receives any care at all, nursing home care, 
any home care, formal home care and, finally, informal home care.  
The results in the first column indicate that a higher unemployment rate is associated with 
significantly lower likelihood of using any form of long-term care, with a one percentage point 
(18 percent) increase in the national unemployment rate reducing that likelihood by 0.24 
percentage points or 1.5 percent.  From the lowest unemployment rate during the Great 
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 Specific ADL limitations include having difficulty walking several blocks, getting out of a chair, climbing stairs, 
getting dressed, bathing, eating, getting in/out of bed and toileting. 
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Recession (4.4% in May 2007) to the highest (10% in October 2009), this would imply an 8.4 
percent decrease in utilization of any care for the full sample. Given that the results for nursing 
home utilization are all statistically insignificant, reductions in overall care utilization are driven 
by reductions in utilization of home care, with the likelihood decreasing by 0.25 percentage 
points or 1.9 percent for every 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. Further, 
reductions in home care are primarily driven by reductions in informal care use, with a 1 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate reducing the likelihood of using informal 
care by 0.19 percentage points or 1.3 percent. 
The parameter estimates of the control variables are as expected, with the likelihood of 
using each type of care increasing with each year of age and married individuals, who can 
receive care from a spouse, being more likely to receive informal home care but less likely to 
receive both nursing home and formal home care. In addition, the respondent’s number of ADL 
limitations, number of IADL limitations, and experiencing of a significant medical condition 
such as cancer, a stroke or a cognitive impairment all consistently increase the likelihood of 
using each type of long-term care. 
In 2010, the life expectancy of a 65-year old woman was over 2.5 years greater than a 65-
year old man born in the same year (Arias 2014). This, along with the fact that women are more 
likely to provide informal home care and married women are more likely to provide care to their 
spouses (Lima et al. 2008; Marks 1996), implies different utilization patterns by gender.  Table 
1.5 shows the results from estimating Equation (1) after stratifying the sample by gender. While 
both men and women are significantly less likely to use any home care as the economy worsens, 
differences between the two appear when we look at the different types of home care. 
Specifically, women are significantly more likely to use formal home care as the economy 
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worsens, with a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate increasing their likelihood 
by 0.18 percentage points or 3.2 percent. They are also less likely to use informal home care, 
although the effect is not precisely estimated. In contrast, male respondents’ utilization of formal 
home care is not significantly affected, but they are 0.26 percentage points or 2.1 percent less 
likely to use informal home care when the unemployment rate increases by 1 point. While the 
decreases in overall and informal care among men are consistent with the baseline results, the 
decreases in overall care and increases in formal care among female respondents are surprising. 
We speculate that more formal home care for women may be the result of them outliving their 
spouses and inherently having less access to informal care, which may in turn cause them to use 
care from more formal sources if their children and/or other relatives are unable to provide care 
for them as the economy worsens
14,15
. 
4.2 Quantity of Care 
 In addition to affecting care utilization, changes in the unemployment rate may also affect 
the quantity of care that individuals receive. Given the discussion in Section 2, it is theoretically 
unclear how the unemployment rate will affect the amount of care provided. To test this effect, 
we estimate several models that examine how the unemployment rate impacts the number of 
individuals who provide care to the recipient and the total amount of care (measured in hours) 
that he or she receives. The results from these regressions can be found in Table 1.6, with all 
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 If children are less willing to provide care because they are less likely to receive financial compensation from their 
parents during a recession, these results may in part be driven by policies, such as the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 
that were designed to reduce inter-vivos transfers. Additional models find that the above effects remain when simply 
controlling for these policies, suggesting that these results are not solely driven by these policies. 
 
15
 We find evidence that women need care after outliving their husbands by including an additional interaction term 
between the parent’s age and marital status in this specification; these results suggesting that relative to a single 
woman, a married woman’s likelihood of using formal care decreases as she grows older. 
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models using the same specification as Equation (1) but a sample of only those respondents who 
report receiving any care
16
.  
 These results suggest that an increase in the unemployment rate significantly increases 
the total number of caregivers that each respondent has; however, this effect is not economically 
meaningful as a respondent would only receive care from an additional individual if the 
unemployment rate were to increase by roughly 32 percentage points. Consistent with the lower 
probability of using any care in our baseline results, a 1 percentage point or 18 percent increase 
in the unemployment rate also significantly causes individuals to receive roughly 5.69 or 4.5 
percent fewer hours of care. This effect is primarily driven by decreases in care provided by 
unpaid caregivers and care provided to female respondents.  
4.3 Mechanisms 
 Given that these above results do not allow us to separate the direct and indirect effects of 
macroeconomic downturns on care use, it is important to try and identify the mechanisms 
through which downturns may indirectly affect care. To do this, we estimate a separate set of 
models that examine the effect of the national unemployment rate on some of the factors 
discussed in Section 2, including health status, wealth and behaviors of adult children. Each 
model includes controls for demographics as well as individual fixed effects.  As with the 
intensity models, only the parameter estimates for the national unemployment rate are presented 
in Table 1.7.  
First, although we expect the unemployment rate to be negatively correlated with income, 
this effect is found to be statistically insignificant in our models; however, the unemployment 
rate is found to adversely affect real wealth across all subsamples, with estimates that are 
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 These models are also estimated using a Tobit specification, with these latter results being consistent in terms of 
both significance and sign. As a result, the separate results concerning care utilization and intensity are presented in 
order to be consistent with the health economics literature.  
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significant at the 1% level. Considering that the sample primarily consists of retired individuals, 
these results are not overly surprising since these individuals are both likely on fixed incomes 
and holding greater assets than younger individuals. In terms of health status, an increase in the 
national unemployment rate is associated with a significant reduction in the likelihood of 
reporting health as either ‘fair’ or ‘poor,’ which is consistent with Ruhm’s (2000) findings that 
health tends to improve during recessions.  This effect is significant in all three columns, but the 
magnitude is slightly larger for women than for men.  The number of ADL limitations reported 
by respondents is also significantly negatively associated with higher unemployment. However, 
in contrast, the IADL results suggest some aspects of health may worsen during recessions, 
though this effect may be explained by the fact that it is conditional upon changes in self-
reported health status and ADLs. 
 The remaining results in Table 1.7 relate to our hypotheses from Section 2, specifically 
that the behaviors and employment status of adult children could affect availability of informal 
care. First, a higher unemployment rate is associated with a significant reduction in the number 
of total children, single daughters, married sons and single sons who work full time in both the 
full sample and the gender subsamples. It is important to note that there is no statistically 
significant effect for the number of married daughters who work full time, suggesting that the 
‘added worker effect,’ which discusses how wives may enter the labor force after their husbands 
lose their jobs, is not driving these results. Additionally, the likelihood of living within ten miles 
of a child increases slightly as the economy worsens while the likelihood of living with an adult 
child is not significantly affected
17
.  All of these results are consistent with our initial hypothesis 
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 Only 590 parents (1.59 percent) ever moved in with a child during this survey period, while only 1,348 children 
(2.77 percent) ever moved in with a parent over this same period, suggesting that changes in proximity are unlikely 




that supply of informal care increases during recessionary periods; however, our results indicate 
that there may be other factors that we have not tested empirically, such as expectations of 
bequests.    
4.4 Additional Specifications 
Since the effect of the unemployment rate likely differs with health status, Table 
1.8 stratifies the sample based on whether or not the respondent reports having a 
limitation with any activities of daily living. These results show that the baseline results 
discussed above are primarily driven by those who have at least one limitation, as the 
effects for those without any ADL limitations are consistently insignificant. This, taken 
together with overall improvements in health when the unemployment rate is higher, 
suggests that better health status may at least partially explain lower care use during 
recessions. 
Table 1.9 shows the odd ratios that result from estimating Equation (1) using a 
logit model with fixed effects. While these results similarly suggest that individuals are 
less likely to use any long-term care, any home care and informal home care as the 
unemployment rate increases, they also suggest that individuals are more likely to use 
both nursing home care and formal home care. While this increase in formal care is 
shown to be driven by women, it is surprising that the increase in nursing home use is 
primarily driven by men
18
. 
Overall, the results of our national unemployment rate analysis predominantly 
suggest that as the economy worsens, health of the elderly improves (by at least two 
                                                          
18
 It is possible that individuals may be substituting from one type of care to another, which all of the above models 
do not allow for. When estimating this same model using a multinomial specification, we find results that are 
consistent with the baseline results for both the full and male samples (with the model not able to be estimated for 
the female sample); it is due to this latter reason that these results are not presented below. 
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important measures) and the availability of children to provide informal care seems to increase. 
The overall improvement in health may help to explain the overall decrease in care discussed in 
the previous section, as the respondents may demand less care as their health improves. 
5. County-Level Analysis 
In the previous specifications we tried to disentangle effects of unemployment from those 
of individual characteristics in a model with individual fixed effects and a rich set of 
demographic and health control variables.  In those models, identification of business cycle 
effects was based upon variation in the national unemployment rate over time for each 
individual.  However, there may be other factors changing over time that are correlated with both 
labor markets and use of care, such as changes in the age structure of the population, the supply 
of health care workers and public expenditures on health, all of which may potentially bias our 
estimates. 
 In order to address this possibility we estimate a set of county-level models that take the 
following form: 
ictctititcttcict ZHDURY   321                                          (2) 
where an annual average unemployment variable UR is matched to each observation by county 
of residence and year.  County and year fixed effects are also in the model, so the identification 
of the parameter  depends upon differential variation in local unemployment rates over time.  
The D and H vectors of demographic and health controls, respectively, are identical to the ones 
in Equation 1.  We also include the Z vector that contains county-level controls that change over 
time and may be correlated with long term care utilization; these include percent of population 
over 65, percent of population under 15, percent of population that is Hispanic, percent of 
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population that is black, and total population.  Descriptive statistics for the county analysis 
sample are in Appendix Table 1.2.  This sample is smaller than the one for the national analysis 
because county identification is not available for all observations. 
5.1 Utilization Effects 
The results for models in which the dependent variables are discrete utilization measures 
are in Table 1.10. The point estimates for all care outcomes are negative, consistent with the 
national results, but none are statistically significant at conventional levels.  Table 1.11 contains 
the results when we stratify the sample by respondent gender.  For men there are no statistically 
significant effects.  For women, a 1 percentage point or 18 percent increase in the county 
unemployment rate is associated with a 0.28 percentage point or 1.71 percent decrease in the 
probability of any care, and this is driven by a significant decrease in the probability of any home 
care.  Formal (paid) home care drops by 0.14 percentage points or 3.3 percent per 1 point 
increase in the unemployment rate while informal (unpaid) care drops by 0.14 percentage points 
or 1.0 percent; however, these effects are only marginally significant.  To provide some 
perspective on the estimates, we again note that the difference between the lowest and highest 
unemployment rates between 2007 and 2009
19
 was 5.6 points; our estimates imply that women’s 
long-term care utilization decreased by roughly 9.5 percent due to the change in unemployment 
during the Great Recession period.  This is roughly comparable to a 6.9 percent decrease in care 
utilization in the national models.  
5.2 Quantity of Care 
 We next test to see whether changes in the county unemployment rate impact the number 
of home-based caregivers a respondent reports and the total amount of care (measured in hours) 
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 May 2007 (4.4%) and October 2009 (10.0%) 
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that he/she receives. Table 1.12 presents the results for models of care intensity, which are 
estimated on the sub-sample of respondents who report receiving some form of home-based care 
and contain the same control variables in Equation 2.  Overall, there is very little evidence that 
changes in the county unemployment rate are associated with changes in the intensity or quantity 
of long-term care used.  The exception is a marginally significant decrease of 3.15 hours of paid 
care that male respondents receive each month for a 1 point increase in the unemployment rate. 
5.3 Mechanisms 
 In order to better understand what might indirectly be driving the county-level results, we 
estimate the same set of mechanism regressions presented in Section 4 using the county data and 
identification strategy.  These results are presented in Table 1.13. With the stronger identification 
strategy and set of controls in the county-level models, we do not find as many effects as in the 
national-level models.   
 However, we do find two statistically significant and economically meaningful effects.  
First, there is a significant negative relationship between the unemployment rate and real assets 
of $17,292 per percentage point; the effect is almost $10,000 per percentage point larger for men 
than for women.  Second, a one point increase in the county unemployment rate is associated 
with a 0.02 percentage point decrease in the number of a respondent’s children who are 
employed full time, which represents a 1 percent decrease.  Using the same “peak-to-trough” 
variation in national unemployment, these estimates would suggest that average assets in the 
sample deceased by nearly $97,000 and the average number of adult children of respondents 
employed full time decreased by 5.6 percent.  The former result is consistent with the significant 
decrease in home-based care that we estimate, or at least the part of it made up by a decrease in 
paid home care.  The latter result is something of a puzzle.  Given our theoretical predictions and 
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the significant decrease in adult child employment that we estimate, we would have expected to 
see an increase in informal care; however, what we observe is a marginally significant decrease 
for women.  One possible explanation is that employment is falling overall and for men during 
recessions, but may increase for women due to an added-worker effect.  In order to test this, we 
separately estimate the effect of county unemployment on adult child employment in four 
separate categories: (1) number of single sons employed full time, (2) number of married sons 
employed full time, (3) number of single daughters employed full time, and (4) number of 
married daughters employed full time. However, as Table 1.13 shows, none of the estimates for 
these categories are statistically significant. 
 Lastly, we estimate several additional specifications to parallel those discussed earlier in 
the national analysis. Unlike earlier, we find no significant results when stratifying the sample by 
respondent health status (measured using presence of ADL limitations, presence of IADL 
limitations and self-reported fair/poor health status). These results are note presented below 
solely for brevity.  
6. Conclusion  
 Given the dramatic aging of the population that is taking place in the U.S. and many other 
countries, ensuring adequate provision of long-term care is likely to be a challenge in the future.  
Therefore, it is critical to understand the factors that affect both the supply of and demand for 
care, including economic ones.  The goal of this study has been to document changes in 
utilization of nursing home care, formal home care and informal home care during the 1998 to 
2012 period, with a particular focus on understanding how the Great Recession of 2007-2009 
directly and indirectly affected both the demand for and supply of different forms of care.    
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 Based upon an analysis of national time trends in care utilization using data from the 
HRS (original, AHEAD and CODA cohorts), we find that the utilization of any care significantly 
decreases with an increase in unemployment.  The reductions in care associated with higher 
unemployment are driven by changes in home care, with a 1 point increase in the unemployment 
rate significantly associated with a 1.9 percent reduction in the likelihood of using any home care 
and, even further, a 1.3 percent reduction in the likelihood of using informal home care. A 1 
point increase in the unemployment rate is also significantly associated with an increase in the 
respondents’ number of caregivers and a decrease in the total amount of care the respondent 
receives by roughly 5 hours each month. Additional regressions find that respondents’ health 
status generally increases with unemployment, possibly explaining some part of the decrease in 
utilization as a demand-side effect. Significant decreases in wealth are also a likely explanation 
for lower rates of nursing home care.  
 When we estimate models that are identified by within-county and over time variation in 
county-level unemployment, there are also significant reductions in utilization of long term care 
associated with higher unemployment, but only for women; specifically, a 1 point increase in the 
unemployment rate is associated with a 1.5 percent decrease in a female respondent’s likelihood 
of using any home care.  Descriptively, there are a number of differences in utilization of long-
term care between men and women, but to our knowledge there is no literature that suggests that 
women respond differently to changes in prices and income compared to men. However, there is 
some reason for believing that women might be more strongly affected by economic conditions 
than men; because of the difference in life expectancy, women are less likely to receive care 
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Table 1.1 National HRS Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Receiving Any Long-Term Care 98,619 0.16 0.36 
Living in a Nursing Home 98,619 0.03 0.16 
Receiving Any In-Home Care 98,619 0.13 0.34 
 
Receiving Any Formal Home Care 













Age 98,619 70.98 9.77 
Female 98,619 0.60 0.49 
Married 98,619 0.60 0.49 
Partnered 98,619 0.03 0.16 
No high school 98,619 0.29 0.46 
High school graduate 98,619 0.53 0.50 
College graduate 98,619 0.18 0.38 
White 98,619 0.83 0.38 
Black 98,619 0.14 0.34 
Other race 98,619 0.04 0.19 
Latino/Hispanic 98,619 0.08 0.27 
Real income 98,619  $ 61,289       233,456  
Real total assets 98,619  $512,767     1,457,884  
Fair/Poor Health Status 98,619 0.31 0.46 
Children (total) 98,619 3.54 2.14 
With child within 10 miles 98,619 0.54 0.50 
    
National Unemployment Rate 98,619 5.45 1.45 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 

















Table 1.2 National HRS Sample Descriptive Statistics for Assets (in $1,000s) 








      
Real Total Assets 512.77 1457.88 55.33 200.72 529.32 
      
Net Value of Primary Residence 145.54 353.14 14.09 91.56 185.05 
Net Value of Secondary Residence 20.6 117.89 0 0 0 
Net Value of Additional Real Estate 54.31 407.08 0 0 0 
Net Value of All Vehicles 16.7 55.31 1.41 9.11 21.33 
Net Value of Business Assets 46.52 579.61 0 0 0 
Net Value of IRA Accounts 65.76 315.88 0 0 36.85 
Net Value of Stocks and Mutual 
Funds 84.56 512.74 0 0 11.39 
Total Value of Checking and Savings 
Accounts 33.32 230.98 0.57 6.32 26.67 
Total Value of CDs and Government 
Savings Bonds 20.32 96.94 0 0 0.38 
Net Value of Bonds and Bond Funds 13.41 122.24 0 0 0 
Net Value of All Other Savings 15.08 389.24 0 0 0 
      
Value of All Other Debt 3.34 27.16 0 0 0 
      
N = 98,619      
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 






Table 1.3 National Sample Variable Means, by Year 
  1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
         
Living in Nursing Home  2.15 2.06 2.93 2.63 2.25 3.44 3.85 4.33 
Receiving Formal Care 2.69 2.46 4.61 4.37 4.60 5.93 7.25 8.14 
Receiving Informal Care 8.54 12.34 13.79 13.78 14.68 16.36 19.40 19.52 
                  
Age 68.36 68.81 70.13 71.20 72.49 73.87 75.30 76.41 
Female 58.81 59.24 59.85 60.19 60.57 61.21 61.68 62.25 
Married 62.92 65.46 60.96 60.23 58.78 56.40 54.56 52.54 
College graduate 16.30 17.17 17.68 17.70 18.18 18.37 18.82 19.36 
Non-white 17.22 17.15 17.21 17.20 16.96 17.50 17.63 17.59 
Real income ($1,000) 64.28 63.92 61.59 61.57 58.10 62.36 52.11 45.27 
Real total assets ($1,000) 452.39 478.62 483.62 548.93 607.57 552.92 491.78 462.44 
Fair/Poor Health Status 32.77 28.90 29.76 31.15 31.35 32.69 30.44 31.92 
With child within 10 miles 54.66 53.51 54.35 55.02 53.76 54.01 54.76 54.02 































Use of Any 
Informal 
Home Care 
      
Unemployment Rate -0.0024*** 0.0001 -0.0025*** 0.0006 -0.0019** 
 (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
Age -0.0380*** -0.0209*** -0.0171*** -0.0303*** -0.0255*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0027) 
Age squared 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Female 0.0224 0.0198 0.0026 0.0803* -0.0174 
 (0.0691) (0.0658) (0.0947) (0.0441) (0.0764) 
Married 0.0041 -0.0122*** 0.0163*** -0.0159*** 0.0122*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0025) (0.0045) (0.0031) (0.0042) 
Not High School Graduate 0.0001 0.0031 -0.0031 0.0158*** 0.0042 
 (0.0227) (0.0061) (0.0232) (0.0058) (0.0228) 
College Graduate 0.0175 -0.0070 0.0245 0.0071 0.0207 














































































































































































































































































      
N 98,619 98,619 98,619 98,619 98,619 
R-squared 0.6916 0.5688 0.6102 0.5766 0.6474 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 1998 through 2012.   















   
Use of Any Long-Term  -0.0021** -0.0029** 
Care (0.0011) (0.0013) 
   
Lives in a Nursing Home 0.0003 -0.0001 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
   
Use of Any Home Care -0.0024** -0.0028** 
 (0.0011) (0.0014) 
   
Use of Formal Home Care 0.0018** -0.0012 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) 
   
Use Informal Home Care -0.0015 -0.0026* 
 (0.0011) (0.0013) 
   
N 59,260 39,359 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 
1998 through 2012.   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Demographic controls: age, female, married, 
other partnered, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, number of sons, number of daughters and number of 
stepchildren. Health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, 
































    
Number of Total Caregivers 0.0310*** 0.0384*** 0.0150 
 (0.0112) (0.0136) (0.0193) 
    
Number of Paid Caregivers 0.0114** 0.0179** -0.0018 
 (0.0057) (0.0070) (0.0097) 
    
Number of Unpaid Caregivers 0.0196* 0.0205 0.0168 
 (0.0108) (0.0131) (0.0189) 
    
Total Hours of Care -5.6858** -4.8947* -7.1048 
 (2.3223) (2.6714) (4.6732) 
    
Total Paid Hours of Care -1.5748 -1.2172 -1.9353 
 (1.1494) (1.4654) (1.7343) 
    
Total Unpaid Hours of Care -4.1110* -3.6775 -5.1695 
 (2.1535) (2.4482) (4.4226) 
    
N 15,293 10,127 5,166 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 
1998 through 2012.   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Demographic controls: age, female, married, 
other partnered, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, number of sons, number of daughters and number of 
stepchildren. Health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, 













Real Income ($1,000) -1.6845 -0.4198 -3.6623 
 (1.1977) (0.3919) (3.0188) 
    
Real Assets ($1,000) -27.0213*** -23.3769*** -32.6679*** 
 (2.8737) (3.4193) (5.1561) 
    
Fair/Poor Health -0.0045*** -0.0051*** -0.0034* 
 (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0018) 
    
Number of ADLs -0.0070 -0.0157** 0.0059 
 (0.0054) (0.0067) (0.0092) 
    
Number of IADLs 0.0068** 0.0063* 0.0080* 
 (0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0044) 
    
Number of Children  -0.0541*** -0.0570*** -0.0500*** 
Employed FT (0.0047) (0.0056) (0.0077) 
    
Number of Married  -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0012 
Daughters Employed FT (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0015) 
    
Number of Single -0.0022*** -0.0016 -0.0032*** 
Daughters Employed FT (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
    
Number of Married  -0.0031*** -0.0037*** -0.0021 
Sons Employed FT (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0016) 
    
Number of Single  -0.0025*** -0.0025** -0.0024* 
Sons Employed FT (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0013) 
    
Live with Adult Child 0.0012 0.0008 0.0016 
 (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0015) 
    
Living within 10 miles of a  0.0018* 0.0020 0.0013 
Child (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0016) 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 
1998 through 2012.   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Demographic controls: age, female, married, 
other partnered, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, number of sons, number of daughters and number of 
stepchildren. All models contain individual fixed effects. 
44 
 








   
Use of Any Long-Term  0.0003 -0.0034*** 
Care (0.0008) (0.0012) 
   
Lives in a Nursing Home 0.0004 -0.0000 
 (0.0003) (0.0006) 
   
Use of Any Home Care -0.0001 -0.0034*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0012) 
   
Use of Formal Home Care 0.0004 0.0007 
 (0.0003) (0.0008) 
   
Use Informal Home Care -0.0002 -0.0025** 
 (0.0007) (0.0012) 
   
N 28,796 21,5996 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 
1998 through 2012.   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Demographic controls: age, female, married, 
other partnered, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, number of sons, number of daughters and number of 
stepchildren. Health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, 






















Table 1.9 Estimates of National Unemployment Rate Effects on LTC Utilization, Logit 









    
Use of Any Long-Term  0.9668** 0.9673 0.9743 
Care (0.0157) (0.0202) (0.0257) 
    
Lives in a Nursing Home 1.0787** 1.0565 1.1176* 
 (0.0372) (0.0454) (0.0667) 
    
Use of Any Home Care 0.9572*** 0.9612** 0.9492** 
 (0.0136) (0.0171) (0.0226) 
    
Use of Formal Home Care 1.0690** 1.0952*** 1.0022 
 (0.0293) (0.0349) (0.0548) 
    
Use Informal Home Care 0.9705** 0.9731 0.9651 
 (0.0147) (0.0185) (0.0244) 
    
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 
1998 through 2012.   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Demographic controls: age, female, married, 
other partnered, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, number of sons, number of daughters and number of 
stepchildren. Health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, 





































Use of Any 
Informal 
Home Care 
Unemployment Rate -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0008 
 (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
Age -0.0102*** -0.0081*** -0.0074*** -0.0020 0.0092*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
Age squared 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.000) 
Female 0.0107*** 0.0004 0.0105*** 0.0098*** 0.0066*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0012) 
Married 0.0161*** -0.0121*** 0.0194*** 0.0318*** -0.0178*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0028) (0.022) (0.0019) 
Not High School Graduate 0.0184*** -0.0003 0.0183*** 0.0180*** -0.0062*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0023) 
College Graduate -0.0047* -0.0004** 0.0183*** 0.0180*** -0.0062*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0002) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0023) 
# ADL Limitations 0.2130*** 0.0290*** 0.2143*** 0.2099*** 0.0570*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0022) 
# IADL Limitations 0.2130*** 0.0302*** 0.0730*** 0.0166*** 0.0033*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0022) 
Diabetes 0.0021 0.0015 0.0201*** 0.0167*** 0.0039* 
 (0.0036) (0.0016) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0020) 
Cancer 0.0091*** -0.0041** 0.0086*** 0.0084** -0.0018 
 (0.0033) (0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0020) 
Heart Condition 0.0182*** -0.0045*** 0.0180*** -0.0188*** -0.0019 








Table 1.10 (Continued) 
Stroke 0.0299*** -0.0019 0.0277*** 0.0257*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0041) (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0046) 
Arthritis 0.0144*** -0.0081*** 0.0142*** 0.0146*** -0.0079*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0014) 
Incontinence -0.0024 0.0044*** -0.0021 -0.0017 0.0027 
 (0.0029) (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.00320 (0.0020) 
Memory Disease -0.0908*** 0.1372*** -0.1001*** -0.1131*** 0.0720*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0100) (0.0110) (0.0127) (0.0104) 
Poor Health 0.0576*** -0.0138*** 0.0580*** 0.0597*** -0.0144*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0019) 
# Sons 0.0016 -0.0013*** 0.0020** 0.0026*** -0.0012** 
 (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0005) 
# Daughters 0.0025*** -0.0022*** 0.0029*** 0.0039*** -0.0014** 
 (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0001) 
# Stepchildren -0.0007 0.0012** -0.0011 -0.0019* 0.0008 
 (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0005) 
County %>65 -0.1918 -0.3642 -0.1989 -0.0899 -0.2387 
 (0.1924) (0.1369) (0.1983) (0.2236) (0.1489) 
Count %<15 0.1376 -0.1747 0.2325 0.3029 -0.1593 
 (0.2549) (0.1497) (0.2361) (0.2325) (0.1808) 
County % Black 0.1973 0.1823** 0.1262 0.0078 0.0734 
 (0.1399) (0.0862) (0.1213) (0.1222) (0.1020) 
County % Hispanic -0.2378** -0.0769 -0.2281** -0.1468 -0.1284 
 (0.1097) (0.0613) (0.1094) (0.1120) (0.0826) 
County Population -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
N 75,299 75,299 75,299 75,299 75,299 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 1998 through 2012.   













   
Use of Any Long-Term  -0.0028** -0.0017 
Care (0.0012) (0.0017) 
   
Lives in a Nursing Home -0.0011 -0.0006 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) 
   
Use of Any Home Care -0.0025** -0.0011 
 (0.0011) (0.0017) 
   
Use of Formal Home Care -0.0014 0.0027 
 (0.0009) (0.0079) 
   
Use Informal Home Care -0.0017 0.0014 
 (0.0010) (0.0017) 
   
N 29,868 45,431 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 
1998 through 2012.   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Demographic controls: age, female, married, 
other partnered, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, number of sons, number of daughters and number of 
stepchildren. Health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, 
































    
Number of Total Caregivers 0.0001 0.0112 -0.0041 
 (0.0077) (0.0123) (0.0114) 
    
Number of Paid Caregivers -0.0015 0.0028 0.0031 
 (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
    
Number of Unpaid Caregivers 0.0017 0.0083 -0.0006 
 (0.0072) (0.0113) (0.0108) 
    
Total Hours of Care 0.7414 3.3874 -1.2341 
 (2.5273) (3.6640) (3.0538) 
    
Total Paid Hours of Care -1.9167 1.0647 -3.1577* 
 (1.2888) (1.2849) (1.6316) 
    
Total Unpaid Hours of Care 2.6582 2.3227 1.9236 
 (2.2416) (3.6015) (2.6389) 
    
N 11,900 4,148 7,752 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 
1998 through 2012.  Sample only includes individuals are report care utilization. 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Demographic controls: age, female, married, 
other partnered, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, number of sons, number of daughters and number of 
stepchildren. Health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, 






















    
Real Income ($1,000) -1781.44 124.08 -4924.49 
 (1329.43) (459.66) (3443.70) 
    
Real Assets ($1,000) -17292.94*** -13461.21** -24318.85*** 
 (5963.08) (5278.91) (8562.98) 
    
Fair/Poor Health -0.0003 -0.0009 0.0014 
 (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0026) 
    
Number of ADLs 0.0053 0.0077 0.0039 
 (0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0064) 
    
Number of IADLs -0.0044 -0.0006 -0.0086 
 (0.0041) (0.0055) (0.0058) 
    
Number of Children  -0.0224*** -0.0220*** -0.0230*** 
Employed FT 
 
(0.0055) (0.0079) (0.0053) 
Number of Married -0.0010 0.0012 -0.0024 
Daughters Employed FT (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0019) 
    
Number of Single -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0014 
Daughters Employed FT (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0017) 
    
Number of Married  -0.0016 -0.0024 -0.0009 
Sons Employed FT (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0019) 
    
Number of Single  -0.0009 -0.0031 0.0009 
Sons Employed FT (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0015) 
    
Live with Adult Child 0.0029 0.0028 0.0033 
 (0.0063) (0.0028) (0.0030) 
    
Living within 10 miles of a  0.0029 0.0042 -0.0002 
Child (0.0063) (0.0072) (0.0067) 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 
1998 through 2012.  Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Demographic controls: 
age, female, married, other partnered, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, number of sons, number of daughters and 
number of stepchildren. All models contain individual fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 1.1 Distribution of HRS Surveys by Month for 1998-2012 Waves 
 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Jan 105 1 198 97 144 189 1,249 222 
Feb 2,068 1,239 77 735 8 25 612 184 
Mar 3,098 3,810 0 1,331 1,830 1,850 626 103 
Apr 3,450 2,691 1,818 1,349 2,231 2,138 894 201 
May 2,813 2,668 2,989 2,269 2,034 2,005 613 2,171 
Jun 2,370 2,352 2,542 2,853 1,907 1,642 525 1,925 
Jul 1,677 1,514 2,644 2,084 1,422 1,394 406 1,686 
Aug 1,123 1,311 1,846 1,558 989 1,061 467 1,264 
Sep 701 565 1,531 829 774 672 565 642 
Oct 719 449 1,044 544 711 513 929 511 
Nov 379 131 530 242 389 293 1,860 328 
Dec 228 1 211 152 227 182 1,755 272 






































Appendix Table 1.2 County HRS Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 
% Using Any Long-Term Care 75,229 16.32 39.96 
% Living in Nursing Home 75,229 2.20 14.67 
% Using Any Home Care 75,229 15.81 36.49 
% Using Formal Home Care 75,229 4.25 20.17 
% Using Informal Home Care 75,229 14.53 35.24 
County Unemployment Rate 75,229 5.95 2.46 
Age 75,229 71.49 9.43 
% Female 75,229 60.33 48.92 
% Married 75,229 61.63 48.62 
% No high school 75,229 28.36 45.07 
% College graduate 75,229 17.67 38.14 
% Black 75,229 13.49 34.17 
% Hispanic 75,229 8.20 27.44 
Number of ADLs 75,229 0.39 1.00 
Number of IADLs 75,229 0.36 0.99 
% with Diabetes 75,229 20.35 40.26 
% with Cancer 75,229 15.81 36.48 
% with Heart Condition 75,229 28.14 44.97 
% with Stroke 75,229 7.96 27.07 
% with Arthritis 75,229 64.78 47.76 
% with Incontinence 75,229 23.38 42.32 
% with Memory Condition 75,229 3.44 18.23 
% Fair/Poor Health Status 75,229 30.20 45.91 
Number of Sons 75,229 1.86 1.45 
Number of Daughters 75,229 1.82 1.47 
Number of Stepchildren 75,229 0.53 1.30 
Real Income 75,229 $60,861.32 244,046.40 
Real Wealth 75,229 $522,806.30 $1,275,776 
County %>65 75,229 13.27 3.81 
County %<15 75,229 20.45 2.81 
County %Black 75,229 13.18 13.09 
County %Hispanic 75,229 14.18 17.49 
County Population 75,229 867,493 1,554,345 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of original HRS, AHEAD and CODA cohorts for the years 
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 The over-65 population in the United States is expected to more than double by 2060 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2012) and 70 percent of these individuals are expected to eventually require 
some form of long-term care (DHHS 2014). Therefore, the demand for services that assist 
individuals who have difficult with activities of daily living (e.g. dressing, bathing, toileting) and 
instrumental activities of daily living (e.g. buying groceries, using the phone, preparing meals) is 
expected to significantly increase in the near future. The severity of these difficulties, along with 
income, wealth and proximity to family, are some of the major determinants of whether an 
individual uses residential nursing home care, paid in-home care or unpaid in-home care (Van 
Houtven and Norton 2004, Charles and Sevak 2005, De Meijer et al. 2009). Although private 
insurance coverage for long term care is relatively rare, roughly a third of elderly Medicaid 
beneficiaries use long-term care services, with roughly half of those beneficiaries using nursing 
home care (KFF 2011).  In this paper I look at the effect of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
(DRA), which made it harder for individuals to transfer away their assets in order to qualify for 
Medicaid, on the utilization of both nursing home care
20
 and in-home care. 
 Between 1995 and 2005, Medicaid spending on long-term care increased by roughly 
6.6 percent each year, with the growth in spending on nursing home care for the elderly (5.7 
percent each year) significantly driving this increase (Eiken 2014). To try and reduce this growth 
in spending, Congress tightened the rules regarding Medicaid eligibility as part of the DRA in 
order to force those with significant assets to finance more of their own long-term care. Prior to 
its implementation, individuals could transfer their assets to relatives in order to reach Medicaid 
                                                          
20
 In the ensuing analysis and discussion, ‘nursing home use’ may potentially include the use of assisted living 
facilities as well. Specifically, the survey question from which this measure is created asks if the respondent 
currently resides in either a nursing home or other health care facility that provides the following services: 
dispensing of medication, 24-hour nursing assistance and supervision, personal assistance, and room & meals. 
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eligibility and wait out any penalty period of delayed coverage with relative ease. The 2005 DRA 
made it more difficult for individuals to become eligible for nursing home coverage under 
Medicaid using this particular form of “spend down” by effectively preventing them from being 
able to wait out any penalty period. Under these DRA rules, individuals were expected to fully 
spend down their assets on their nursing home care before becoming Medicaid eligible, thereby 
reducing overall Medicaid spending. This decrease in spending was expected to be significant -- 
approximately $6.4 billion over the 10 years following its implementation (KFF 2006)
21
.  
 While two studies have examined the effect of this policy on transfer behavior, none 
have looked at the impact on long-term care utilization.  Baird, Hurd and Rohwedder (2015) find 
that elderly singles/couples who expect to require nursing home care within 5 years are 
significantly less likely to transfer assets to their children following the implementation of the 
DRA in February of 2006. They also find that individuals continue to spend down their assets, 
albeit through other means such as charitable donations. In contrast, Ayyagari and He (2015) 
find that elderly couples with high expectations of nursing home use reduce their assets by 
roughly $139,000, with the majority of this reduction likely caused by increased transfers; they 
argue that, based on the specific changes implemented by the DRA, individuals now have a 
greater incentive to make transfers as soon as possible in order to avoid future penalties.  
 This study expands the literature on the DRA by looking at how it impacts the decision 
to hold assets in trusts, in addition to the decision to make transfers, and how it may in turn affect 
utilization of the different types of long-term care. I look at trusts in particular because, like 
direct asset transfers, they can also be used to bequeath assets to others; however, unlike direct 
transfers, trusts are not explicitly impacted by the DRA, meaning that analyzing them will 
                                                          
21
 In addition, these new limits were expected to temporarily postpone Medicaid payments for roughly 15% of new 
nursing home beneficiaries each year through 2015. 
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provide additional insight into how individual behavior concerning intergenerational transfers 
changed with the enactment of this policy. In addition, the DRA may impact care utilization 
through several possible mechanisms. For example, if those who need care are denied coverage 
because of these stricter policies, they may not be able to afford nursing home care out of pocket 
and may be forced to use other types of care instead. In addition, the DRA may reduce the 
availability of informal care if elderly parents use these transfers to compensate their otherwise 
unpaid caregivers, as Norton et al. (2014) find. If this is true, the decrease in transfers resulting 
from the DRA may cause some unpaid caregivers to reduce their supply of care. In sum, by 
changing financial incentives related to Medicaid eligibility the DRA has the potential to impact 
the utilization of all types of long-term care.  
2. Spend Down and the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
 Institutional long-term care (more commonly referred to as nursing home care) 
represents a significant cost
22
 that few individuals are privately insured against (KFF 2015). In 
2013, roughly 29% of all nursing home expenses were paid for out-of-pocket, 8% by private 
insurance, 22% by Medicare and 30% by Medicaid (CMS 2013). Although there is a market for 
private long-term care insurance, few individuals purchase it due to high premiums resulting 
from adverse selection (Brown and Finkelstein 2007). Medicare only covers post-acute care 
stays for up to 100 days, but Medicaid covers all nursing home costs as long as the individual has 
sufficiently low assets in order to be eligible for coverage. Although Medicaid eligibility also 
depends on health status and income, eligibility for most elderly individuals is often determined 
by assets since they already likely have relatively low fixed incomes and sufficient health 
limitations if in need of nursing home care.  
                                                          
22
 As of 2016, the annual median price for a semi-private room in a nursing home is $82,125 while the price of a 
private room is $92,378 (Genworth 2016). 
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 To become eligible for Medicaid, a single individual can have no more than $2,000 in 
countable assets, while a married individual may have no more than $121,220 in countable assets 
as of 2015
23. However, assets such as one’s primary residence, vehicle, clothing, furniture, 
jewelry and other personal possessions are exempt from Medicaid asset rules and do not need to 
be spent down
24
. Because of this, converting countable assets into one or more of these exempt 
forms effectively serves as one way through which individuals can spend down their assets and 
reach Medicaid eligibility; in addition, as opposed to simply spending these assets on long-term 
care or other types of consumption, converting them into exempt assets may allow one to 
bequeath more wealth to relatives and friends than they otherwise would have been able to 
bequeath.  
 Another relatively straightforward way to spend down assets while bequeathing wealth 
to others is to simply give them to family or friends through inter-vivos transfers (i.e. transfers 
“among the living”) (Hurd 2009). Although Medicaid had policies in place prior to 2006 to 
prevent individuals from gaining coverage via such transfers, it was still possible to do so under 
certain conditions and avoid being penalized. Specifically, prior to 2006, a transfer was only 
subject to penalty if it was either given away or sold for less than market value within the 3-year 
“look back” period immediately prior to Medicaid application25,26. The penalty for such a 
                                                          
23
 While someone entering a nursing home as a Medicaid patient is allowed to keep $2,000 of assets, his/her spouse 
is allowed to keep an amount of assets referred to as the Community Spouse Resource Allocation (CSRA). Though 
the amount of the CSRA differs by states, most states have a minimum CSRA of $23,844 (in 2015) and allow the 
spouse to keep half of the couple’s combined assets up to $119,220 (again in 2015). Together they must spend down 
to $121,220 in assets, though they must spend down their assets to $3,000 if both individuals require nursing home 
care (which is uncommon). 
 
24
 Additional exempt assets include prepaid funeral plans, small life insurance policies and “inaccessible assets” 
such as irrevocable trusts and immediate annuities. 
 
25
 Transfers of any kind are not subject to penalty if made either to a spouse (since all assets are combined when 




transfer was that the applicant was denied benefits for the number of months of nursing home 
care that the transfer would have paid for, calculated by dividing the amount of the transfer by 
the average monthly out-of-pocket cost for nursing home care in the applicant’s state. This 
penalty period began on the date of the transfer, meaning that an individual could potentially 
wait out the penalty period before applying for Medicaid and receive full benefits immediately 
upon entering the nursing home. 
 For example, if a 75-year old unmarried man transferred the $20,000 he held in excess 
of the Medicaid asset threshold to his children on January 1 and lived in a state where the 
average monthly cost of nursing home care was $5,000, he would be ineligible to receive 
Medicaid for four months (e.g. $20,000/$5,000 = 4), or until May 1. Regardless of when he 
actually entered a nursing home, Medicaid would only start paying for care on May 1. He would 
be denied Medicaid coverage for the full four-month period if he entered the nursing home on 
January 1 but for only one month if he entered on April 1 (having already served 3 months of the 
penalty outside of the nursing home)
27
. In addition, if he was not ready to enter the nursing home 
until three years after making this transfer, he would not be subject to any penalty since the 
transfer would have been made outside of the look back period. Although waiting out the penalty 
period is much easier than waiting for three years in this particular example, choosing to wait out 
the look-back period may have been a more viable option for those who make significant 
transfers and would have incurred substantial penalties. For these reasons, the pre-2006 policies 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
26
 These transfers are identified during the Medicaid application process, as all applicants are asked to explain any 
significant decrease in their assets over the previous three years and subsequently provide documentation for their 
explanation. If the applicant is found to have made an illegal transfer, he/she is subject to a penalty.   
 
27
 A popular spend down strategy, commonly referred to as the ‘half-a-loaf’ strategy, had the Medicaid applicant 
transfer away half of the assets he held in excess of the Medicaid threshold prior to entering a nursing home. The 
remaining half would exactly cover the nursing home costs during the subsequent penalty period, meaning that the 
applicant would have sufficiently low assets and be eligible for Medicaid exactly as the penalty period expired. In 
this way, he is able to earn Medicaid coverage and transfer half of his assets to others rather than spend all of these 
assets on nursing home care.   
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did not explicitly prevent individuals from making inter-vivos transfers but made it difficult for 
them to do so without facing penalties.   
 The 2005 DRA changed both the look-back period and the penalty period in order to 
make it more difficult to become eligible for Medicaid using inter-vivos transfers. First, the law 
increased the length of the look back period from three years to five years, meaning that all 
transfers made within the five years prior to Medicaid application are now subject to penalties. In 
addition, and arguably more importantly, the law changed the start date of the penalty period 
from the date of the transfer to the date when the individual is otherwise eligible to receive 
Medicaid long-term care benefits
28
. This particular change, in effect, prevents all Medicaid 
applicants from being able to wait out their respective penalty periods before receiving benefits. 
For example, suppose that the man described above makes the exact same transfer and spends 
down his remaining countable assets in order to become eligible for Medicaid coverage on May 
1. If he enters a nursing home on May 1 and this is before the enactment of the DRA, he would 
be eligible for immediate Medicaid benefits since he has already served his four month penalty 
period; however, if this occurs after the enactment of the DRA, he would be ineligible for 
benefits for the next four months (i.e. until September 1) since his penalty period would only 
have started on May 1 (as he is only now actually eligible for Medicaid).  
 Besides simply preventing individuals from waiting out their respective penalty 
periods, this change also makes the penalties more severe in that, by definition, these individuals 
have very few countable assets with which to pay for their care during this penalty; these 
                                                          
28
 Although it does not explicitly impact inter-vivos transfers, the DRA also made individuals ineligible to receive 
nursing home coverage under Medicaid if they had home equity in excess of a particular threshold. In 2015, states 
could choose a threshold between $552,000 and $828,000. Its intention was to force individuals to use some of their 
significant home equity (which could be reduced through reverse mortgages and/or downsizing) to finance their 
nursing home care, though this particular change did not apply for individuals who had either a spouse, child under 
the age of 21, blind or disabled child living in the house. 
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individuals may be forced to sell their exempt assets, which in turn reduces how much they are 
able to bequeath to others. Because it is no longer possible to wait out the penalty period, the 
only way to avoid a penalty is to apply for Medicaid at least five years after the transfer date so 
that this transfer exists outside of the look-back period. Given the difficulty of accurately 
predicting their need for long-term care within a five year window, individuals should be less 




 While these stricter law changes were designed to reduce inter-vivos transfers from 
future Medicaid applicants, they may have also unintentionally encouraged some individuals to 
transfer assets sooner than they otherwise would have. As mentioned earlier, the only way to 
avoid transfer penalties following the DRA would be to wait five years after making such a 
transfer before entering a nursing home; if individuals are confident that they will not need to 
enter a nursing home within the next five years, they now have an incentive to transfer assets 
immediately since these transfers will again occur outside of the look-back period (and in turn 
are not subject to penalties). If inter-vivos transfers are the only means of spend down, this policy 
will likely reduce the number of transfers made by those who expect to require nursing home 
care within the next five years while potentially increasing the number made by those who 
expect to need nursing home care in more than five years. However, if considering all other 
                                                          
29
 Since these same policies make the ‘half-a-loaf’ strategy discussed earlier no longer viable, they did give rise to 
the ‘reverse half-a-loaf’ strategy that has become relatively common since the DRA’s implementation. With this 
strategy, an individual transfers all excess assets away (most likely to a child), applies for Medicaid and immediately 
starts serving the penalty period; he then purchases an annuity or promissory note in which the transfer recipient 
gradually ‘returns’ part of the transfer by paying for the individual’s nursing home care. If the individual’s state 
allows ‘partial cures,’ in that they allow a partial return of the transfer to reduce the length of the penalty period, this 
repayment will continue to reduce the length of the penalty period as it is being served; eventually, after half of the 
transfer has been returned, the length of the penalty period will equal the amount of time that has already been 
served, and the individual will be able to start receiving Medicaid benefits while the recipient still has half of the 
original transfer. However, if states do not allow partial cures, this transfer repayment will not be effective since the 
penalty period will only begin once these new assets are spent down; in other words, repayment in such states 
reduced the length of the penalty period while also further delaying its start date. 
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forms of spend down, it is possible that both groups may simply substitute to these other forms 
that are now relatively less restricted than inter-vivos transfers
30
.  
 Finally, the DRA also introduced several other changes that were designed to reduce 
Medicaid spending by increasing the demand for private long-term care insurance. The first of 
these changes required applicants to have written proof of citizenship when applying for 
Medicaid. The second allowed states to adopt Long Term Care Partnership (LTCP) programs 
that would allow elderly individuals to keep more of their assets when spending down for 
Medicaid if they purchased private long term care insurance. Specifically, if individuals needed 
additional coverage beyond what their private insurance would provide, they would be able to 
keep a larger majority of their assets while spending down to reach Medicaid eligibility. With 
these LTCP programs increasing the purchase of private plans by 3 percent (Greenhalgh-Stanley 
2012), any change in care utilization resulting from the DRA may be caused by changes in 
private insurance coverage in addition to changes in inter-vivos transfers. 
3. Past Research 
 There are a variety of reasons why elderly individuals make inter-vivos transfers. Some 
may transfer assets altruistically in order to help relatives in need.  Alternately they could do so 
in exchange for someone’s time, companionship or provision of unpaid in-home care (i.e. 
informal home care). Finally, individuals may do so in an effort to reduce their total level of 
assets, as doing so could potentially help them to qualify for LTC coverage under Medicaid 
and/or reduce their future estate tax burden
31
. 
                                                          
30
 It is also possible that individuals may accumulate fewer assets in an effort to reduce their countable assets. 
However, when separately estimating the effects of the DRA on one’s likelihood of working and level of assets, the 
results are consistently insignificant.  
 
31McGarry (2013) finds that the amount of the estate tax’s maximum allowable, tax-free annual transfer exemption 
has no significant impact on inter-vivos transfers (both extensively and intensively). In addition, the strong majority 
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 It is also important to understand the impacts of the additional DRA policy changes that 
might also affect LTC utilization. As discussed in the previous section, these include the 
requirement of proof of citizenship during the Medicaid application process and the ability for 
states to adopt LTCP programs. The literatures concerning these different transfer motivations 
and DRA impacts are summarized below.  
3.1 Altruism and Exchange  
 Early research concerning the motivation for inter-vivos transfers examines whether 
individuals who make them are motivated by either altruism or exchange. Many empirical tests 
of altruism are motivated by Becker’s (1974) neutrality rule which states that a simultaneous unit 
increase in the parent’s income and unit decrease in the child’s income leads to a unit increase in 
the amount the parent transfers to the child. In other words, an altruistic parent will transfer any 
new income to his/her child in order to completely counteract reductions in the child’s income. 
When testing this rule empirically, both Cox and Rank (1992) and Altonji et al. (1997) find 
significant evidence that contradicts these assumptions, leading them to conclude that exchange 
for a child’s time is relatively more likely to motivate inter-vivos transfers than altruism.  
 Other researchers have examined the same question using different econometric 
techniques yet find similar results.  Cox and Rank (1992) and Alessie et al. (2014) both argue 
that it is possible to test altruism vs. exchange by looking solely at the partial effect of the 
transfer amount with respect to the child’s income,
𝑑𝑇
𝑑𝑌𝑘
, as the sign of this parameter will differ 
under altruism and exchange motives. For example, if the parent’s motive is altruism, this 
parameter should be negative since the child’s relative need for a transfer decreases as his/her 
income increases, all else equal. However, if exchange motivates transfers, the sign will be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of transfers made in this data are less than the annual exemption as well, meaning that they have neither gift nor 
estate tax implications. For these reasons, this potential motivation is not discussed in more detail in the paper. 
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positive because conditional upon receiving a transfer, children with greater incomes have 
greater opportunity costs of their time and will therefore require larger transfers to compensate 
for their time. When estimating this effect, these authors have found its value to be 0.055 (Cox 
and Rank 1992) and 0.019 (Alessie et al. 2014), with both parameters being statistically 
significant. Given that both estimates are found to be positive, both of these studies provide 
additional evidence of exchange being the primary motivation for transfers.   
 Additional research has examined the extent to which actual exchange, as opposed to 
the theoretical exchange discussed in the previous papers, explains why an elderly individual 
makes an inter-vivos transfer. For example, Norton et al. (2014) estimate how an exchange of a 
child’s time (measured through his/her provision of informal care) affects his/her likelihood of 
receiving a transfer from that parent along both the extensive and intensive margins. When using 
both mother fixed-effect and IV models, they find that the provision of providing informal care 
significantly increases the likelihood of a child receiving a financial transfer by 8.6 percentage 
points, though they do not find that it significantly affects the amount of the transfer. Norton and 
van Houtven (2006) get similar results, as children who provide care are significantly three times 
more likely to receive an inter-vivos transfer than their siblings who do not provide care. In 
addition, they find that care provision by one particular child does not significantly impact a 
parent’s expectation that her bequest will be divided equally, suggesting that informal care is 
more likely to be compensated through inter-vivos transfers rather than through increased 
bequests. 
 Because parents may use inter-vivos transfers to help compensate their children for the 
informal care they provide, researchers have examined the child’s decision to provide care and 
the role that expected transfers play in this process. For example, Brown (2006) finds evidence 
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that end-of-life bequests are significantly greater for those children who provided care or were 
expected to provide care. She also finds that even altruistic children take these bequests into 
consideration when deciding how much care to provide.  
 An arguably more important determinant of a child’s care provision than future transfers 
and bequests is her labor supply, as it directly affects the amount of care that she can provide and 
the opportunity cost of that care. For employed children, the opportunity cost of providing care 
to parents is higher, meaning that employment is likely to be associated with lower levels of care 
provision ceteris paribus; both Heitmueller (2007) and Henz (2006) find significant evidence of 
this, as well as evidence of an endogenous relationship between the decision to provide care and 
labor supply. While transfers would have to be relatively high in order to encourage a child to 
leave the labor market and provide care full time, this helps to explain why, descriptively, adult 
children who are out of the labor market are much more likely to provide long term care to their 
parents. Historically, women have been much more likely to provide care then men and this 
trend has changed over time as women began to work more and earn greater incomes 
(Carmichael and Charles 2003).  
 The DRA may affect a parent’s ability to make inter-vivos transfers and consequently 
discourage children from providing informal care. Therefore it may also have a positive impact 
on formal long-term care utilization. Specifically, the change in access to Medicaid that results 
from the DRA will likely change the affordability of nursing home care and may result in higher 
utilization of paid in-home care (i.e. formal home care), although this depends on whether 
recipients view these types of care as substitutes or not. When examining this question, 
Mentzakis et al. (2009) find that individuals tend to view informal care as a substitute for in-
home medical care and as a complement for formal home care. In addition, Mellor (2001) finds 
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that the availability of informal care does not significantly affect an individual’s purchase or 
expected purchase of private long-term care insurance, suggesting that individuals do not view 
informal care as a substitute for more formal types of care. Given these findings, it is unclear 
how the effective increase in the cost of nursing home care as a result of the DRA will directly 
impact the utilization of informal care, if it is affected at all. 
3.2 “Spend Down” Through Inter-Vivos Transfers 
 Individuals may also make inter-vivos transfers to reduce their level of assets and 
become eligible for Medicaid. Bassett (2007) shows that both the likelihood of making an inter-
vivos transfer and the transfer amount are generally positively related to expected need for 
nursing home care. This effect becomes negative at very high levels of certainty, however, 
suggesting that the Medicaid look-back period and penalty are effective at discouraging these 
individuals from making transfers. When examining this same behavior, Norton (1995) finds that 
elderly individuals pay for their own nursing home care for longer than their initial level of assets 
would suggest is possible. This causes him to infer that these individuals are “welfare averse” 
and likely receiving transfers from their children in order to avoid becoming eligible for 
Medicaid.  
 Two recent papers have used the implementation of the DRA to examine transfer 
behavior. Baird, Hurd and Rohwedder (2015) first develop a theoretical model to demonstrate 
why an individual would be willing to make an inter-vivos transfer in order to gain Medicaid 
eligibility. They model this decision as a dynamic process in which an individual maximizes 
both current and future utility by deciding what portion of assets to spend, transfer and save 
while considering current and future budget constraints, the odds of experiencing worsening 
health in the future and the costs of any transfer penalties. The authors then derive several 
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testable hypotheses from this model. One is that individuals should transfer more assets as their 
expectation of future nursing home use increases. The other is that this effect decreases as the 
level of assets increases (since these individuals would need to transfer more in order to become 
eligible for Medicaid) and after the passing of the DRA.  
 In their econometric analysis, the authors use data from waves 2 through 10 of the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which includes information about each individual’s self-
reported likelihood of needing nursing home care within 5 years, assets, income, and current 
Medicaid eligibility. Using a difference-in-difference model, the authors estimate the effect of 
the DRA by using those who must spend down assets in order to reach the Medicaid eligibility 
threshold as the treatment group. This model is used to estimate the effect on inter-vivos 
transfers, measured both in levels and logs, using both OLS and parent-fixed-effects regressions.   
 The results suggest that a marginal increase in the expected likelihood of future nursing 
home care (i.e. their likelihood increasing from 0% to 100%) significantly decreases the amount 
transfers for individuals with assets in excess of $250,000. This suggests that the incentive for 
these individuals to spend down is relatively small since they would have to spend down a 
significant number of assets in order to become eligible for Medicaid. These results also suggest 
that transfers increase following the DRA, contrary to their initial hypothesis, although this 
marginal effect is relatively small. As a sensitivity analysis, the authors also estimate the DRA’s 
effect on charitable donations, another possible form of spend down, using the same model 
specification and find results similar to those concerning transfers.  
 Ayyagari and He (2015) consider the same question and explore the possibility that the 
DRA has two distinct effects on using inter-vivos transfers as a form of spend-down. First, it may  
have a “deterrence effect” of discouraging those individuals who expect to need nursing home 
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care within five years from making transfers post-DRA while also potentially having an 
“acceleration effect” of encouraging those who expect to need nursing home care in more than 
five years to make more transfers post-DRA (in order to avoid future penalties). Using data from 
waves 4 through 10 of the HRS and a difference –in-difference model in which an indicator of 
risk of future nursing home use is interacted with a post-DRA indicator, the authors find that 
married individuals with a high risk of nursing home use reduce their countable assets by 
roughly $125,000 (and their total assets by $139,000) following the DRA, relative to those with a 
low risk of nursing home use. Single individuals are not significantly affected, likely due to their 
significantly lower asset threshold under Medicaid (and in turn, the need for greater spend down 
in order to become eligible for Medicaid). Additional results that use data from the Consumption 
and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) suggest that the DRA did not significantly affect 
consumption spending, leading the authors to conclude that the aforementioned reduction in 
assets is likely caused by increased transfers; this, in turn, leads them to conclude that the 
acceleration effect of the DRA is stronger than the intended deterrence effect.  
3.3 Other DRA Effects 
 It is also important to understand the changes in the 2005 DRA other than those 
concerning the look-back period and penalty period start date. To my knowledge, no existing 
research has examined all these additional provisions simultaneously, but several papers have 
examined specific changes. One of these additional changes was the requirement of proof of 
citizenship when applying for Medicaid, which Ross (2007) finds adversely affects Medicaid 
enrollment among all applicants regardless of citizenship status. Sommers (2010) looks at the 
same question using a difference-in-difference approach in which an indicator equaling 1 if the 
respondent’s state required documentation of citizenship prior to the DRA is interacted with a 
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post-DRA indicator, finding that only non-citizens are significantly adversely affected by this 
new requirement. With both of these studies focusing primarily on families with small children 
applying for Medicaid and not exclusively on the elderly, it is unclear whether this policy change 
would greatly impact elderly applicants and their use of long-term care. Regardless, this potential 
effect is not likely to impact the identification strategy in my analysis because although the non- 
citizen percentage of the U.S. elderly population increased from 2.5% to 3.4% between 1990 and 
2003 (Han et al. 2005), less than 0.3% of the elderly sample used in my analysis consists of non-
citizens. 
 The final provision of DRA 2005 allowed states to adopt Long-Term Care Partnership 
(LTCP) programs to incentivize individuals to purchase private long-term care insurance. 
Greenhalgh-Stanley (2012) investigates the effectiveness of these programs, which made 
participating individuals exempt from Medicaid spend-down rules should they need additional 
health care beyond what their private insurance covers. In other words, they could qualify for 
Medicaid coverage without having to spend down their assets to the asset limits
32
. If effective, 
these LTCP programs should help to reduce Medicaid spending by shifting some portion of LTC 
costs to private insurers. By exploiting within-state variation over time
33
, Greenhalgh-Stanley 
finds that the adoption of these programs led to a 3 percent increase in the purchase of private 
long-term insurance plans and between an 18 and 22 percent decrease in Medicaid utilization. 
However, given that her model only includes controls for individual demographics and state and 
year fixed-effects, it is possible that these results capture changes from other aspects of the DRA 
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 Most LTCP programs provide “dollar for dollar” coverage, in that for every dollar of coverage your private plan 
provides, you may keep one more dollar of assets that you otherwise would have spent down to qualify for 
Medicaid. For example, a single male who purchases a qualified plan that provides $100,000 in benefits would only 
have to spend his assets down to $102,000 rather than the aforementioned $2,000 limit.  
 
33
 Four states had LTCP programs in place in 1992, which were grandfathered in when LTCP programs were banned 
through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993). These same 4 programs were still in effect 
in 2006, with 27 states having them by 2008 and 34 by 2010. 
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beyond those caused only by the adoption of LTCP programs. Regardless of the magnitude of 
their effect, the adoption of LTCP programs may influence the DRA’s effect on transfers as 
purchasing private insurance will now reduce the amount of assets that individuals must spend 
down to become Medicaid eligible; in this way, purchasing private insurance may essentially 
serve as a substitute for making inter-vivos transfers.  
4. Data 
 The data used in this analysis come from the 1998 - 2010 waves of the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal, biennial panel study sponsored by the National Institute 
on Aging that follows a representative sample of Americans over the age of 50. The HRS is 
uniquely suited to the analysis of long term care utilization and funding because each respondent 
is asked questions on the number and amount of inter-vivos transfers they make, their utilization 
of different types of long-term care, their income, assets (split between real estate, personal 
possessions, financial assets and savings) and health insurance coverage. It also includes 
additional control variables such as health status, physical limitations, cognitive functioning, 
employment and family structure.  
 The initial sample of individuals used in the analysis consists of only those individuals 
age 65 and older as they are relatively more likely to require LTC and be affected by these 
particular changes of the DRA. In addition, these individuals also all have access to Medicare 
coverage, meaning that any findings will not be driven by individuals suddenly becoming 
eligible for Medicare. The sample also includes only those respondents who have children, as the 
questions about inter-vivos transfers specifically ask about those made to children. Due to these 
sample restrictions, as well as eliminating those individuals who are missing information about 
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their transfers and care utilization in the subsequent survey wave
34
, the final sample consists of 
52,674 person-wave observations. The unweighted summary statistics for this sample can be 
found in Table 2.1, along with those after stratifying the sample by their need to spend down to 
reach Medicaid eligibility. The unweighted summary statistics when stratifying by each 
individual’s date of interview can be found in Table 2.2, with transfers becoming less common 
and both trusts and care use becoming more common following the DRA. Lastly, given how the 
ensuing analysis examines how individuals hold their assets, Table 2.3 shows the unweighted 
full sample means of the different types of assets measured in the HRS as well as how these 
means change across sample waves; overall, the mean values for both exempt and non-exempt 
assets increase until 2006 before decreasing in both 2008 and 2010 (likely due to the Financial 
Crisis). 
5. Methodology 
5.1 Effect of DRA on Transfers 
 The effect of the DRA is estimated using variation in household assets over time and 
the implementation of the law in 2006 in a difference-in-difference framework. The estimating 
equation is as follows: 
     𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−2 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2 +  𝛽𝐼𝑖 +  𝜀 (1) 
where Y is either the likelihood of making an inter-vivos transfer between years t-2 and t or the 
likelihood of holding assets in trusts in year t. As discussed earlier, this latter measure represents 
a different way for elderly individuals to spend down their assets while remaining Medicaid 
eligible. However, for trusts to be exempt from Medicaid spend down rules, they must be 
irrevocable in that they cannot be altered after being created. If the trust is revocable and can be 
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 As will be discussed shortly, all dependent variables come from the subsequent survey wave. Roughly 17,000 
observations were missing this information and dropped from the sample. 
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altered, the assets it contains are still countable under Medicaid and transfers into such trusts are 
ineffective ways to spend down one’s assets. To account for this, I also use this model to 
separately estimate the likelihood that the respondent holds assets in revocable trusts and 
irrevocable trusts.  
 Post equals 1 if the individual is interviewed after the DRA’s implementation (i.e. 
February of 2006) and 0 if interviewed before. Assets equals 1 for those individuals who 
currently hold non-exempt assets in excess of those allowed under Medicaid ($2,000 for single 
individuals, $2,000 plus that year’s maximum CSRA for married individuals)35,36 and 0 for those 
who do not need to spend down their assets to become eligible (i.e. the control group). The 
coefficient on the interaction of these two variables estimates the overall effect of the DRA. The 
unweighted summary statistics for both the treatment and control group subsamples can also be 
found in Table 2.1. 
 While the above model estimates the overall change in transfer behavior, it does not 
test whether this effect differs across individuals; given that the extent to which an individual is 
impacted by the DRA strongly depends on his amount of non-exempt assets and expected use of 
long-term care, it is highly unlikely that this effect is the same for all individuals. I first examine 
how this effect changes with one’s level of non-exempt assets by separating the initial treatment 
group into four separate asset groups and estimating a similar difference-in-difference model as 
seen in Equation 1. Controlling for the difference in expectations regarding future long-term care 
use is less straightforward but equally important since the response to the DRA’s implementation 
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 The CSRA initially ranged between $12,000 and $60,000, with both the minimum and maximum values starting 
to adjust for inflation in 1990. As of 2015, the CSRA ranged between $23,844 and $119,220. 
 
36
 The maximum CSRA is used to control for variation in the CSRA across states, as states may choose the level of 
the minimum CSRA (but cannot choose an amount lower than $23,844 (in 2015)) but must use the same maximum 
value. While individuals may actually have to spend down to a lower limit, this measure accurately captures all 
individuals who need to engage in spend down. 
72 
 
may change significantly if a person expects to need care during the next five years. One way to 
try to separate these individuals would be to use the questions that HRS asks about expected use 
of nursing home care, although this self-reported measure is likely to be endogenous with future 
use of both formal and informal home care since it is likely to be influenced by the expected 
availability of said care. Instead, I stratify the sample based on whether or not individuals 
suffered from adverse health when initially interviewed, measured using whether or not the 
individual had any limitations with either ADLs or IADLs. These conditions are likely to 
necessitate long-term care in the near future, and may, in turn, cause individuals to react 
differently to the implementation of the DRA. In addition, I stratify the sample by age cohort to 
estimate how the timing of the DRA’s implementation affects individuals, as its impact will 
certainly differ depending on the individual’s age in February of 2006. Lastly, I also stratify by 
gender and marital status to try and estimate this effect since women may be more likely to need 
nursing home care given their expected greater longevity than men while single individuals 
should similarly be more likely to use nursing home care than those in couples given that they 
inherently have fewer potential caregivers. The results from these particular stratifications can be 
found in the Appendix. 
  The model also includes individual fixed effects to control for time-invariant 
individual and household characteristics as well as year fixed effects to control for variation over 
time within each individual (such as changes in the macroeconomy like the Great Recession). All 
standard errors are clustered at the household level. Each model also includes the following set 
of control variables: log values of exempt and non-exempt assets
37
 under Medicaid, log of 
                                                          
37
 Although it may be correlated with the Assets variable, each individual’s level of exempt assets is included to 
control for the amount of spend down the individual would have to engage in, not simply whether they need to 
spend down assets or not. Specifically, this continuous measure of assets allows for a more accurate estimation of 
how changes in wealth may affect the behavior within both the treatment and control groups. 
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household income, respondent age, age squared, number of children (which may change over 
time as it includes biological children, step-children and children-in-law) and child proximity. 
All monetary variables used in these analyses have been converted to 2012 dollars using the CPI. 
In addition, it is important to note that all dependent variables are taken from the subsequent 
survey wave, or that all independent variables are lagged by one wave. Given that the survey 
questions concerning transfers ask about those made since the previous interview, this model 
estimates how current expectations, assets, and health status influence the likelihood of making a 
transfer during the two years before the next interview.  
5.2 Effect of DRA on Care Utilization – Reduced Form 
 Given that the DRA is likely to affect how an individual chooses to spend down her 
assets in order to qualify for Medicaid coverage, it is possible that the individual’s use of long-
term care may change as well. I estimate a reduced-form model of utilization using discrete 
measures of the different types of LTC -- nursing home care, formal home care and informal 
home care -- in year t as the dependent variables. These models also include additional health 
variables to control for each individual’s demand for LTC, such as the number of limitations 
with Activities of Daily Living and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living
38
, self-reported poor 
health and several dichotomous variables indicating whether the individual has any history of 
specific health conditions (e.g. cancer, stroke, heart conditions).  
 Lastly, for this identification strategy to appropriately estimate the effects of the DRA, 
it is important that the behavior of both the treatment and control groups follows similar trends 
prior to the policy’s implementation. If this is true, it is safe to assume that both groups would 
follow a similar trend after the policy’s implementation as well and that the difference-in-
                                                          
38
 The particular ADLs measured include walking across a room, dressing, bathing/showering, eating, getting in/out 
of bed and toileting. The particular IADLs measured include using a telephone, managing money, taking 
medications, shopping for groceries and preparing meals. 
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difference estimates only capture the policy effect; if they follow different trends, this difference 
will cause the parameter estimates to either over- or under-estimate the actual policy effect. To 
show that these trends are relatively consistent prior to the DRA for both groups, Figures 2.1 - 
2.6 in the attached appendix show the trends in the likelihood of making inter-vivos transfers, 
having assets in trusts and utilizing the different types of long-term care, respectively, over time 
while controlling for age, gender, marital status and income. As can be seen in these graphs, the 
treatment group is relatively more likely to make transfers and have trusts (as expected) while 
the control group is more likely to utilize each type of care; however, as mentioned above, the 
difference in level does not impact the appropriateness of using a difference-in-difference 
approach but any difference in trend would. Overall, these graphs show that outcomes for 
individuals in both groups follow relatively similar trends prior to the implementation of the 
DRA in early 2006. Aside from a slight deviation around 2004 when examining trusts, the 
similarity of these trends suggest that difference-in-difference will accurately estimate the effects 
of the DRA on both asset transfers and long-term care utilization.  
6. Results 
6.1 Transfers and Trusts 
 Table 2.4 shows the results from estimating Equation (1) with the following dependent 
variables: any inter-vivos transfer, transfer amount, holding assets in any trusts, in revocable 
trusts and in irrevocable trusts, respectively. The coefficient on Post*Assets estimates the effect 
of the DRA by measuring how the policy affects the behavior of those who need to spend down 
assets to gain Medicaid eligibility (the treatment group) relative to those who already have 
sufficiently low assets (the control group). The models in columns 1, 3, 4 and 5 are linear 
probability models; the estimates in column 2 are from an OLS model.  
75 
 
 Overall, the coefficient of interest on the Post*Assets interaction term is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level for the first four dependent variables, suggesting that HRS 
respondents did change their transfer behavior in response to the DRA.  The first estimates in 
Column 1 and 2 suggest that individuals are 5 percentage points (19 percent) less likely to make 
any inter-vivos transfers and that those with higher asset levels transfer $1,685 less after DRA. 
Individuals are also 3.1 percentage points (20 percent) more likely to hold assets in trusts 
following the DRA, implying that they are substituting away from cash transfers and into trusts. I 
have also examined the effect of the DRA on the amount of assets that individuals hold in trusts 
but these results are inconclusive given the number of respondents who are uncertain or unaware 
of the value of these trusts; because of this, I do not present these results in this paper. 
 As mentioned earlier, it is necessary to examine whether or not these trusts are 
irrevocable to determine whether or not they must be spent down as well. The final two columns 
of Table 2.4 show that individuals are significantly 3.5 percentage points (29.3 percent) more 
likely to hold assets in revocable trusts and insignificantly 0.3 percentage points (29 percent) 
more likely to hold assets in irrevocable trusts following the DRA. Because this change is 
primarily driven by revocable trusts, this apparent substitution from inter-vivos transfers to trusts 
may not necessarily be motivated by spend down since these particular trusts are not exempt 
from Medicaid. However, it is also possible that individuals are simply unaware of the difference 
between these types of trusts and still trying to effectively spend down their assets
39
. Regardless 
of the motivation, this apparent substitution from transfers to trusts following the DRA will still 
help provide insight into the relationship between such transfers and long-term care use. Though 
not presented below, additional results suggest that children are significantly more likely to be 
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 There seems to be significant anecdotal evidence that this is true, based on conversations with several UNH law 
professors that specialize in estate planning. Specifically, they argue that one of the greatest misconceptions that 
individuals have about estate planning is that the type of trust does not matter.  
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named as beneficiaries of these trusts following the DRA, suggesting that any changes in 
informal care utilization may be driven by their reaction to receiving a less immediate form of 
compensation. 
6.2 Care Utilization 
 Table 2.5 presents estimates from Equation 1 in which the dependent variables measure 
long-term care utilization. These results show that individuals are significantly 2.5 percentage 
points (14.4 percent) less likely to receive any long-term care following the DRA. This change 
seems to be driven by changes in the use of formal care, with the DRA significantly reducing the 
likelihood of using such care by 2.1 percentage points (49.3 percent).  
 Estimates of the effects of the DRA on the intensive margin of care utilization, 
measured by the number of hours of care that the individual receives each month, are in Table 
2.6. As a result of the DRA, individuals are likely to receive roughly 14.8 fewer hours of total 
care each month, with the strong majority of this decrease driven by the change in hours 
provided by informal caregivers. This result implies that as the likelihood of receiving an inter-
vivos transfer from the care recipient decreases, informal caregivers may be forced to scale back 
their care provision and increase their labor supply to counter this loss in transfers with increased 
earnings. Testing such an explanation would require more information about the 
providers/sources of the informal home care, which is possible given that the HRS provides 
information on each caregiver’s relationship to the recipient of his/her care. The results for 
models in which the dependent variables are care provision and hours of care provided per 
month by one’s spouse, one’s children and other relatives/friends are in Table 2.7. 
 Columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 2.7 represent the results from linear probability models 
while those in Columns 2, 4 and 6 represent results from OLS models. As can be seen, 
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individuals are significantly 2 percentage points (31.8 percent) more likely to receive care from 
their spouse, 3 percentage points (37.9 percent) less likely to receive care from a child and 1.5 
percentage points (49.7 percent) less likely to receive care from someone else following the 
implementation of the DRA. When taken together, these findings suggest that non-spouse 
caregivers may be less likely to provide care when their likelihood of receiving compensation 
through inter-vivos transfers diminishes, with the spouse providing care to make up for what was 
lost. Though the results in Columns 2 and 6 suggest that spouses and other caregivers do not 
provide significantly more or less hours of care following the DRA, those in Columns 4 suggest 
that the individual significantly receives 11.32 fewer hours of care from their children following 
its implementation. 
6.3 Utilization of Additional Health Services 
 While the previously results suggest an overall reduction in the utilization of long-term 
care, it is unclear if these individuals simply substitute to using other forms of medical care to 
deal with ADLs and IADLs or if they receive less care overall. The results presented in Table 2.8 
examine the first of these possibilities when using the same model specification; overall, they 
suggest that individuals who must engage in spend down significantly increase their utilization 
of other health services, as they are specifically 2.7 percentage points (9.5 percent) more likely to 
visit a hospital, likely to meet with doctors
40,41
 roughly 2 more times and 2.4 percentage points 
(24.7 percent) more likely to use ‘other’ health services such as adult care facilities and physical 
therapy over the following two years as a result of the DRA’s implementation. Although not 
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 This measure includes both ‘regular’ doctor visits as well as visits to the emergency room, meaning that this result 
may potentially be driven by increases in emergency care; however, it is not possible to separate these effects and 
formally test this hypothesis.  
 
41
 Only 2,600 observations (5.26 percent of the sample) do not visit the doctor at all over the previous two years, 
which is why the likelihood of visiting the doctor at least once is not separately estimated. 
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presented, additional results suggest that the DRA does not significantly impact the intensity of 
hospital visits (measured using the number of hospital visits and the number of nights spent in a 
hospital). In addition, the results in the third column suggest that these individuals are 
significantly 3.3 percentage points (41.2 percent) less likely to utilize home health services 
following the DRA, with these services incorporating those provided by, for example, 
occupational therapists, chemotherapists and hospice caregivers. Given that Medicaid often 
covers part of these particular services, it is not overly surprising that use of these services 
decreases after the DRA; in addition, this measure may also include services provided by home 
health aides, which would also explain why these results are consistent with the baseline 
estimates concerning formal home care use. Overall, these results consistently imply that 
individuals substitute from long-term care to other medical services, specifically doctor visits 
and adult care facilities (most likely), following the enactment of the DRA; while it is unclear if 
these substitutions adversely impacted individuals’ health status and quality of life, this does call 
the effectiveness of the DRA at reducing government spending into question if Medicare 
spending increases because of this substitution to other medical services. 
 To examine the effects on health status, the results in Table 2.9 demonstrate the effects 
of the DRA on one’s reported number of limitations with ADLs, number of limitations with 
IADLs and likelihood of reporting being in overall poor health, respectively, in the subsequent 
interview. Taken together, these results are inconclusive, as individuals significantly report 
having .10 and .12 fewer ADL and IADL limitations, respectively, following the DRA but are 
also 3.11 percentage points (11.2 percent) more likely to report being in poor health after its 
implementation. It is important to note that these measures of future health status are taken 
roughly two years later and are not likely to perfectly the estimate the effect of the DRA on 
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individual health. As a result, the inconsistency of the aforementioned results is not overly 
surprising. 
7. Alternate Specifications 
7.1.Stratification of the Treatment Group 
 As discussed earlier, these previous results only estimate the overall change in transfer 
behavior and care utilization for all individuals who must engage in spend down relative to those 
who do not; however, given that such spend down is easier for individuals with lower levels of 
non-exempt assets, this effect likely differs among the individuals in this initial treatment group. 
For this reason, I separate those individuals for whom Assets equals 1 into the following groups 
based on the amount of assets they must spend down to become Medicaid eligible: Group A 
(assets ≤ $21,900), Group B ($21,900 < assets ≤ $87,600), Group C ($87,600 < assets ≤ 
$262,800) and Group D (assets > $262,800)
42
. These particular cutoff values are chosen to 
separate the sample by the amount of nursing home care that the individual would need to pay 
for in order to become eligible for Medicaid; specifically, these groups represent having 
sufficient assets to pay for up to 3 months of nursing home care, between 3 months and 12 
months of care, between 12 months and 36 months of care and more than 36 months of care, 
respectively. The omitted comparison group is still those individuals who do not need to engage 
in any spend down to become eligible for Medicaid (i.e. those for whom Assets equals zero). The 
results from estimating Equation 1 with these four group variables in lieu of Assets can be found 
in Table 2.10.   
 Specifically, Table 2.10 shows estimates from linear probability models that examine 
the likelihood of making transfers, having assets in trusts and using each type of long-term care, 
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 This specification includes both single and married respondents (and their spouses/partners), with every individual 




respectively. Despite having the least amount of non-exempt assets and needing to engage in the 
least amount of spend down to gain Medicaid eligibility, the results in the first row suggests that 
the respondents in Group A are not significantly impacted by the implementation of the DRA 
(aside from being slightly more likely to have assets in trusts). This is likely because these 
individuals do not have significant wealth to bequeath to others and may decide that it makes 
more sense to spend down these assets by consumption spending rather than inter-vivos transfers.  
 The results from the next three columns show that as a person’s level of non-exempt 
assets increase, he is significantly less likely to make inter-vivos transfers and significantly more 
likely to hold assets in trusts following the DRA. In addition, both overall and informal care 
utilization significantly decrease after the DRA, with this effect becoming larger (in absolute 
magnitude) as the level of non-exempt assets increase. Formal care utilization also significantly 
decreases following the DRA, though this effect becomes smaller (in absolute magnitude) as 
non-exempt assets increase. Lastly, once again, nursing home care is not significantly impacted 
by the passing of the DRA.  
 While these findings are consistent with the initial results in suggesting that care 
utilization seems to follow inter-vivos transfers, this raises additional concerns that the Financial 
Crisis may be impacting these results since the entire crisis occurs during the post-DRA period. 
Despite the inclusion of year fixed effects to control for changes in the macroeconomy, the 
wealthy respondents who appear to be most responsive to the DRA are also most likely to be 
affected by the Financial Crisis; as a result, these results could be driven in part by both events 
rather than solely the enactment of the DRA. To investigate, I estimate additional models that 
control for variation in economic conditions by separately controlling for monthly changes in 
RGDP per capita and the unemployment rate. The results are consistent with the baseline results 
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discussed earlier. While this does not eliminate the possibility of the Financial Crisis influencing 
these results, they help to suggest that these results are not solely driven by the Crisis. 
7.2. Stratifications by ADL Limitations and Cohort 
 Tables 2.11 and 2.12 show how the effect of the DRA differs for those who are 
relatively more likely to require nursing home care in the future, based on whether or not one 
initially reports having any ADL limitations. As mentioned earlier, ADLs and/or IADLs may 
eventually make nursing home care necessary for these individuals, which may in turn cause 
them to react relatively differently to the DRA. Specifically, Table 2.11 shows the results for the 
subsample of those who did not report having any such limitations whereas Table 2.12 shows the 
results for those who did. 
 When just looking at the significance of the difference-in-difference interaction term 
between these two tables, it becomes clear that the baseline results discussed above are primarily 
driven by those individuals who do not currently suffer any limitations with ADLs. As can be 
seen in Table 2.11, the interaction term is statistically significant in all but one of the models (i.e. 
that which estimates nursing home care, which is expected given the baseline results) while the 
parallel results in Table 2.12 are consistently insignificant. One possible explanation for this lack 
of significance is that those with such limitations may need long-term care shortly, if they do not 
already receive it, and may not be able to make transfers, for example, without facing penalties. 
In contrast, those in relatively better health may likely be confident that they will not need such 
care any time soon and therefore may transfer assets without fear of being penalized. I also 
stratify the sample based on whether or not one has any limitations with IADLs, with these 
results being very similar to those concerning ADLs and are therefore excluded from this paper.  
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 Tables 2.13, 2.14 and 2.15 show the results from stratifying the sample by age cohort. 
The three cohorts in this sample are the AHEAD cohort, the CODA (i.e. Children of the 
Depression Age) cohort and the HRS cohort; by definition these cohorts include all respondents 
born before 1924, between 1924 and 1930, and between 1931 and 1940, respectively. I separate 
the sample by these cohorts to examine the effect of the timing of the DRA, as its impact again 
likely differs based on the individual’s age at the implementation date.  
 Table 2.13 shows the results when looking only at the AHEAD cohort, with these 
results suggesting that these individuals’ transfer behavior and care utilization was not 
significantly impacted by the DRA’s implementation. Given that individuals in this cohort were 
83 years old or older when the DRA was put into effect and the average age of a nursing home 
entrant is 79 years old (Morningstar 2012), the lack of significant results is not entirely 
unexpected. Since these individuals are older than the average nursing home entrant, they may be 
relatively confident that they will not need nursing home care in the future, which in turn gives 
them no reason to alter their behavior in response to the DRA. If this is true, we should see more 
of a significant impact on the progressively younger cohorts whose members are relatively less 
certain about their future need for nursing home care. 
 Table 2.14 shows the results for the CODA cohort, whose members are between the 
ages of 76 and 82 at the time of the DRA’s implementation. These results provide some support 
to the previous argument as these individuals are significantly 5.4 percentage points (20.3 
percent) less likely to make inter-vivos transfers and 4.2 percentage points (22.2 percent) more 
likely to hold assets in trusts. Despite these significant changes in their transfer behavior, there 
are no significant changes in care utilization for these respondents. Less than 1 percent of this 
cohort currently resides in nursing homes, which explains why there are no estimates in Column 
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4. In contrast, the results for the HRS cohort (whose respondents are between the ages of 65 and 
75 at the time of the DRA’s implementation) in Table 2.15 suggest that the care utilization 
effects are predominantly driven by the youngest respondents. Specifically, while they are 
similarly less likely to make transfers and more likely to hold assets in trusts, the HRS members 
are significantly 3.8 percentage points (31.5 percent) less likely to utilize any long-term care, 2.8 
percentage points (135 percent) less likely to utilize formal home care and 3.3 percentage points 
(28.5 percent) less likely to utilize informal home care following the DRA. When taken together, 
these results suggest that the individuals who were most impacted by the DRA’s implementation 
were the relatively young, the relatively wealthy and those in relatively good health who had the 
most to gain from acting immediately. While not overly surprising, the apparent substitution 
from inter-vivos transfers to trusts suggests that the DRA potentially led individuals to spend 
down their assets through other means and not on nursing home care as was its intent; such a 
substitution would drastically reduce the expected cost savings to Medicaid and requires further 
examination. 
7.3. Fixed Effect Logit Models 
 In order to test the robustness of the linear probability specification, Table 2.16 shows the 
results from estimating Equation 1 using conditional fixed-effects logit models. These particular 
models are designed to examine dichotomous dependent variables, whereas linear probability 
models are not, making it important to determine whether or not this particular difference is 
responsible for the results discussed above. The results in Table 2.16 are presented as odds ratios 
and as a result can be interpreted as suggesting that the likelihood of the dependent variable 
equaling 1 is greater (relative to equaling 0) if significant and greater than 1. As can be seen in 
the first row of Table 2.16, the Post*Assets interaction odds ratio is roughly 2.52 when 
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estimating the likelihood of having trusts, 1.61 when examining formal home care and 1.29 when 
examining informal home care; all three of these estimates are statistically significant and greater 
than 1, implying that individuals are more likely to have trusts and use both formal and informal 
home care following the DRA’s implementation. In addition, the odds ratios for inter-vivos 
transfers, overall care use and nursing home use (1.08, 1.15 and 1.33, respectively) are also 
greater than 1 but statistically insignificant. 
 Although only some of these odds ratios are significant, these results for care utilization 
differ drastically from those presented in the earlier tables. One important thing to note, however, 
is the reduced sample size in these models because they only include respondents who have both 
possible values of the dependent variable (i.e. 0 and 1) at least once each during the sample 
period. Due to these restrictions, the respective samples exclude those individuals who never 
made transfers or used care at any point during the sample and those who made transfers or used 
care in every survey wave; in other words, the samples used in these models primarily include 
only those individuals who started making transfers, having assets in trusts and using long-term 
care, respectively, between 1998 and 2010
43
. 
 For several reasons, these sample restrictions are responsible for the drastically different 
estimates that result from these models. One such reason is that the Post variable likely captures 
each individual’s transition to making transfers, using care, etc., given that the individual likely 
starts performing this behavior later on in the sample (i.e. when Post equals 1); when coupled 
with the majority of the sample needing to spend down assets to reach Medicaid eligibility, both 
Post and the Post*Assets interaction term are likely to be positive and, in the case of the care 
                                                          
43
 These samples may also include those who stopped making transfers, having assets in trusts, etc., during the 
sample period, but those who start engaging in these behaviors are relatively much more prevalent. 
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utilization estimates, unnaturally large. In addition, by excluding the relatively younger and 
wealthier respondents who are not yet in need of long-term care, these estimates essentially 
represent an upper-bound estimate of the DRA’s impact on care utilization; specifically, these 
omitted respondents do not use any form of care but have Post*Assets equal to 1, meaning that 
the estimates shown in Table 2.16 severely overestimate the true effect of the DRA.  
 Although they are not presented in this paper, additional linear probability and logit 
models are run using the same restricted sample used in the fixed effect logit models. The results 
from these models are different from the baseline results in Section 6.1 but similar to those for 
the fixed effect logit specification in Table 2.16, suggesting that the sample restrictions are 
responsible for these changes and not the logit specification.  
7.4. Logit and OLS models that omit Individual Fixed Effects 
 To further examine the importance of model specification in driving the baseline results, 
Table 2.17 shows the marginal effect estimates that result from estimating Equation 1 using 
Logit models without fixed effects. While these models do not suffer from the same sample 
restrictions as the fixed-effect logit models, they also do not (inherently) include individual fixed 
effects that again control for individual time in-variant characteristics; to try and minimize the 
effect of this change, these models all include additional variables that control for each 
individual’s gender, ethnicity and education. As can be seen, individuals are significantly 7 
percent more likely to hold assets in trusts and 1.57 percent more likely to use informal care 
following the DRA, with the former result being consistent with the baseline findings and the 
latter being different. As a comparison, the results from linear probability models that omit 
individual fixed effects but include the same set of time-invariant controls are shown in Table 
2.18, with these results showing a similar effect on informal care. Overall, these results suggest 
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that the inclusion of individual fixed effects controls for sizable omitted variable bias that would 
drastically alter the estimated impact of the DRA if unaccounted for. 
8. Conclusion   
 The 2005 Deficit Reduction Act made it more difficult for individuals to become 
Medicaid eligible for long-term care benefits using inter-vivos transfers; as a result, individuals 
were expected to pay for a greater portion of their long-term care expenses and Medicaid 
spending on long-term care would in turn decrease. However, the results from this analysis 
suggest that the enactment of the DRA had significant unintended effects on both asset transfer 
behavior and in-home care use. First, individuals seem to substitute away from inter-vivos 
transfers to revocable trusts following the DRA. While these particular trusts are not exempt 
from Medicaid and in turn not an effective form of spend down, this suggests that individuals 
will continue to try and spend down their countable assets in ways other than paying for their 
own care if possible.  
 This effect, in turn, may help to explain why non-spousal caregivers seem to be less 
willing to provide informal home care following the DRA, especially considering that some 
caregivers do so in the hopes of receiving financial compensation in the future. In addition, likely 
due to the diminished availability of in-home care, elderly individuals seem to use other medical 
services, specifically doctor visits and (most likely) adult care facilities, following its enactment. 
While it is unclear if these changes adversely affect the individual’s health, they may adversely 
affect others due to busier doctor’s offices and potentially over-crowded emergency rooms; in 
addition, Medicare spending on these services is likely to increase, thus calling into question the 
effectiveness of the DRA and reducing overall government spending. 
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 Overall, despite raising concerns about the Deficit Reduction Act’s ability to 
accomplish its target goals, this analysis helps to provide a greater understanding of both 
individual asset transfer behavior and long-term care use. Specifically, with sample 
stratifications suggesting that younger individuals, wealthier individuals and relatively healthier 
individuals predominantly drive the results discussed above, we find that the most forward-
looking individuals are likely to react to any policies concerning long-term care. By 
implementing additional policies designed to help this particular population either improve their 
own health status (and in turn reduce their eventual need for long-term care) or purchase private 
long-term care insurance, it may be possible to reduce Medicaid spending on long-term care 
more efficiently. In addition, these policies may help to ensure that sufficient care will be 
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Table 2.1 HRS Sample Descriptive Statistics, by Asset Level 








Make Any Inter-Vivos Transfers 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45 0.12 0.33 
Inter-Vivos Transfer Amount ($1,000s) 3.70 23.58 4.30 25.64 0.72 5.80 
Have Any Assets in Trusts 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.01 0.10 
Have Assets in Revocable Trusts 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.01 0.08 
Have Assets in Irrevocable Trusts 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.04 
       
Receive Any Long-Term Care 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36 0.28 0.45 
Live in a Nursing Home 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.16 
Receive Any Formal Home Care 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.28 
Receive Any Informal Home Care 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.34 0.25 0.43 
 
    
  Interviewed After DRA 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Must Engage in Spend Down 0.83 0.37 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       
AHEAD Cohort 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 
CODA Cohort 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35 
HRS Cohort 0.59 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.64 0.48 
Age 73.88 6.67 73.95 6.66 73.52 6.76 
Female 0.57 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.64 0.48 
White 0.84 0.36 0.89 0.31 0.60 0.49 
Black 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.28 0.33 0.47 
Other Race 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.25 
Hispanic 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.22 0.22 0.42 
Married 0.62 0.49 0.65 0.48 0.44 0.50 
Partnered 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.16 
No High School 0.28 0.45 0.22 0.42 0.57 0.49 
High School Graduate 0.54 0.50 0.57 0.49 0.37 0.48 
College Graduate 0.18 0.39 0.21 0.40 0.05 0.22 
Children (total) 3.60 2.15 3.46 2.00 4.33 2.69 
Real Countable Assets ($1,000s) 362.04 1116.58 435.04 1208.97 0.00 0.00 
Real Exempt Assets ($1,000s) 192.69 368.43 218.75 393.85 61.35 131.85 
Real Income ($1,000s) 57.66 295.40 62.69 105.68 32.27 685.67 
       
N 52,674 43,955 8,719 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of respondents ages 65 and older for the years 1998 through 






Table 2.2 HRS Sample Descriptive Statistics, by Interview Date 








Make Any Inter-Vivos Transfers 0.26 0.44 0.30 0.46 0.22 0.41 
Inter-Vivos Transfer Amount ($1,000s) 3.70 23.58 4.41 25.95 2.86 20.33 
Have Any Assets in Trusts 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.36 
Have Assets in Revocable Trusts 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.34 
Have Assets in Irrevocable Trusts 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 
       
Receive Any Long-Term Care 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.36 0.19 0.39 
Live in a Nursing Home 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.12 
Receive Any Formal Home Care 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22 
Receive Any Informal Home Care 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.37 
 
    
  Interviewed After DRA 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Must Engage in Spend Down 0.83 0.37 0.85 0.36 0.82 0.39 
       
AHEAD Cohort 0.24 0.42 0.32 0.47 0.14 0.34 
CODA Cohort 0.17 0.37 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.33 
HRS Cohort 0.59 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.73 0.44 
Age 73.88 6.67 73.33 6.61 74.54 6.69 
Female 0.57 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.59 0.49 
White 0.84 0.36 0.85 0.36 0.83 0.37 
Black 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.34 
Other Race 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 
Hispanic 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.28 
Married 0.62 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.60 0.49 
Partnered 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 
No High School 0.28 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.44 
High School Graduate 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.50 
College Graduate 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.39 
Children (total) 3.60 2.15 3.58 2.17 3.63 2.12 
Real Countable Assets ($1,000s) 362.04 1116.58 347.02 1014.52 380.09 1227.79 
Real Exempt Assets ($1,000s) 192.69 368.43 178.14 327.44 210.18 411.64 
Real Income ($1,000s) 57.66 295.40 56.40 81.34 59.16 429.12 
       
N 52,674 28,746 23,928 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of respondents ages 65 and older for the years 1998 through 
2010.  Unweighted summary statistics.
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Residence 161.64 132.92 133.49 148.15 173.46 196.62 183.85 151.28 
Vehicles 16.37 16.86 16.91 17.26 16.69 16.84 15.82 14.30 
Other Savings 14.69 10.61 11.53 13.00 16.86 13.97 18.84 16.91 
Total Exempt 
Assets 192.69 160.39 161.93 178.41 207.01 227.43 218.52 182.49 
         
Real Estate 56.62 55.72 58.20 51.02 55.61 62.96 65.05 46.67 
Second 
Residence 23.47 17.02 16.65 21.27 27.51 28.02 27.18 24.35 
Businesses 49.19 34.07 37.49 41.27 59.41 64.34 57.94 44.23 
IRAs 71.25 58.43 70.24 65.04 70.55 85.88 74.08 70.91 
Stocks 89.47 82.54 89.13 73.46 104.93 105.67 86.31 81.14 
Checking 35.77 33.99 32.30 42.93 37.54 33.66 32.11 37.78 
CDs 23.65 21.89 24.94 23.99 20.01 25.05 27.36 21.93 
Bonds 15.35 12.42 15.37 18.03 18.38 15.95 14.48 12.34 
Other Debt 2.74 2.54 1.87 2.77 2.95 2.61 3.08 3.23 
Total Non-
Exempt Assets 362.04 313.55 342.45 334.23 390.99 418.92 381.42 336.13 
         













Source: Health and Retirement Study, sample consists of respondents ages 65 and older for the years 1998 through 
2010.  Unweighted summary statistics. 
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Holding Any  












Post*Assets -0.0500*** -1,685.30*** 0.0306*** 0.0352*** 0.0029 
 (0.0120) (359.1046) (0.0054) (0.0049) (0.0018) 
      
Post -0.3149*** -6,006.7116 0.0027 0.0356 0.0000 
 (0.0847) (8,400.6177) (0.0490) (0.0477) (0.0222) 
      
Assets 0.0259** 682.0728*** -0.0133*** -0.0153*** -0.0005 
 (0.0105) (252.5648) (0.0043) (0.0037) (0.0014) 
      
Log Spend 
Down Assets 0.0037*** 67.3003 0.0014* 0.0031*** 0.0001 
 (0.0014) (44.8061) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
      
Log Exempt 
Assets 0.0025 -53.1143 0.0024 0.0031 -0.0001 
 (0.0026) (107.5442) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0012) 
      
Log Income 0.0109* 347.5523 0.0034 0.0059 0.0030 
 (0.0062) (352.9211) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0023) 
      
Age -0.0219* 1,495.1843 0.0280*** 0.0133* 0.0027 
 (0.0117) (1,177.9231) (0.0082) (0.0073) (0.0035) 
      
Age squared 0.0001** -8.8277* -0.0002*** -0.0001* -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (4.6702) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
      
# of Children -0.0032 -211.7374 0.0074 0.0037 0.0001 
 (0.0059) (244.8487) (0.0046) (0.0032) (0.0014) 
      
Intercept 1.1042* -57,021.8166 -1.0605*** -0.5174 -0.1104 
 (0.5824) (62,496.069) (0.3770) (0.3440) (0.1662) 
      
Observations 51,713 51,713 49,606 51,693 51,693 
R-Squared 0.5120 0.3970 0.7648 0.7188 0.4382 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   





Table 2.5 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Utilization of LTC Services 
 
(1)  















Post*Assets -0.0246** -0.0013 -0.0207*** -0.0177 
 (0.0110) (0.0013) (0.0066) (0.0111) 
     
Post 0.1586*** -0.0025 0.0847*** 0.1363** 
 (0.0597) (0.0041) (0.0318) (0.0596) 
     
Assets 0.0077 0.0007 0.0108** 0.0019 
 (0.0092) (0.0010) (0.0052) (0.0093) 
     
Log Spend 
Down Assets -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0009) 
     
Log Exempt 
Assets -0.0022 -0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0015 
 (0.0019) (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0019) 
     
Log Income -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0013 
 (0.0048) (0.0004) (0.0028) (0.0049) 
     
Age -0.1292*** 0.0006 -0.0673*** -0.1180*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0012) (0.0067) (0.0095) 
     
Age squared 0.0009*** -0.0000 0.0004*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
     
# of Children 0.0032 0.0000 0.0020 0.0032 
 (0.0042) (0.0001) (0.0023) (0.0041) 
     
Intercept 4.5779*** -0.0246 2.4896*** 4.1495*** 
 (0.4436) (0.0478) (0.2855) (0.4429) 
     
Observations 51,711 51,711 51,711 51,711 
R-Squared 0.6429 0.9675 0.6431 0.6162 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Additional health controls: sum of ADLs; sum 
of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, stroke, memory disease, arthritis and 
incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
96 
 

















Post*Assets -14.8368*** -1.0275 -13.8094*** 
 (3.7267) (1.5154) (3.5609) 
    
Post 58.9124*** 9.8750 49.0374*** 
 (18.7023) (7.8065) (17.0849) 
    
Assets 5.9240* 0.2275 5.6965* 
 (3.1542) (1.1152) (2.9738) 
    
Log Spend 
Down Assets -0.1193 -0.0726 -0.0466 
 (0.3218) (0.1272) (0.2971) 
    
Log Exempt 
Assets 0.2568 0.1615 0.0953 
 (0.6670) (0.2531) (0.6202) 
    
Log Income -0.0580 -0.6737 0.6157 
 (1.7389) (0.6974) (1.5832) 
    
Age -34.4228*** -12.5735*** -21.8493*** 
 (3.5004) (2.0758) (2.8665) 
    
Age squared 0.2271*** 0.0838*** 0.1433*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0125) (0.0173) 
    
# of Children 2.8175* 0.6706 2.1469 
 (1.5210) (0.4874) (1.4581) 
    
Intercept 1,267.59*** 466.0448*** 801.5441*** 
 (153.7088) (87.1174) (128.9254) 
    
Observations 51,711 51,711 51,711 
R-Squared 0.5654 0.5492 0.5317 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Additional health controls: sum of ADLs; sum 
of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, stroke, memory disease, arthritis and 
incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Post*Assets 0.0200*** -1.5268 -0.0302*** -11.319*** -0.0152** -1.4973 
 (0.0068) (2.1026) (0.0093) (2.4768) (0.0068) (1.1548) 
       
Post 0.0233 24.7595** 0.1245*** 20.8714* 0.0926*** 6.0438 
 (0.0426) (11.6681) (0.0465) (10.7969) (0.0335) (5.8846) 
       
Assets -0.0098* -0.5873 0.0068 5.7498*** 0.0093 0.8693 
 (0.0058) (1.6674) (0.0078) (2.1474) (0.0058) (0.9684) 
       
Log Spend 
Down Assets -0.0009 -0.1836 0.0002 0.1151 0.0001 0.0732 
 (0.0007) (0.2068) (0.0007) (0.1967) (0.0005) (0.0956) 
       
Log Exempt 
Assets 0.0008 0.0646 -0.0024 -0.1101 0.0004 0.1132 
 (0.0014) (0.4109) (0.0016) (0.3590) (0.0011) (0.1304) 
       
Log Income 0.0042 0.9349 -0.0032 -0.2244 -0.0022 0.0570 
 (0.0031) (0.9206) (0.0042) (1.0269) (0.0030) (0.5535) 
       
Age -0.0028 -3.1641** -0.1021*** -17.121*** -0.0310*** -3.1265*** 
 (0.0061) (1.4959) (0.0082) (2.3691) (0.0057) (0.9963) 
       
Age squared 0.0000 0.0149* 0.0007*** 0.1173*** 0.0002*** 0.0210*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0083) (0.0000) (0.0148) (0.0000) (0.0061) 
       
# of Children 0.0040 1.8568* -0.0002 0.6121 -0.0008 -0.3878 
 (0.0031) (1.0190) (0.0032) (0.9622) (0.0023) (0.4074) 
       
Intercept 0.0088 133.9989* 3.7325*** 612.64*** 1.2273*** 114.87*** 
 (0.2992) (75.4336) (0.3642) (99.1298) (0.2603) (44.4867) 
       
Observations 51,711 51,711 51,711 51,711 51,711 51,711 
R-Squared 0.5650 0.5286 0.5882 0.4997 0.4903 0.4737 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Additional health controls: sum of ADLs; sum 
of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, stroke, memory disease, arthritis and 
incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Post*Assets 0.0274* 1.9457*** -0.0329*** 0.0235** 
 (0.0151) (0.6554) (0.0107) (0.0104) 
     
Post 0.3339*** 5.5560 0.1804*** 0.1436** 
 (0.0935) (3.9996) (0.0606) (0.0658) 
     
Assets -0.0085 -1.3378** 0.0094 -0.0200** 
 (0.0130) (0.5236) (0.0086) (0.0083) 
     
Log Spend 
Down Assets 0.0011 0.0023 0.0013 -0.0004 
 (0.0013) (0.0592) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
     
Log Exempt 
Assets 0.0011 -0.1255 0.0009 -0.0007 
 (0.0027) (0.1260) (0.0018) (0.0021) 
     
Log Income -0.0070 0.2161 -0.0038 -0.0019 
 (0.0068) (0.2387) (0.0046) (0.0048) 
     
Age -0.0206 0.5845 -0.0583*** -0.0377*** 
 (0.0133) (0.5474) (0.0091) (0.0095) 
     
Age squared 0.0001 -0.0059** 0.0004*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0026) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
     
# of Children -0.0049 0.3331* -0.0004 -0.0028 
 (0.0060) (0.1967) (0.0040) (0.0041) 
     
Intercept 1.3652** -5.5161 2.2280*** 1.5419*** 
 (0.6512) (28.0751) (0.4331) (0.4648) 
     
Observations 51,570 48,571 51,193 51,535 
R-Squared 0.4252 0.4870 0.4313 0.4067 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 
stroke, memory disease, arthritis and incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Post*Assets -0.1048*** -0.1232*** 0.0311** 
 (0.0288) (0.0282) (0.0131) 
    
Post 0.4235*** 0.5264*** 0.1904*** 
 (0.1380) (0.1440) (0.0727) 
    
Assets 0.0423* 0.0555** -0.0052 
 (0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0110) 
    
Log Spend 
Down Assets -0.0025 -0.0007 -0.0022** 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0011) 
    
Log Exempt 
Assets 0.0036 -0.0057 -0.0005 
 (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0024) 
    
Log Income -0.0177 -0.0132 -0.0042 
 (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0057) 
    
Age -0.2828*** -0.3989*** -0.0179 
 (0.0246) (0.0255) (0.0113) 
    
Age squared 0.0019*** 0.0027*** 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
    
# of Children 0.0130 0.0070 0.0050 
 (0.0109) (0.0100) (0.0050) 
    
Intercept 10.4235*** 14.5343*** 0.9600* 
 (1.1008) (1.1401) (0.5298) 
    
Observations 51,711 51,709 51,711 
R-Squared 0.7205 0.7095 0.6447 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 
stroke, memory disease, arthritis and incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Post* Assets(A) -0.0170 0.0108** 0.0076 -0.0015 -0.0073 0.0089 
 (0.0140) (0.0053) (0.0130) (0.0014) (0.0076) (0.0132) 
       
Post* Assets(B) -0.0460*** 0.0199** -0.0282** -0.0024 -0.0297*** -0.0160 
 (0.0173) (0.0088) (0.0136) (0.0015) (0.0076) (0.0137) 
       
Post* Assets(C) -0.0417** 0.0301*** -0.0357*** -0.0008 -0.0258*** -0.0300** 
 (0.0172) (0.0095) (0.0130) (0.0013) (0.0074) (0.0131) 
       
Post* Assets(D) -0.0815*** 0.0507*** -0.0403*** -0.0011 -0.0231*** -0.0312*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0097) (0.0120) (0.0014) (0.0072) (0.0121) 
       
Post -0.3192*** 0.0057 0.1553*** -0.0025 0.0831*** 0.1338** 
 (0.0846) (0.0490) (0.0597) (0.0041) (0.0318) (0.0596) 
       
Assets(A) 0.0123 -0.0018 -0.0069 0.0008 0.0042 -0.0100 
 (0.0110) (0.0043) (0.0097) (0.0010) (0.0054) (0.0099) 
       
Assets(B) 0.0185 -0.0002 -0.0092 0.0019 0.0024 -0.0152 
 (0.0202) (0.0105) (0.0151) (0.0015) (0.0085) (0.0150) 
       
Assets(C) 0.0210 0.0034 0.0011 0.0009 -0.0014 0.0002 
 (0.0241) (0.0125) (0.0174) (0.0016) (0.0099) (0.0173) 
       
Assets(D) 0.0500* 0.0073 0.0010 0.0010 0.0012 -0.0034 
 (0.0270) (0.0148) (0.0191) (0.0017) (0.0106) (0.0189) 
       
Intercept 1.0407* -1.007*** 4.5322*** -0.0240 2.4778*** 4.1095*** 
 (0.5808) (0.3772) (0.4431) (0.0476) (0.2853) (0.4424) 
       
Observations 51,713 49,606 51,711 51,711 51,711 51,711 
R-Squared 0.5126 0.7652 0.6433 0.9675 0.6435 0.6166 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 
stroke, memory disease, arthritis and incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Table 2.11 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Asset Transfer Behavior and LTC Use For 































Post*Assets -0.0418*** 0.0341*** -0.0342*** -0.0003 -0.0177*** -0.0280** 
 (0.0143) (0.0062) (0.0116) (0.0006) (0.0058) (0.0114) 
       
Post -0.3399*** 0.0027 0.1984*** 0.0007 0.0901*** 0.1696*** 
 (0.0947) (0.0547) (0.0595) (0.0008) (0.0259) (0.0586) 
       
Assets 0.0173 -0.0140*** 0.0179* -0.0002 0.0120*** 0.0136 
 (0.0123) (0.0049) (0.0098) (0.0007) (0.0046) (0.0097) 
       
Log Spend  0.0032** 0.0014 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
Down Assets (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0009) 
       
Log Exempt  0.0042 0.0034* -0.0022 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0018 
Assets (0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0020) 
       
Log Income 0.0113 0.0041 0.0026 -0.0000 -0.0015 0.0045 
 (0.0072) (0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0001) (0.0024) (0.0050) 
       
Age -0.0221 0.0295*** -0.1336*** 0.0003 -0.0480*** -0.1229*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0096) (0.0103) (0.0004) (0.0057) (0.0100) 
       
Age squared 0.0001** -0.0002*** 0.0009*** -0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
       
# of Children -0.0050 0.0075 -0.0020 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0014 
 (0.0065) (0.0054) (0.0038) (0.0000) (0.0015) (0.0035) 
       
Intercept 1.0891 -1.1253*** 4.8497*** -0.0070 1.8495*** 4.4095*** 
 (0.6703) (0.4303) (0.4641) (0.0141) (0.2425) (0.4546) 
       
Observations 43,711 42,144 43,711 43,711 43,711 43,711 
R-Squared 0.5285 0.7723 0.5665 0.9613 0.5306 0.5578 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, stroke, memory disease, 
arthritis and incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Table 2.12 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Asset Transfer Behavior and LTC Use For 































Post*Assets -0.0042 0.0202 0.0481 -0.0026 -0.0136 0.0537 
 (0.0360) (0.0148) (0.0420) (0.0077) (0.0336) (0.0461) 
       
Post -0.0884 0.0427 -0.1134 -0.0055 0.0465 -0.1408 
 (0.3040) (0.1654) (0.3301) (0.0322) (0.2338) (0.3494) 
       
Assets 0.0021 -0.0066 -0.0496 0.0060 -0.0165 -0.0597 
 (0.0318) (0.0130) (0.0367) (0.0065) (0.0289) (0.0386) 
       
Log Spend  0.0092** 0.0007 0.0010 0.0003 0.0062* 0.0010 
Down Assets (0.0045) (0.0022) (0.0047) (0.0006) (0.0033) (0.0049) 
       
Log Exempt  0.0037 -0.0020 -0.0026 0.0005 -0.0075 -0.0014 
Assets (0.0085) (0.0045) (0.0088) (0.0017) (0.0070) (0.0095) 
       
Log Income 0.0062 0.0013 0.0034 0.0031 0.0045 0.0013 
 (0.0193) (0.0110) (0.0193) (0.0039) (0.0163) (0.0221) 
       
Age -0.0292 -0.0125 -0.0561 0.0063 -0.0776** -0.0680 
 (0.0373) (0.0192) (0.0422) (0.0126) (0.0365) (0.0461) 
       
Age squared 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006*** -0.0000 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
       
# of Children 0.0110 0.0004 0.0419** -0.0003 0.0074 0.0409* 
 (0.0175) (0.0049) (0.0190) (0.0008) (0.0203) (0.0212) 
       
Intercept 1.9198 0.6193 1.0831 -0.2311 2.4153 1.5723 
 (1.9799) (1.0303) (2.2206) (0.5050) (1.7564) (2.4126) 
       
Observations 8,002 7,462 8,002 8,002 8,002 8,002 
R-Squared 0.6868 0.8833 0.7657 0.9769 0.7907 0.7386 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, stroke, memory disease, 
arthritis and incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Table 2.13 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Asset Transfer Behavior and LTC Use For 































Post*Assets -0.0172 0.0162 0.0198 0.0015 -0.0152 0.0372 
 (0.0263) (0.0143) (0.0328) (0.0041) (0.0246) (0.0334) 
       
Post -0.4315** 0.0802 0.3607** -0.0137 0.2242** 0.2929* 
 (0.1826) (0.1205) (0.1593) (0.0197) (0.1014) (0.1618) 
       
Assets 0.0152 -0.0078 -0.0265 0.0019 -0.0056 -0.0305 
 (0.0197) (0.0124) (0.0228) (0.0038) (0.0144) (0.0237) 
       
Log Spend  0.0035 0.0037* 0.0006 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0005 
Down Assets (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0024) 
       
Log Exempt  -0.0057 -0.0052 -0.0073 -0.0006 -0.0081 -0.0046 
Assets (0.0058) (0.0045) (0.0064) (0.0010) (0.0051) (0.0064) 
       
Log Income 0.0287** 0.0210** -0.0021 0.0019 0.0084 -0.0008 
 (0.0129) (0.0103) (0.0140) (0.0020) (0.0109) (0.0142) 
       
Age 0.0377 0.0311 -0.2275*** 0.0009 -0.1186*** -0.2191*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0218) (0.0266) (0.0049) (0.0209) (0.0266) 
       
Age squared -0.0002 -0.0002* 0.0014*** 0.0000 0.0007*** 0.0013*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
       
# of Children -0.0013 0.0145 0.0041 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0069 
 (0.0115) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0002) (0.0059) (0.0092) 
       
Intercept -1.7250 -1.0702 9.4186*** -0.0593 5.0036*** 8.9685*** 
 (1.4995) (1.0736) (1.3177) (0.2004) (0.9625) (1.3192) 
       
Observations 12,222 11,371 12,221 12,221 12,221 12,221 
R-Squared 0.5199 0.7355 0.6601 0.9654 0.6691 0.6280 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 
stroke, memory disease, arthritis and incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Table 2.14 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Asset Transfer Behavior and LTC Use For 































Post*Assets -0.0544** 0.0421*** -0.0298 - -0.0089 -0.0322 
 (0.0262) (0.0150) (0.0272)  (0.0169) (0.0278) 
       
Post -0.1169 -0.1832 0.0518 - 0.0153 0.0213 
 (0.2007) (0.1253) (0.1473)  (0.0740) (0.1464) 
       
Assets 0.0518** -0.0161 0.0022 - 0.0122 -0.0138 
 (0.0228) (0.0106) (0.0204)  (0.0102) (0.0204) 
       
Log Spend  0.0096*** -0.0008 -0.0029 - -0.0014 -0.0016 
Down Assets (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0025)  (0.0013) (0.0024) 
       
Log Exempt  0.0044 0.0044 -0.0053 - -0.0018 -0.0071 
Assets (0.0059) (0.0039) (0.0053)  (0.0027) (0.0055) 
       
Log Income 0.0043 -0.0018 0.0157 - -0.0004 0.0216* 
 (0.0151) (0.0092) (0.0114)  (0.0060) (0.0115) 
       
Age -0.0725 0.0159 -0.1361*** - -0.0440* -0.1303*** 
 (0.0510) (0.0415) (0.0403)  (0.0247) (0.0392) 
       
Age squared 0.0004 0.0000 0.0010*** - 0.0003* 0.0010*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0002) (0.0002) 
       
# of Children 0.0097 0.0002 0.0132 - 0.0028 0.0127 
 (0.0111) (0.0085) (0.0101)  (0.0057) (0.0103) 
       
Intercept 3.4283 -0.9915 4.5804*** 0.0071 1.5478 4.3041*** 
 (2.1577) (1.7156) (1.6651) (0.0000) (0.9747) (1.6278) 
       
Observations 8,781 8,365 8,781 8,781 8,781 8,781 
R-Squared 0.4863 0.7480 0.6106 1.0000 0.5681 0.5830 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 
stroke, memory disease, arthritis and incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Table 2.15 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Asset Transfer Behavior and LTC Use For 































Post*Assets -0.0555*** 0.0335*** -0.0381*** -0.0019 -0.0283*** -0.0325** 
 (0.0160) (0.0061) (0.0126) (0.0016) (0.0068) (0.0127) 
       
Post -0.3042*** 0.0078 0.1237* 0.0009 0.0704** 0.1091 
 (0.1103) (0.0587) (0.0710) (0.0021) (0.0338) (0.0705) 
       
Assets 0.0220 -0.0159*** 0.0241** 0.0005 0.0194*** 0.0205* 
 (0.0148) (0.0046) (0.0111) (0.0010) (0.0058) (0.0110) 
       
Log Spend  0.0024 0.0013 0.0002 0.0000 0.0005 0.0002 
Down Assets (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0010) 
       
Log Exempt  0.0038 0.0032 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 
Assets (0.0033) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0021) 
       
Log Income 0.0086 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0022 -0.0019 
 (0.0081) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0057) 
       
Age -0.0572*** 0.0244* -0.1126*** -0.0004 -0.0267** -0.1047*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0148) (0.0192) (0.0004) (0.0105) (0.0189) 
       
Age squared 0.0004*** -0.0002 0.0008*** 0.0000 0.0002** 0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       
# of Children -0.0074 0.0067 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0018 -0.0011 
 (0.0082) (0.0062) (0.0051) (0.0000) (0.0029) (0.0050) 
       
Intercept 2.3823*** -0.8845 3.8404*** 0.0146 0.9704** 3.5610*** 
 (0.9107) (0.5723) (0.7463) (0.0168) (0.4039) (0.7335) 
       
Observations 30,436 29,614 30,436 30,436 30,436 30,436 
R-Squared 0.5181 0.7841 0.6163 0.9578 0.6130 0.6008 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 
stroke, memory disease, arthritis and incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Table 2.16 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Asset Transfer Behavior and LTC Use, 































Post*Assets 1.0834 2.5192** 1.1501 1.3317 1.6061** 1.2943** 
 (0.1171) (0.9423) (0.1309) (2.9488) (0.3678) (0.1442) 
       
Post 0.0000 0.8605 31.879*** 0.0000 1,052.3*** 21.209*** 
 (0.0000) (0.9109) (26.4150) (0.0000) (1,862.45) (17.3910) 
       
Assets 1.0875 0.8741 0.8607 0.3614 0.7726 0.7835** 
 (0.0943) (0.2540) (0.0853) (0.6008) (0.1571) (0.0761) 
       
Log Spend  1.0312*** 1.0365** 1.0063 1.4845 1.0119 1.0014 
Down Assets (0.0085) (0.0165) (0.0113) (0.4422) (0.0263) (0.0112) 
       
Log Exempt  1.0354* 1.0421 1.0002 1.6984 1.0233 1.0122 
Assets (0.0209) (0.0343) (0.0234) (0.8585) (0.0491) (0.0236) 
       
Log Income 1.0621 1.0751 1.0213 0.5766 0.9813 1.0373 
 (0.0492) (0.0821) (0.0560) (0.5966) (0.1054) (0.0555) 
       
Age 1.0401 2.4258*** 0.3563*** 1,584.231* 0.4776*** 0.4190*** 
 (0.0879) (0.3232) (0.0428) (6,369.60) (0.1186) (0.0492) 
       
Age squared 0.9996 0.9945*** 1.0072*** 0.9831 1.0042*** 1.0062*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0110) (0.0013) (0.0006) 
       
# of Children 0.9727 1.1515** 1.0310 0.0000 1.1175 1.0369 
 (0.0347) (0.0642) (0.0522) (0.0008) (0.1190) (0.0517) 
       
Observations 27,712 7,991 15,184 84 4,286 14,891 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 









Table 2.17 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Asset Transfer Behavior and LTC Use, 































Post*Assets 0.0037 0.0703** 0.0102 0.0006 0.0052 0.0157** 
 (0.0159) (0.0288) (0.0066) (0.0018) (0.0036) (0.0070) 
       
Post 0.0003 -0.0550* -0.0013 -0.0013 0.0076* -0.0045 
 (0.0164) (0.0289) (0.0076) (0.0020) (0.0041) (0.0078) 
       
Assets 0.0189 -0.0141 -0.0030 -0.0028* -0.0046 -0.0010 
 (0.0127) (0.0229) (0.0055) (0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0058) 
       
Log Spend  0.0116*** 0.0224*** -0.0028*** -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0032*** 
Down Assets (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
       
Log Exempt  -0.0100*** -0.0048** -0.0016 -0.0012*** -0.0024*** 0.0013 
Assets (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0014) 
       
Log Income 0.0776*** 0.0751*** -0.0058** -0.0022*** -0.0006 -0.0059* 
 (0.0061) (0.0054) (0.0027) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0030) 
       
Age -0.0080 0.0270*** -0.0077** 0.0016 0.0020 0.0019 
 (0.0081) (0.0066) (0.0039) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0042) 
       
Age squared 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
       
# of Children -0.0042** 0.0003 0.0017** -0.0004 0.0001 0.0024*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0007) 
       
Observations 44,305 49,606 51,711 51,711 51,711 51,711 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 








Table 2.18 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Asset Transfer Behavior and LTC Use, 































Post*Assets -0.0518*** 0.0267*** 0.0192** -0.0050 -0.0018 0.0209** 
 (0.0092) (0.0056) (0.0085) (0.0037) (0.0056) (0.0087) 
       
Post 0.0492*** -0.0056 -0.0123 0.0038 0.0107* -0.0128 
 (0.0107) (0.0060) (0.0092) (0.0038) (0.0061) (0.0094) 
       
Assets 0.0170** -0.0748*** -0.0074 -0.0021 -0.0050 -0.0029 
 (0.0085) (0.0060) (0.0072) (0.0027) (0.0045) (0.0074) 
       
Log Spend  0.0114*** 0.0184*** -0.0027*** 0.0001 0.0007** -0.0030*** 
Down Assets (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
       
Log Exempt  -0.0102*** -0.0130*** -0.0021 -0.0045*** -0.0055*** 0.0010 
Assets (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0014) 
       
Log Income 0.0644*** 0.0803*** -0.0066** 0.0001 0.0014 -0.0052* 
 (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0029) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0029) 
       
Age -0.0166*** 0.0286*** -0.0382*** -0.0181*** -0.0433*** -0.0252*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0052) 
       
Age squared 0.0001** -0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
       
# of Children -0.0028** 0.0015 0.0021** -0.0009*** -0.0001 0.0028*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
       
Intercept 0.7692*** -1.4941*** 1.1899*** 0.6929*** 1.5525*** 0.7070*** 
 (0.2409) (0.2411) (0.1802) (0.1218) (0.1636) (0.1958) 
       
Observations 51,713 49,606 51,711 51,711 51,711 51,711 
R-Squared 0.1338 0.1383 0.3534 0.2064 0.2658 0.2918 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 







































Appendix Table 2.1 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Asset Transfer Behavior and LTC 































Post*Assets -0.0482*** 0.0347*** -0.0255 -0.0001 -0.0169* -0.0117 
 (0.0186) (0.0070) (0.0179) (0.0003) (0.0095) (0.0177) 
       
Post -0.3199** -0.0659 0.0468 -0.0061 0.0238 0.0359 
 (0.1284) (0.0735) (0.0928) (0.0057) (0.0414) (0.0906) 
       
Assets 0.0312* -0.0175*** -0.0028 -0.0002 0.0071 -0.0100 
 (0.0166) (0.0061) (0.0143) (0.0001) (0.0071) (0.0144) 
       
Log Spend  0.0029 0.0013 0.0006 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 
Down Assets (0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0013) 
       
Log Exempt  0.0046 0.0031 -0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0005 
Assets (0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0001) (0.0014) (0.0026) 
       
Log Income 0.0109 0.0048 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0029 -0.0003 
 (0.0088) (0.0058) (0.0075) (0.0002) (0.0038) (0.0076) 
       
Age -0.0304* 0.0279** -0.1159*** -0.0000 -0.0545*** -0.1011*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0129) (0.0153) (0.0005) (0.0086) (0.0151) 
       
Age squared 0.0002* -0.0001* 0.0009*** 0.0000 0.0004*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       
# of Children 0.0005 0.0091* 0.0022 0.0000 0.0019 0.0025 
 (0.0080) (0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0000) (0.0032) (0.0057) 
       
Intercept 1.4930* -1.2359** 3.8150*** -0.0081 1.9254*** 3.3026*** 
 (0.8858) (0.5873) (0.7049) (0.0284) (0.3637) (0.6916) 
       
Observations 22,104 21,327 22,103 22,103 22,103 22,103 
R-Squared 0.5137 0.7657 0.6061 0.9898 0.6163 0.5925 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 
stroke, memory disease, arthritis and incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 2.2 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Asset Transfer Behavior and LTC 































Post*Assets -0.0483*** 0.0279*** -0.0234* -0.0021 -0.0215** -0.0209 
 (0.0130) (0.0061) (0.0139) (0.0020) (0.0086) (0.0143) 
       
Post -0.3152*** 0.0527 0.2404*** -0.0000 0.1298*** 0.2094*** 
 (0.1000) (0.0596) (0.0780) (0.0059) (0.0452) (0.0794) 
       
Assets 0.0207* -0.0107** 0.0137 0.0012 0.0119* 0.0090 
 (0.0113) (0.0047) (0.0119) (0.0017) (0.0070) (0.0121) 
       
Log Spend  0.0044*** 0.0015* -0.0008 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0009 
Down Assets (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0012) 
       
Log Exempt  0.0010 0.0017 -0.0024 0.0000 -0.0017 -0.0023 
Assets (0.0031) (0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0027) 
       
Log Income 0.0123* 0.0030 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0014 0.0029 
 (0.0070) (0.0042) (0.0063) (0.0007) (0.0040) (0.0064) 
       
Age -0.0149 0.0274*** -0.1383*** 0.0010 -0.0746*** -0.1290*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0092) (0.0121) (0.0019) (0.0092) (0.0122) 
       
Age squared 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0009*** -0.0000 0.0005*** 0.0009*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       
# of Children -0.0054 0.0058 0.0039 0.0000 0.0029 0.0035 
 (0.0068) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0001) (0.0031) (0.0059) 
       
Intercept 0.7838 -0.9026** 5.1147*** -0.0324 2.8343*** 4.7218*** 
 (0.6859) (0.4362) (0.5669) (0.0761) (0.3956) (0.5738) 
       
Observations 29,609 28,279 29,608 29,608 29,608 29,608 
R-Squared 0.5078 0.7641 0.6654 0.9599 0.6520 0.6315 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 
stroke, memory disease, arthritis and incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 2.3 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Asset Transfer Behavior and LTC 































Post*Assets -0.0392** 0.0090 -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0041 -0.0056 
 (0.0158) (0.0072) (0.0175) (0.0020) (0.0111) (0.0179) 
       
Post -0.2500* -0.0354 0.2104* -0.0045 0.1422** 0.1717 
 (0.1297) (0.0673) (0.1108) (0.0111) (0.0723) (0.1131) 
       
Assets 0.0121 -0.0043 -0.0070 0.0004 0.0027 -0.0096 
 (0.0139) (0.0059) (0.0157) (0.0022) (0.0094) (0.0159) 
       
Log Spend  0.0071*** 0.0025* 0.0010 0.0001 0.0018 0.0006 
Down Assets (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0023) 
       
Log Exempt  -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0002 
Assets (0.0037) (0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0005) (0.0024) (0.0037) 
       
Log Income 0.0109 0.0011 -0.0015 0.0007 0.0035 0.0003 
 (0.0081) (0.0043) (0.0081) (0.0010) (0.0055) (0.0086) 
       
Age -0.0284* 0.0272** -0.1399*** 0.0013 -0.0794*** -0.1291*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0106) (0.0165) (0.0026) (0.0130) (0.0166) 
       
Age squared 0.0002** -0.0002*** 0.0010*** -0.0000 0.0005*** 0.0009*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       
# of Children 0.0024 -0.0057 0.0149 0.0001 0.0105* 0.0110 
 (0.0086) (0.0074) (0.0097) (0.0002) (0.0062) (0.0098) 
       
Intercept 1.3775 -1.0136** 5.0560*** -0.0436 2.9827*** 4.6078*** 
 (0.8999) (0.5075) (0.8036) (0.1000) (0.5954) (0.8165) 
       
Observations 18,581 17,569 18,580 18,580 18,580 18,580 
R-Squared 0.5525 0.7951 0.7038 0.9686 0.6991 0.6640 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 
stroke, memory disease, arthritis and incontinence. All models contain individual and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 2.4 Estimates of the Post-DRA Effect on Asset Transfer Behavior and LTC 































Post*Assets -0.0483** 0.0375*** -0.0290* -0.0023 -0.0157* -0.0194 
 (0.0204) (0.0080) (0.0158) (0.0023) (0.0082) (0.0157) 
       
Post -0.3511*** 0.0178 0.1162 -0.0017 0.0480 0.1124 
 (0.1164) (0.0681) (0.0745) (0.0028) (0.0328) (0.0735) 
       
Assets 0.0311* -0.0179*** 0.0107 0.0012 0.0041 0.0087 
 (0.0172) (0.0068) (0.0124) (0.0013) (0.0065) (0.0124) 
       
Log Spend  0.0018 0.0015 -0.0007 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0007 
Down Assets (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0010) 
       
Log Exempt  0.0044 0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0027 
Assets (0.0037) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0023) 
       
Log Income 0.0142 0.0009 -0.0020 0.0001 -0.0041 -0.0018 
 (0.0105) (0.0071) (0.0064) (0.0002) (0.0032) (0.0064) 
       
Age -0.0125 0.0114 -0.1304*** 0.0003 -0.0488*** -0.1224*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0007) (0.0079) (0.0138) 
       
Age squared 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0009*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0009*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       
# of Children -0.0074 0.0158** -0.0026 0.0000 -0.0019 -0.0017 
 (0.0090) (0.0072) (0.0054) (0.0000) (0.0029) (0.0052) 
       
Intercept 0.7537 -0.4708 4.5506*** -0.0202 1.8079*** 4.2762*** 
 (0.8670) (0.5956) (0.6096) (0.0359) (0.3259) (0.6026) 
       
Observations 33,132 32,037 33,131 33,131 33,131 33,131 
R-Squared 0.5248 0.7745 0.6269 0.9671 0.5908 0.6186 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010).   
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Care models include the following additional 
health controls: sum of ADLs; sum of IADLs; fair/poor health; and indicators for diabetes, cancer, heart condition, 
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 Over time, as individuals age, their ability to perform both activities of daily living 
(ADLs, such as dressing and bathing) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs, such as 
buying groceries and preparing meals) diminishes. As a result, many elderly require help with 
these tasks in the form of long-term care. Although formal long-term care is provided in nursing 
homes and by paid in-home health aides, most individuals receive such care from their children, 
spouse, relatives and friends; these caregivers are not directly paid, and are consequently 
described as informal caregivers. In 2015, 80 percent of the elderly who required long-term care 
remained in the community, not in institutions such as nursing homes, with more than 90% of 
these individuals receiving some form of informal care (FCA 2015). 
 The demand for long-term care is expected to significantly increase in the future, as the 
U.S. population over the age of 65 is expected to more than double in size over the next 40 years 
(Census 2012). As a result, long-term care has recently become increasingly relevant for public 
policymakers as it is unclear whether sufficient in-home care will be available to meet this 
demand and to what extent Medicaid spending on long-term care will need to increase. To try 
and help meet the future need for care, recent policies have both directly and indirectly 
encouraged the use of informal care in place of nursing home care. For example, the Affordable 
Care Act created additional incentives for states to expand their spending on Home and 
Community Based Services (HCBS) by adopting Community First Choice programs and, in turn, 
receive greater Federal matching of funds. In addition, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
effectively increased the out-of-pocket cost of nursing homes by reducing individuals’ ability to 
qualify for Medicaid coverage by transferring away their assets, which in turn increased its 
relative price with respect to informal care.  
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 While policymakers seek to increase the utilization of informal care relative to formal 
care for financial reasons, such care may also be particularly beneficial for the elderly recipients. 
Nearly 90 percent of individuals over the age of 50 state that they want to stay in their current 
residence as they age (AARP 2006), suggesting that all else equal, they place greater value on in-
home care than institutional care. Informal care may also be effective in delaying the need for 
institutional long-term care; Lo Sasso and Johnson (2002) find that disabled individuals over the 
age of 70 are 60 percent less likely to use nursing home care over the next two years if they 
receive any informal care. In addition, Phillips et al. (2008) find that informal support, 
specifically support from family members, is a significant predictor of psychological well-being 
for elderly individuals in Hong Kong, with the effect being strongest for those who live alone. In 
this way, informal care can help elderly individuals with both their physical limitations and their 
mental health. Overall, the potential gains from informal care for both the elderly care recipients 
and policymakers emphasize the importance of understanding how adult children decide to start 
providing informal care. 
 In this paper I examine the relationship between that inter-vivos transfers, or asset 
transfers that a parent makes while still alive, and the subsequent informal care provided by the 
parent’s adult children (including biological children, stepchildren and children-in-law). Previous 
research has found that care recipients may use inter-vivos transfers and/or greater bequests to 
compensate those who have previously provided informal care and were otherwise unpaid 
(Norton et al. 2014, Brown 2006); however, there is much less research on whether these 
transfers may be used to motivate individuals to start providing care. Given that both Sloan et al. 
(1997) and Carmichael et al (2010) find that a child’s income and wage are significant predictors 
of his/her willingness to provide care, transfers may provide enough of a financial incentive for 
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those children who are on the margin of providing care by effectively making care provision 
more affordable. With a deeper understanding of how inter-vivos transfers impact informal care 
use, it will be possible to more accurately forecast the future supply of informal care. In order to 
gain this deeper understanding, I intend to examine the extent to which a child’s initial receipt of 
an inter-vivos transfer is correlated with his or her provision of informal care in the future. 
2. Literature Review 
 Previous research examines both how informal care affects inter-vivos transfers and how 
such transfers affect informal care provision. Below is a brief summary of prior research 
regarding these two relationships. 
2.1 Inter-Vivos Transfers as a Function of Informal Care 
 One of the main questions in this literature is whether asset transfers from parent to 
child are driven by parental altruism or made in exchange for the child’s time and/or care. One 
test of this is whether parents transfer more to their poorer children than their wealthier children, 
as Becker’s (1972) model of altruism implies that parents value all of their children’s utility 
equally and such transfers would help all children to have a comparable standard of living. 
However, this test does not necessarily rule out exchange, as poorer children may be relatively 
more likely to provide care than wealthier children due to the lower opportunity cost of their time 
(Cox 1987). Instead, several empirical studies test the neutrality hypothesis, which states that an 
altruistic parent will transfer any new income to a child in order to completely offset a 
simultaneous reduction in that child’s income. Specifically, if the parent’s income increases by 
one dollar at the same time that a child’s income decreases by one dollar, the parent should 
transfer one more dollar to that child if acting altruistically. Empirical tests of this theory, such as 
Cox and Rank (1992), Altonji et al. (1997) and Alessie et al. (2014), all find consistent evidence 
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that contradicts the neutrality rule, leading many to conclude that inter-vivos transfers are 
primarily motivated by exchange.  
 There are three studies that estimate the effect of care provision on financial transfers 
from parent to child. Two of these papers look at the relationship between the provision of 
informal care and contemporaneous inter-vivos transfer receipt while the third examines the 
relationship between care provision and expected end-of-life bequests. Norton et al. (2014), uses 
data from the 1999 and 2003 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women and 
finds that adult children who provided care during the previous year were significantly 8.6 
percentage points more likely to receive an inter-vivos transfer during that year than those who 
did not. Because both of these measures look at the same time period, the authors address 
concerns about endogeneity due to transfers potentially preceding care provision in two different 
ways. First, they instrument for care provision using the child’s number of sisters and an 
indicator if he/she is the parents’ eldest child as proxies for the supply of informal care in some 
models. Second, they include mother fixed-effects in other models to capture any unobserved 
time-invariant factors that may influence both caregiving and transfers such as the quality of the 
parent-child relationship. In the latter models, they find that the relationship is only significant 
along the extensive margin, as caregiving does not significantly affect the amount of the transfer.  
 The second paper, Norton and van Houtven (2006), uses data from the 1993 and 1995 
waves of the AHEAD survey and find that children who provide any care during the previous 
two years are roughly three times more likely to receive an inter-vivos transfer in the last year 
than their siblings who do not provide care. Given concerns that transfers may precede care 
provision, the authors similarly control for possible endogeneity by instrumenting for care 
provision using the child’s birth order, gender and marital status in some models and including 
121 
 
household fixed-effects in others. They also find that care provision does not significantly impact 
a parent’s expectation that her end-of-life bequest will be divided equally, suggesting that 
informal care is more likely to be compensated through inter-vivos transfers than through 
increased bequests.  
 However, Brown (2006) uses data from the first wave of the AHEAD survey and finds 
that children who regularly provide informal care are expected to receive significantly greater 
end-of-life bequests from their parents than those siblings who do not
44
. Specifically, after 
instrumenting for care provision using a child’s number of sisters, Brown finds that caregivers 
are, on average, expected to receive $11,302 more in end-of-life bequests than non-caregivers. 
This analysis only looks at end-of-life transfers and not inter-vivos transfers. Overall, although 
these three studies do not identify a precise timing effect, they all provide evidence that supports 
the theory that transfers are strongly motivated by exchange. 
  It is important to also acknowledge other possible motivations beyond exchange and 
altruism that may cause individuals to make inter-vivos transfers. One motive is that inter-vivos 
transfers can help individuals spend down their assets and qualify for Medicaid coverage so that 
Medicaid will help cover the costs of their long-term care
45
. Similarly, individuals can use such 
transfers to reduce their future estate tax burden
46
. However, given that the empirical research 
regarding these different motivations has yet to find consistent evidence in support of them, the 
                                                          
44
 Although not able to monitor actual end-of-life-bequests, the author calculates expected bequests as the sum of the 
amount of the parent’s life insurance held in that child’s name and that child’s share of the parent’s net worth if 
named in the parent’s will. 
 
45
 Bassett (2007) finds that individuals are more likely to make any inter-vivos transfers as their expectation of 
future nursing home care increases, which supports this motive. However, Norton (1995) finds that elderly 
individuals may be “welfare averse” as they may potentially be receiving transfers from their children in order to 
avoid becoming eligible for Medicaid. 
 
46
 Bernheim et al. (2004) find that individuals were 10-14 percentage points less likely to make an inter- vivos 
transfer after the estate tax threshold increased and effectively made more estates exempt from taxation. However, 
both McGarry (2000) and Poterba (2001) find that individuals who are subject to the estate tax do not consistently 
use the optimal inter-vivos transfers to reduce their future tax burden, which goes against this possible motivation. 
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argument that exchange is a primary reason why individuals make inter-vivos transfers gains 
more credibility. 
2.2 Care as a Function of Inter-Vivos Transfers 
 Children may also consider both past and future asset transfers from their parents when 
deciding how much informal care to provide to their parents. Beyond simply transferring their 
time, children may also transfer their “space” by either moving closer to a parent or moving in 
with a parent if he/she requires constant care and supervision. Koh and MacDonald (2006) use 
data from the 1992/1993 wave of the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study to estimate the effect of 
parent-to-child inter-vivos transfers on future child time, space and asset transfers
47
. Using 
multivariate logistic regressions, the authors find that a child’s receipt of at least $1,000 in inter-
vivos transfer from his/her parents over the previous forty years is associated with a significantly 
higher likelihood of providing care and helping with household chores over the past year but not 
with making a financial transfer or moving in with the parent.  
 Lopez-Anuarbe (2013) uses data from the 1993 and 1995 waves of the AHEAD survey 
to examine the overall determinants of both parent-to-child inter-vivos transfers and child 
informal care provision. Although both sets of models find that parent characteristics, child 
characteristics and state policies concerning long-term care significantly influence both decision 
processes, Lopez-Anuarbe finds that neither receiving financial help from one’s parents in the 
past two years nor receiving it between two and four years ago significantly affects a child’s 
likelihood of providing informal care. However, she includes in her models an indicator variable 
                                                          
 
47
 Asset transfers made from the child to the parent in response to those made from the parent to the child are likely 
made in order to help children overcome temporary liquidity constraints; as a result, I will focus solely on time and 
spatial transfers in the ensuing analysis. 
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equaling 1 if the child believes that the parent expects them to eventually provide informal care, 
which may help to explain why these measures are insignificant.  
 Finally, Norton et al. (2014) briefly discuss testing for whether parents make inter-
vivos transfers in anticipation of informal care. As discussed earlier, the authors focus primarily 
on whether a child’s provision of informal care provided in the previous year increases his or her 
likelihood of receiving an inter-vivos transfer during that same year and instrument for care 
provision in order to correct for potential endogeneity. They also test the effect of inter-vivos 
transfers on future care, though they do not discuss the model specification or present these 
particular results; however, they do mention that the estimated effect is usually statistically 
insignificant.  
2.3 Other Determinants of Care 
 Although the economics literature regarding altruism and informal care is relatively 
small, a much broader literature looks at the role of altruism from a sociological perspective. 
England (2005) notes that even though altruism likely plays a significant role in encouraging 
children to care for their parents, it may also be detrimental to the children if it makes them 
‘prisoners of love’ and prevents them from accomplishing other goals. But, Basu and Rosenman 
(2014) find that altruism, when measured using whether a child feels good about providing care, 
is significantly correlated with increases in the amount of care provided. Kahana et al. (2013) 
extend this work even further by noting that parents who act altruistically during their lifetimes 
are more likely to have higher qualities of life when older, which in turn may reduce their need 
for long-term care. When coupled with the concept that children pick up caregiving tendencies 
from their parents during their lifetimes, as noted in Ribar and Wilhelm (2006), parental altruism 
may also lead to an increase in the availability of informal care should these parents even need it. 
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In addition, Ribar and Wilhelm’s (2006) findings provide a greater understanding why oldest 
daughters are most likely to provide informal care, as has been noted ever since Stone et al. 
(1987). It is because since they are most likely, relative to their siblings, to notice their parents’ 
caregiving tendencies during their youth and emulate them when older.  
 Additional research has examined other factors that influence the provision of informal 
care, and it is necessary to control for these factors in order to isolate any relationship between 
inter-vivos transfers and care. For example, Couch et al. (1999) find a significant positive 
correlation between time and financial transfers, suggesting that they are complements rather 
than substitutes, and that children who make any transfer to their parents are likely to make both 
time and financial transfers. Boaz et al. (1999) find evidence of this, as well, and show that the 
type of transfer the child makes to their parent is strongly dependent upon the parent’s needs and 
the child’s household structure.  
 Both Henz (2006) and Heitmueller (2007) find significant evidence that a child’s ability 
to provide informal care depends on his/her labor supply and wage, as the former inherently 
affects the amount of time that he/she can provide care and the latter equals the opportunity cost 
of his/her time. Horowitz (1985) notes that the child’s gender strongly influences his or her 
decision to provide care, with daughters being significantly more likely to provide care and sons 
only more likely to do so in the absence of a female sibling. Mentzakis et al. (2009) find that a 
parent’s use of informal care depends on their use of other in-home care, as individuals tend to 
view informal care as a substitute for in-home medical care (such as services provided by 
physical therapists and chiropodists) and as a complement for formal home care (such as care 
provided by home health aides). Lastly, Keene and Batson (2010) note the importance of both 
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the parent’s and child’s marital status, health status and home ownership when summarizing the 
literature concerning the determinants of coresidence.  
 This analysis represents a contribution to this literature on inter-vivos transfers and future 
informal care provision by more accurately estimating the timing of this relationship. 
Specifically, the data used in my analyses allow me to examine the relationship between 
transfers made within the past two years and informal care provision during the previous month. 
While this does not eliminate the possibility that care still precedes transfers it significantly 
reduces this likelihood, given the relatively smaller period of overlap. In addition, my analysis is 
based on seven waves of longitudinal data across a twelve year period, whereas the previous 
research uses either cross-sectional data or two waves of longitudinal data. This will allow me to 
examine the dynamics of the relationship over time. Finally, I will be able to include a fuller set 
of control variables, such as the parent’s use of other long-term care services and additional child 
demographic information, to truly isolate any relationship between inter-vivos transfers and 
informal care.  
3. Theoretical Model 
 To show how inter-vivos transfers influence a child’s decision to provide informal care, I 
provide a simplified version of the conceptual framework from Van Houtven and Norton (2004), 
which models the relationship between formal and informal care. By incorporating inter-vivos 
transfers into child’s decision processes, it is possible to show how such transfers may lead to 
increased care provision and utilization.  


















)   such that w(24 – LC - AC) + T = XC 
where the superscript C denotes child-level variables and the superscript P denotes parent-level 
variables. In this maximization problem, the child chooses consumption (X
C
) by allocating his 
time between leisure (L
C
), providing informal care to his parent(s) (A
C
) and labor. He receives 
utility from consumption (X
C), leisure and the parent’s quality of life (QP).  The parent’s quality 
of life is a function of the total amount of informal care the parent receives from all n possible 
sources (specifically from a spouse/partner and all children), the formal home care they receive 
(M
P
) and their underlying health status (h
P)). Aside from labor income, in which the child’s wage 
(w) is multiplied by the hours he devotes to working (24 – LC - AC), the child may also receive 
additional income through an inter-vivos transfer from the parent (T); all income is spent on a 
numeraire consumption good.  
 Van Houtven and Norton (2004)’s initial model consists of separate utility maximization 
problems for both the parent and each child, which in turn allows them to examine not only 
caregiving from children to their parents but also crowding out of care provision among siblings. 
However, since my empirical analysis focuses only on the child’s decision process, I reduce their 
model to only the single maximization problem presented above. I assume that the parent’s 
underlying health status, the parent’s use of formal care and the amount of the inter-vivos 
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 There is no first order condition for X
C
 due to the budget constraint being substituted in for X
C
 so that the model 
only contains two choice variables. 
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These first order conditions suggest that the child will choose the amount of both leisure and 
informal care for which the marginal utility from doing so is equal to the marginal utility of 
working for one hour (i.e. wage w times the marginal utility of income λ). 
 It is more important to understand how each of these choices changes with the amount of 
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[(wU𝑋𝐿)(U𝑄𝑋Q𝐴 – U𝐿𝑋) + (U𝑄𝐿Q𝐴)(U𝐿𝑋 – wU𝑋𝑋) + (U𝐿𝐿)(wU𝑋𝑋 – U𝑄𝑋Q𝐴)
𝛥
, 
where UXX equals 
𝜕2𝑈
𝜕𝑋2
 and Δ is known to be negative based on the second order conditions. The 
full derivations of these partial derivatives can be found in the appendix. Although the signs of 
these derivatives are mathematically ambiguous, I assume that both are positive and that, in turn, 
both leisure and informal care are normal goods. As a result, given that consumption is a normal 
good as well, a child should increase informal caregiving as a result of receiving an inter-vivos 
transfer. 
 The literature suggests that there are several other important factors that influence a 
child’s provision of informal care beyond inter-vivos transfers. Specifically, a child is more 
likely to provide care if the child is female and/or has fewer siblings (if any) who could 
potentially provide care and less likely to do so if the parent receives significant formal home 
care. In addition, the child’s care provision is also influenced by her marital status, number of 
children and proximity to the parent in need of care. Overall, this simplified theoretical 
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framework suggests that in order to accurately estimate the effects of inter-vivos transfers on 
informal care utilization, it is necessary to control for the parent’s need for care, the availability 
of care from other sources and the child’s ability to provide such care. 
4. Data 
 The data used in this paper come from the 1998-2010 waves of the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal, biennial survey that follows a representative sample of 
Americans over the age of 50 and their spouses as they transition into retirement
49
. It is ideally 
suited to this analysis because it includes information on each respondent’s long-term care use, 
asset transfers, wealth, income, health status, children and demographics.  
 Given that the HRS sample consists of individuals age 50 and over, it is important to 
focus on those respondents who are likely to need informal care; because 70% of those 
individuals turning 65 are expected to need some form of long-term care during their lifetime 
(DHHS 2014), the sample used in this analysis includes only those respondents age 65 and over. 
This sample restriction also ensures that every respondent has access to Medicare and that any 
estimated effects are not driven by the receipt of Medicare coverage at age 65.  
 In addition, in order to examine how transfer receipt impacts caregiving, the unit of 
observation for the analysis is the child-respondent pair. There are potentially two respondents 
interviewed from each household (i.e. the primary respondent and his or her spouse) so it is 
possible for each child to provide care to two unique respondents. As a result, each child may 
have up to two observations in each period. I also limit the final sample to include children 
                                                          
49
 Specifically, the data used comes from the RAND HRS Family Data, not the raw HRS data, primarily for 
convenience. For example, this file standardizes the coding of the raw HRS data across survey waves and includes a 
separate file in which the child, rather than the respondent, is the unit of observation.  
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between the ages of 24 and 65 in order to focus on those children who are likely to be both 
physically and financially able to provide care
50
.  
 Lastly, in order to identify a plausibly causal relationship between inter-vivos transfers 
and care provision, I exclude all observations in which the child has received any inter-vivos 
transfers from that respondent or provided informal care to that respondent in an earlier survey 
wave. These exclusions help to reduce the possibility of reverse causality biasing the results. For 
example, consider a child who provides care during the previous survey wave (i.e. within the 
past two years), receives an inter-vivos transfer as compensation for doing so during that same 
wave and continues to provide care during the current wave. Without controlling for his care 
provision last period, empirical estimates would find a positive correlation between transfers and 
future caregiving when, in reality, that is incorrect. Although these restrictions again reduce the 
likelihood of reverse causality, they also reduce the prevalence of caregiving in the sample due to 
the majority of caregivers providing care during consecutive periods in the sample period. 
Overall, these restrictions result in the final sample consisting of 52,642 child-respondent 
observations that follow 9,063 unique respondents and 10,815 unique children.  
 The unweighted summary statistics
51
 for the unique respondents can be found in Table 
3.1. Each table shows the summary statistics for the full sample in Column 1, as well as stratified 
by number of children in Columns 2 through 5. In the sample, 22 percent of respondents ever 
make an inter-vivos transfer during the survey period, with 7 percent ever receiving informal 
care from a child, 3 percent ever receiving help with ADLs, 5 percent ever receiving help with 
IADLs and 3 percent ever receiving help with their finances. In addition, the average respondent 
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 These particular criteria eliminate 8,639 observations (7.92% of the final sample), with 7,694 of these 
observations being children over the age of 65.  
 
51
 It is important to note that these summary statistics look at unique respondents, children and pairs, meaning that 
all observations are not necessarily from the same survey wave; because of this, sample waits are not applicable.  
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in the sample is 73 years old and 57 percent of respondents are female, while 83 percent are 
white and 61 percent are married. Respondents seem to be in relatively good health, with an 
average number of ADL and IADL limitations of 0.38 and 0.33, respectively, and have a mean 
of nearly $422,000 in real wealth. It is important to note, however, that the level of assets varies 
widely cross-sectionally within the sample, with 7 percent of respondents either having no assets 
or being in debt and 23 percent of respondents having more than $500,000 in real wealth. All 
respondents in the sample have at least one biological child or stepchild, and those who have 
fewer biological children are relatively less likely to have ever received any type of informal care 
from their children. However, respondents have similar likelihoods of ever making an inter-vivos 
transfer regardless of their number of biological children. 
 Table 3.2 presents the unweighted summary statistics for the unique children included 
in the sample, with 12 percent of these children ever receiving an inter-vivos transfer from a 
respondent during the sample period. In addition, 4 percent ever provide informal care to a 
respondent, 1 percent ever help with ADLs, 2 percent ever help with IADLs and 1 percent ever 
help with finances. The majority of these children are biologically related to their respondents, 
with 86 percent being their biological children, 13 percent being their stepchildren and less than 
1 percent being their children-in-law. Although relatively few children have respondents who 
have zero biological children, these children are (inherently) more likely to be stepchildren of the 
respondent, be unemployed and live farther away from the respondent. Aside from not being 
biological children of the respondent, their distance from the respondent may also help to explain 
their much lower likelihoods of ever providing any of the types of care to their respondents.  
 Table 3.3 summarizes the statistics for the full sample, in which the unit of observation 
is the child-respondent pair. It shows that throughout the entire survey period, the respondent 
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made an inter-vivos transfer to the child in 6 percent of observations. Conditional upon making a 
transfer, respondents in the full sample transfer roughly $7,000 to their children in any two-year 
period. In contrast, respondents who only have one biological child make such transfers in 9 
percent of these observations and on average transfer roughly $8,200 when they do. In the full 
sample, children also provide informal care in only 2 percent of these observations, with this 
very low rate of provision again likely due to the sample restrictions discussed above. Since the 
sample prevents any particular child from caring for a respondent in multiple periods, it is more 
accurate to interpret this mean as saying that children start to provide informal care in 2 percent 
of these observations. Similarly, when splitting this result between care that predominantly helps 
with ADL limitations, care that helps with IADL limitations and care that helps with finances, 
we find that 1 percent of children start providing each type of care in the sample. However, 
contingent upon providing any care, children provide care on 14 days and for 56 hours each 
month. Finally, the majority of children in this sample are again biological children of the 
respondents, married, work full time and own their own homes. 
5. Methodology 
 This analysis exploits the longitudinal nature of the HRS data to identify a temporal 
relationship between inter-vivos transfers and informal care utilization. Such an analysis is not 
possible using most other sources of data since they are not able to account for either the timing 
of transfers or care utilization as effectively. Most importantly, when HRS respondents are asked 
about inter-vivos transfers, they are asked in each survey wave whether or not they made any 
transfers over the past two years (i.e. since the previous interview) and if so, how much they 
transferred and to whom they transferred the assets. Similarly, when asked about care utilization, 
the respondent is asked each survey wave if he currently receives any care, who provides this 
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care and how much care (measured in hours) he received from each caregiver during the 
previous month. While cross-sectional surveys often ask similar questions, they are unable to 
document the timing of transfers and caregiving as effectively as longitudinal data; in addition, 
the use of longitudinal data allows for repeatedly looking at this relationship for each child-
respondent pair over time and examining how it changes. 
 By taking advantage of both the longitudinal nature of the data and the wording of the 
key survey questions, the baseline model specification is designed as follows:  
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑗,𝑡−2 + 𝑇𝑡 +  𝑃𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (1)
 
In this model, Care equals 1 if child j provided informal care to respondent i during the month 
before being interviewed in year t and zero otherwise. The HRS contains information about the 
type of informal care provided, specifically whether the child helps the respondent with ADLs, 
IADLs and/or finances; this, in turn, allows for Care to separately represent the use of four 
different types of informal care: any informal care, care dealing with ADLs, care dealing with 
IADLs and care dealing with finances. Transfer is the independent variable of interest and equals 
1 if the child received an inter-vivos transfer from parent i in the two years before being 
interviewed in year t and zero otherwise.  
 The model includes both year fixed effects (Tt) and parent fixed effects (Pi) to control 
for changes over time that affect all respondents and time-invariant parent characteristics, 
respectively. Additional parent and child control variables (Xi and Xj, respectively) are included 
as well, with these variables taken from the previous survey wave (i.e. from two years earlier) in 
order to precede any inter-vivos transfer that the parent makes. The parent control variables 
include age, marital status, number of kids, number of ADL limitations, number of IADL 
limitations, an indicator of self-reported poor health and log values of both real household wealth 
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and real household income. The child control variables include age, number of kids, gender, 
whether the child is the respondent’s biological child, level of education, employment status, 
home ownership, coresidence, proximity to parent and indicators for income bracket.  
 Figure 3.1 below helps to show how exactly this model specification, when coupled 
with the sample restrictions discussed earlier, measures the relationship between inter-vivos 
transfer receipt and informal care provision. The timeline presented in Figure 3.1 represents the 
full two year period between the interviews in years t-2 and t, split into 24 months. Using the 
variables from the HRS, I again examine whether or not the child received any transfers from a 
respondent during these two years as well as whether or not that child provides any care to that 
same respondent in the both preceding the interview at year t. Using the aforementioned sample 
restrictions, I aim to ensure, as best as possible, that the child neither receives any transfers from 
that respondent nor provides any care to him/her in any year before year t-2.  
 While this helps to more accurately identify this particular relationship between 
transfers and care, it is not a perfect empirical approach. First, due to the exact timing of the 
transfer within these two years being unknown, it is impossible to guarantee that the transfer 
precedes any care provision. In addition, the data do not identify whether the child provides any 
informal care during the first 23 months of this period, meaning that it is possible that any 




6.1 Baseline Results 
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 While instrumenting for care provision could further help to control for potential endogeneity, using the child’s 
gender, birth order and/or number of siblings as instruments, concerns over their effectiveness in the previous 
literature leads me to not use this approach in the ensuing analysis; instead, I choose to do so using these 
aforementioned sample restrictions and including parent fixed-effects. 
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 Table 3.4 shows the results from estimating Equation 1 as a linear probability model. 
Receiving an inter-vivos transfer from a parent is associated with a significant 0.8 percentage 
point (44.6 percent) increase in the likelihood of providing any informal care to that parent. 
Transfer receipt is also significantly associated with a 0.9 percentage point (68.8 percent) 
increase in the likelihood of helping the respondent with IADL limitations and a 0.4 percentage 
point (56.2 percent) increase in the likelihood of helping with finances.  Somewhat surprising is 
that the correlation with the likelihood of helping with ADL limitations is statistically 
insignificant, though it is important to note that these limitations adversely affect an individual’s 
physical functioning whereas IADL limitations impair one’s ability to live independently. 
Because of this, parents may experience IADL limitations sooner than ADL limitations and/or 
children may potentially find it easier to help with IADLs (rather than ADLs) as it may be 
relatively less time-intensive; either of these explanations can help to explain why the correlation 
is significant for IADLs but insignificant for ADLs. The other significant results are that 
biological children, female children, coresident children and children who live within 10 miles of 
the parent are significantly more likely to provide all four types of care. 
 Table 3.5 shows estimates of Equation (1) using the logged real transfer amount instead 
of the indicator of inter-vivos transfer receipt, with fewer control parameter estimates shown for 
brevity (but available upon request). Conditional upon the child receiving a transfer, the amount 
of the transfer is not significantly associated with care provision across all four measures of care. 
When taken together, the results from Tables 3.4 and 3.5 seem to suggest that the receipt of any 
inter-vivos transfer is more strongly associated with future care provision than the magnitude of 
this transfer. However, the small sample size due to only looking at children who received any 
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transfers may also be partially responsible for the lack of significant findings in the amount 
models. 
 Tables 3.6 presents the results from estimating Equation 1 to examine the relationship 
between transfers and informal care use among parents with specific self-reported ADL and 
IADL limitations. The key dependent variables are interactions between indicator variables that 
equal one if the child provides help with ADLs/IADLs and if the respondent reports having that 
particular ADL/IADL limitation. Despite finding no significant correlation between inter-vivos 
transfers and informal care concerning ADL limitations in Table 3.4, Table 3.6 shows that 
transfer receipt is significantly associated with a 0.4 percentage point (75 percent) increase in the 
child’s likelihood of helping the respondent with dressing and a 0.3 percentage point (66 percent) 
increase in helping with bathing. Similarly, the receipt of a transfer is significantly associated 
with a 0.5 percentage point (44.7 percent) increase in the child’s likelihood of helping with 
shopping for groceries, a 0.5 percentage point (70.6 percent) increase in helping with meal 
preparation, a 0.44 percentage point (125.7 percent) increase in helping with medications and a 
0.4 percentage point (69.1 percent) increase in helping with money. This table also shows that 
being the respondent’s biological child, being female and living near the respondent are still 
significantly associated with a child providing informal care. All other control variable estimates 
are comparable to those from Table 3.4 in sign, magnitude and significance (not presented in 
Table 3.6 but available upon request). 
 Table 3.7 shows estimates of an equation similar to Equation (1) in which the 
dependent variable is the amount of care that children provide, measured using both the number 
of days and the number of hours of care that the child provides to the respondent each month. 
Conditional upon providing any care, these results suggest that inter-vivos transfers are not 
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significantly associated with the amount of care that children provide. However, similar to the 
results in Table 3.5, the small sample size due to only looking at children who provide care may 
also help to explain the lack of significant results. 
 Lastly, given that children may also be willing to transfer their “space” to their parent, 
Table 3.8 estimates Equation (1) to see if the receipt of any inter-vivos transfer is associated with 
a change in the child’s proximity to the respondent. Column 1 shows that the receipt of an inter-
vivos transfer is not significantly associated with the likelihood of a child currently living with a 
parent, conditional upon the child living within 10 miles of the respondent in the previous survey 
wave (i.e. two years ago). However, Columns 2 and 3 show that for those children who lived 10 
miles or further from the respondent during the previous wave, the receipt of an inter-vivos 
transfer is significantly associated with a child being 0.97 percentage points (24.3 percent) more 
likely to currently live within 10 miles of the respondent and 1.9 percentage points (7.92 percent) 
more likely to currently live with the respondent. Despite the magnitude of these effects, these 
results need to be taken with caution for two reasons. First, these results do not suggest by what 
action or mechanism the proximity between the respondent and child changes, which can also 
change if the respondent moves closer to or moves in with the child; because of this, these 
estimates do not necessarily reflect changes in child behavior
53
. Second, given that the timing of 
any move is unclear, it is certainly possible that the move could precede the transfer as well.  
6.2 Sample Stratifications 
 Given the likelihood that not all children will react to receiving an inter-vivos transfer 
in the exact same manner, Table 3.9 contains the results from estimating Equation (1) after 
stratifying the sample by child gender, child marital status, child proximity and respondent 
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 The HRS does separately ask about the respondent and child moving during the two years between survey waves 
but these variables include significant missing values that prevent them from being used. 
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family size. As mentioned earlier, female children are relatively more likely to provide care than 
male children, and this stratification examines whether the effect of inter-vivos transfers differs 
across child genders as well. Only the parameter estimates concerning the child’s inter-vivos 
transfer receipt are presented for brevity. The first two rows suggest that receiving an inter-vivos 
transfer is significantly associated with female children being 1.2 percentage points (49.6 
percent) more likely to provide any care, 1.2 percentage points (69.8 percent) more likely to help 
with IADL limitations and .7 percentage points (78.3 percent) more likely to help with the 
respondent’s finances. In contrast, these estimates are consistently statistically insignificant for 
male children, suggesting that the baseline results are driven by female children
54
.  
 The next stratification is by child marital status, as married children may either be more 
or less willing to provide care than single children; specifically, they may be more likely to 
provide care if their spouse is the primary earner in the household and less likely if they have 
relatively more time commitments (such as those to their spouse and children). The results in the 
next two rows of Table 3.9 suggest that inter-vivos transfer receipt is significantly associated 
with care provision for married children but not for single children. Specifically, transfer receipt 
for married children is significantly associated with a 0.9 percentage point (60.1 percent) 
increase in the likelihood of providing any care, a 0.8 percentage point (83.3 percent) increase in 
helping with IADL limitations and a 0.6 percentage point increase (106.9 percent) in helping 
with finances. Just as with male children, the correlations for single children are consistently 
statistically insignificant. 
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  With children who live near the respondent (i.e. those who either live with the 
respondent or live within 10 miles of the respondent
55
) more likely to provide informal care 
because of their proximity, stratifying the sample by proximity in the previous period suggests 
that the receipt of an inter-vivos transfer is only correlated with a significant 1.2 percentage point 
(113 percent) increase in their likelihood of helping with finances and not significantly correlated 
with either help with ADLs or IADLs. However, these correlations differ for children who live 
more than 10 miles from the respondent, as transfer receipt is significantly associated with a 0.6 
percentage point (60.6 percent) increase in the likelihood that they provide any informal care and 
0.6 percentage point (90.5 percent) increase in the likelihood that they help with IADL 
limitations. It is possible that children who live near the respondent are already likely to provide 
these care services, and in turn not affected by transfers, while those who live farther away may 
use these transfers to cover the cost of travelling to the respondent. 
 Finally, given the importance of care from other potential siblings in a particular child’s 
decision to provide care, the last three rows of Table 3.9 stratify the sample based on the 
respondent’s number of biological children. The insignificant results for respondents with one or 
fewer biological children
56
 across all four care measures suggest that children in smaller families 
may be expected to provide informal care simply because there are so few other potential 
caregivers, causing their likelihood of providing care to not be significantly associated with 
inter-vivos transfers. This changes with children in families with between two and four biological 
children, where transfer receipt is associated with a 0.8 percentage point (44.2 percent) increased 
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 When estimating Equation 1 separately for children who reside with their parents and those who live within 10 
miles of them, the results were consistently statistically insignificant. Because of this, these two samples are 
combined for brevity. 
 
56
 Again, respondents with zero biological children have at least one stepchild and are still capable of receiving 
informal care from children. 
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likelihood of providing any informal care and a 0.8 percentage point (66.9 percent) increased 
likelihood of helping with IADL limitations. Children in families with five or more biological 
children react similarly, as transfer receipt for them is significantly associated with a 1 
percentage point (82.4 percent) increased likelihood of helping with IADLs. Overall, these 
stratifications suggest that the baseline results are primarily driven by female children, married 
children, children who live farther than 10 miles from the respondent and children in relatively 
medium sized families. 
6.3 Alternate Specifications 
 Reverse causality could enter Equation 1 based on the wording of the survey questions 
regarding both inter-vivos transfers and informal care. Specifically, Equation 1 estimates the 
effects of receiving a transfer during the past two years on care provided during the past month. 
Although there is only a slight overlap, there is a slight chance that care provided earlier in this 
past month could have preceded an inter-vivos transfer made at the end of the month. 
Unfortunately, the HRS does not contain detailed information about the specific dates either 
when transfers are made or when care starts to be provided, so there is no way to know for 
certain whether the transfer or the care occurs first. The only way to eliminate this overlap is to 
estimate Equation (1) using the lagged value of Transfer, which equals 1 if the child received 
any inter-vivos transfers during the previous survey wave (i.e. between two and four years ago).  
 The results from this model can be found in Table 3.10, with again the only difference 
between the results in Tables 3.4 and 3.10 being that Transfer is now lagged. This one small 
change leads to all of the aforementioned significant correlations from Table 3.4 becoming 
statistically insignificant. While this specification helps to make sure that the inter-vivos transfer 
precedes any informal caregiving, it also imposes a significant amount of time (i.e. two to four 
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years) between the transfer and care provision. Since it is highly unlikely that transfers may 
influence child behavior several years in the future, it is unclear if these results are insignificant 
due to this gap or due to controlling for possible reverse causality.   
 As another specification, Table 3.11 shows the results from estimating Equation (1) after 
excluding both the number of kids and the measure of home ownership from the child control 
variables. These two variables, while important to control for, contain missing values for a large 
number of respondents and in turn reduce the size of the sample used in the analyses. When 
removing these variables and increasing the sample size by roughly 23,000 observations, the 
results are relatively comparable to those presented in Table 3.4. Specifically, the receipt of an 
inter-vivos transfer is now significantly associated with a 0.9 percentage point (47.3 percent) 
increased likelihood of providing any care, a 0.8 percentage point (65.6 percent) increased 
likelihood of helping with IADL limitations and a 0.4 percentage points (58.3 percent) increased 
likelihood of helping with finances. However, unlike the baseline results, excluding these two 
control variables now results in transfer receipt being significantly correlated with a 0.3 
percentage point (47.2 percent) increased likelihood of helping with ADLs.  
 Another possible, although unlikely, explanation for the findings in Table 3.4 is that the 
RAND HRS Family Data includes imputed values of financial transfers, household assets and 
household income for those respondents who were unsure of these amounts when completing the 
survey. Although only 1 percent of the full sample (1,106 observations) has imputed values, 
these respondents make up roughly 12.2 percent of those who make transfers and may 
potentially impact the results discussed above.  The results in Table 3.12 represent the same 
model specifications as those in Table 3.4, albeit after excluding those individuals with imputed 
inter-vivos transfer amounts from the sample. While the results regarding inter-vivos transfers 
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are slightly less significant than they were in Table 3.4, they all still remain comparable in terms 
of both sign and magnitude; specifically, transfer receipt is associated with a 0.6 percentage point 
(42.4 percent) increased likelihood of providing any care, a 0.7 percentage point (70.2 percent) 
increased likelihood of helping with IADL limitations and a 0.4 percentage point (78.2 percent) 
increased likelihood of helping with the respondent’s finances. Given these significant results, I 
conclude that the imputed values are not driving the baseline results. 
 Finally, Table 3.13 presents the odds ratios from estimating Equation (1) using a Logit 
Model instead of a Linear Probability Model. Due to conditional fixed-effect logit models 
imposing additional sample restrictions that will reduce the validity for this particular analysis
57
, 
I instead choose to omit parent fixed effects from the specification and include additional parent-
level time invariant controls for the respondent’s gender, race, ethnicity and education status. 
Overall, the parameter estimates concerning inter-vivos transfers are consistently significant and 
greater than 1, suggesting that transfer receipt is associated with an increased likelihood of 
providing each type of informal care. In addition, the parent’s age and self-reported health status 
also significantly increase the likelihood of providing each type of care, as are the child’s 
relationship to the respondent, gender and proximity to the respondent. 
7. Conclusion 
 Overall, the expected increase in the demand for long-term care in the near future has 
raised concerns over whether sufficient care will be available to meet this demand. In an effort to 
help better understand why children decide to provide informal caregiving to their parents, this 
                                                          
57
 Specifically, conditional fixed-effect logit models only include observations that have both values of the 
dependent variable (i.e. 0 and 1) at least once each during the sample period. In this particular context, only those 
individuals who receive care in at least one period and do not receive care in at least one period are included in the 
analysis. Because these analyses, in turn, effectively only look at those individuals who start using care during the 
period, it is not appropriate for determining the effectiveness of transfers at incentivizing informal care provision.  
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analysis seeks to increase our understanding of how inter-vivos asset transfers from parents 
affect the child’s decision process. Overall, the results presented above suggest that there is a 
positive correlation between inter-vivos transfer receipt in the past two years and starting to 
provide informal care in the past month, as children who receive such transfers are roughly 44 
percent more likely to provide care relative those children who do not; these correlations are also 
sizable in magnitude, though it remains to be seen if this can solely be attributed to small sample 
means that result from the imposed sample restrictions. In addition, these effects are 
predominantly significant for female children, married children, children who live more than 10 
miles away from the parent and children in medium-sized families.  
 Although having a better understanding of this relationship may be helpful in more 
accurately forecasting the future supply of informal care, this analysis is not without its 
shortcomings. First, it is only a descriptive analysis that makes use of the variation in the timing 
and wording of questions in the HRS, meaning that these results are not causal estimates of the 
effects of inter-vivos transfers. In addition, despite the way in which the baseline model was 
designed to limit the risk of reverse causality, it is still possible that these results are in fact 
biased. Due to the HRS not containing information about exactly when children start to provide 
care, it is impossible to determine when children start providing care during any particular 
survey wave, meaning that informal care may still precede any inter-vivos transfers between the 
parent and child. While the inclusion of parent and year fixed effects will help to control for any 
unobserved sources of endogeneity, such as the parent’s relationship with each child and changes 
in the economy, respectively, reverse causality may still be biasing these results. The only way to 
correct this is with stronger data, though these results still suggest that there may be a significant 
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Table 3.1 HRS Sample Descriptive Statistics for Unique Respondents 
 Full Sample 
0 Bio Kids 
Sample 
1 Bio Kids  
Sample 
2-4 Bio Kids 
Sample 











           
Ever Make Inter-Vivos Transfer 0.22 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.40 
Ever Receive Informal Care 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.31 
Ever Receive Help with ADLs 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.20 
Ever Receive Help with IADLs 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.26 
Ever Receive Help with Finances 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.20 
           
Age 73.62 6.47 75.18 7.03 75.29 7.07 73.56 6.44 73.12 6.18 
Female 0.57 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.56 0.50 
White 0.83 0.37 0.79 0.41 0.81 0.39 0.88 0.32 0.71 0.45 
Black 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.39 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.29 0.23 0.42 
Other Race 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.23 
Hispanic 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.16 0.36 
Married 0.61 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.59 0.49 
Widowed 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.27 0.44 0.29 0.45 
Divorced 0.07 0.26 0.02 0.15 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 
No High School 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.27 0.45 0.48 0.50 
High School grad 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.43 0.50 
College Grad 0.14 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.09 0.29 
           
# Kids 4.06 2.29 3.08 1.81 1.84 1.53 3.37 1.46 6.78 2.14 
# Biological Children 3.51 2.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.89 0.79 6.33 1.76 
# Stepchildren 0.51 1.28 3.01 1.83 0.80 1.48 0.44 1.19 0.38 1.15 










Table 3.1 HRS Sample Descriptive Statistics for Unique Respondents (Continued) 
 Full Sample 
0 Bio Kids 
Sample 
1 Bio Kids  
Sample 
2-4 Bio Kids 
Sample 











# ADL limitations 0.38 0.96 0.60 1.19 0.36 0.91 0.34 0.91 0.47 1.08 
#IADL Limitations 0.33 0.94 0.43 1.11 0.28 0.87 0.30 0.89 0.43 1.06 
Poor Health 0.31 0.46 0.35 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.37 0.48 
           
Real Income ($1,000s) 49.60 65.83 51.02 44.78 46.04 59.48 52.60 70.78 42.42 53.39 
Real Wealth ($1,000s) 421.39 961.30 555.12 1121.79 372.53 657.65 466.23 1076.55 303.20 627.34 
Real Wealth ≤$0 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.21 0.11 0.31 
$0 < Real Wealth ≤$100,000 0.29 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.38 0.49 
$100,000 < Real Wealth ≤$250,000 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 
$250,000 < Real Wealth ≤$500,000 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.13 0.34 
$500,000 < Real Wealth 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.17 0.37 
           
N 9,063 179 728 5,984 2,172 
















Table 3.2 HRS Sample Descriptive Statistics for Unique Children 
 Full Sample 
0 Bio Kids 
Sample 
1 Bio Kids  
Sample 
2-4 Bio Kids 
Sample 











           
Ever Receive Inter-Vivos Transfer 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36 0.08 0.27 
Ever Provide Informal Care 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 
Ever Provide Help with ADLs 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12 
Ever Provide Help with IADLs 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 
Ever Provide Help with Finances 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.10 
           
Biological Child 0.86 0.34 0.07 0.25 0.61 0.49 0.86 0.35 0.93 0.26 
Stepchild 0.13 0.34 0.90 0.29 0.38 0.48 0.14 0.34 0.07 0.26 
Child in Law 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 
# Other Children 4.29 2.90 2.78 1.91 1.73 2.08 2.94 1.92 6.48 2.72 
           
Age 45.96 7.40 47.58 8.34 47.98 8.18 46.39 7.22 45.08 7.41 
Female 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Married 0.67 0.47 0.67 0.47 0.66 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.65 0.48 
Partnered 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.25 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 
Live w/in 10 miles of Parent(s) 0.27 0.44 0.16 0.37 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 
Live with Parent(s) 0.04 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 













Table 3.2 HRS Sample Descriptive Statistics for Unique Children (Continued) 
 Full Sample 0 Bio Kids Sample 
1 Bio Kids  
Sample 
2-4 Bio Kids  
Sample 
5+ Bio Kids  
Sample 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Work full-time 0.75 0.43 0.71 0.46 0.75 0.44 0.77 0.42 0.73 0.44 
Work part time 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 
Unemployed 0.18 0.38 0.25 0.43 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.40 
No High School 0.12 0.33 0.24 0.43 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28 0.17 0.38 
High School Grad 0.59 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.61 0.49 
College Grad 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.21 0.41 
Income A 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.21 
Income B 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 
Income C 0.19 0.39 0.12 0.33 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.17 0.37 
Income D 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37 0.09 0.29 
Income Missing 0.54 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.57 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.58 0.49 
Owns Home 0.62 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.66 0.47 0.58 0.49 
      
N 10,815 179 657 6,574 3,405 
















Table 3.3 HRS Sample Descriptive Statistics for Child-Respondent Pairs 
 Full Sample 
0 Bio Kids 
Sample 
1 Bio Kids  
Sample 
2-4 Bio Kids 
Sample 






Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
           
Make Inter-Vivos Transfer 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.25 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.18 
Amount of Transfer ($1,000s) 7.02 22.06 5.34 6.91 8.24 12.40 7.41 25.83 5.81 10.30 
Provide Care 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12 
Provide ADL Care 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08 
Provide IADL Care 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 
Provide Financial Help 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.07 
# Days Helped 14.14 12.06 14.50 12.76 16.43 13.29 14.38 12.07 13.43 11.83 
# Hours Helped 56.14 112.82 25.00 23.88 70.98 136.90 55.32 106.37 55.35 117.69 
           
Parent Variables           
Female 0.57 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.57 0.50 
White 0.82 0.38 0.84 0.36 0.82 0.39 0.89 0.31 0.72 0.45 
Black 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.08 0.28 0.22 0.42 
Hispanic 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.16 0.37 
Age 72.99 5.99 74.07 6.67 74.04 6.61 72.95 6.02 72.92 5.86 
Married 0.65 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.57 0.49 0.68 0.47 0.62 0.48 
Divorced 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 
Widowed 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.45 
# Kids 5.22 2.83 3.91 2.06 2.86 1.99 3.90 1.93 7.29 2.67 
in Poor Health 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.35 0.48 
# ADL Limitations 0.26 0.76 0.35 0.85 0.24 0.73 0.21 0.68 0.33 0.87 
# IADL Limitations 0.20 0.68 0.22 0.62 0.14 0.57 0.16 0.60 0.27 0.78 
Real Income ($1,000s) 49.61 288.28 59.62 68.49 77.55 1412.08 53.81 87.97 40.80 49.22 









Table 3.3 HRS Sample Descriptive Statistics for Child-Respondent Pairs (Continued) 
 Full Sample 0 Bio Kids Sample 
1 Bio Kids  
Sample 
2-4 Bio Kids  
Sample 
5+ Bio Kids  
Sample 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Child Variables           
Biological Kid 0.88 0.33 0.05 0.22 0.59 0.49 0.87 0.33 0.94 0.24 
Female 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Age 45.44 7.35 46.76 7.99 47.04 8.15 45.90 7.14 44.62 7.43 
Married 0.69 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.69 0.46 0.71 0.45 0.66 0.47 
# Kids 1.97 1.52 2.11 1.59 1.80 1.51 1.83 1.42 2.18 1.64 
No High School  0.11 0.31 0.21 0.41 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.16 0.37 
High School Grad 0.59 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.62 0.49 
College Grad 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.22 0.42 
Work Full Time 0.77 0.42 0.70 0.46 0.76 0.42 0.78 0.41 0.75 0.43 
Unemployed 0.16 0.37 0.24 0.42 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.39 
Live with Parent(s) 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 
Live w/in 10 miles of Parent(s) 0.24 0.43 0.13 0.33 0.24 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 
Owns Home 0.68 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.73 0.44 0.63 0.48 
           
N 52,642 701 2,054 28,804 21,083 
































Vivos Transfert 0.0080** 0.0025 0.0085*** 0.0041** 
 (0.0035) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0021) 
Parent Controlst-2 
Age 0.0033** 0.0018* 0.0019* 0.0014* 
 (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
Married 0.0092 0.0097 0.0039 -0.0042 
 (0.0100) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0049) 
Divorced 0.0061 0.0039 0.0027 -0.0090 
 (0.0104) (0.0077) (0.0094) (0.0069) 
Widowed 0.0183* 0.0147* 0.0128 0.0003 
 (0.0105) (0.0087) (0.0094) (0.0054) 
# of kids -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0000 
 (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0005) 
Poor Health 0.0052 0.0019 0.0042 0.0006 
 (0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0018) 
# ADLs 0.0029 -0.0022 0.0024 0.0014 
 (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0014) 
# IADLs -0.0048 0.0050** -0.0074*** -0.0044** 
 (0.0034) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0020) 
Log Wealth -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0000 
 (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
Log Income -0.0021* -0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0008 
 (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0007) 
Formal Care 0.0040 0.0021 -0.0050 -0.0042 
 (0.0164) (0.0109) (0.0126) (0.0080) 
Child Controlst-2 
Biological Child 0.0115*** 0.0048*** 0.0090*** 0.0030*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0011) 
Female 0.0110*** 0.0052*** 0.0080*** 0.0030*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0009) 
Age -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married 0.0006 0.0004 0.0002 0.0009 
 (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0010) 
# of kids -0.0011** -0.0002 -0.0007* -0.0003 




Table 3.4: Continued 
Child Controlst-2 (Cont’d) 
Not HS 
Graduate 0.0029 0.0018 0.0024 0.0003 
 (0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0018) 
College 
Graduate -0.0007 0.0006 -0.0008 0.0011 
 (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0009) 
Work full-time 0.0010 0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0014) 
Work part-time -0.0009 -0.0019 -0.0000 -0.0035** 
 (0.0033) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0017) 
Income – A 0.0041 0.0076** -0.0002 -0.0055** 
 (0.0051) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0028) 
Income – B 0.0015 -0.0008 0.0015 0.0007 
 (0.0027) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0016) 
Income – C -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0008 
 (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0010) 
Income – 
Missing 0.0016 -0.0014 0.0017 0.0009 
 (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0012) 
Owns Home 0.0001 -0.0016 0.0002 -0.0008 
 (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0011) 
Coresident 0.0545*** 0.0199*** 0.0449*** 0.0151*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0045) (0.0064) (0.0039) 
Lives within 10 
miles of parent 0.0147*** 0.0053*** 0.0095*** 0.0049*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0012) 
     
2004 0.0016 -0.0005 0.0021 -0.0008 
 (0.0038) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0023) 
2006 -0.0007 -0.0028 0.0006 -0.0017 
 (0.0063) (0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0036) 
2008 -0.0030 -0.0037 -0.0005 -0.0051 
 (0.0099) (0.0060) (0.0081) (0.0052) 
2010 0.0012 -0.0030 0.0008 -0.0014 
 (0.0115) (0.0075) (0.0094) (0.0065) 
Observations 52,268 52,268 52,261 52,260 
R-Squared 0.3400 0.3392 0.3614 0.3295 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010). 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All models contain parent fixed effects.  
Child Income Brackets: A = Income <$10,000, B = Income between $10,000 and $35,000, C= Income between 























Log Inter-Vivos  0.0011 0.0000 0.0043 -0.0010 
Transfer Amtt (0.0054) (0.0029) (0.0047) (0.0034) 
Parent Controlst-2 
Age 0.0013 0.0046 -0.0015 0.0021 
 (0.0069) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0028) 
Married -0.0063 0.0018 -0.0111 0.0023 
 (0.0243) (0.0078) (0.0234) (0.0075) 
Poor Health -0.0159 0.0066 -0.0155 -0.0006 
 (0.0243) (0.0096) (0.0240) (0.0017) 
Formal Care 0.1897 0.0013 0.1918 0.0008 
 (0.3984) (0.0180) (0.4061) (0.0175) 
Child Controlst-2 
Biological Child 0.0112 0.0011 0.0104 0.0009 
 (0.0138) (0.0024) (0.0136) (0.0026) 
Female 0.0043 0.0051 0.0059 -0.0038 
 (0.0082) (0.0047) (0.0067) (0.0049) 
Age 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0004) 
Married 0.0031 0.0004 0.0058 -0.0004 
 (0.0119) (0.0068) (0.0112) (0.0026) 
Number of kids -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0013 
 (0.0031) (0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0015) 
Work full-time -0.0091 -0.0042 -0.0109 0.0048 
 (0.0126) (0.0060) (0.0097) (0.0060) 
Work part-time -0.0160 -0.0083 -0.0143 0.0024 
 (0.0180) (0.0115) (0.0172) (0.0090) 
Coresident 0.0417 -0.0157 0.0305 0.0096 
 (0.0494) (0.0205) (0.0451) (0.0303) 
Lives 10 miles 0.0103 0.0019 0.0004 0.0074 
 (0.0110) (0.0063) (0.0073) (0.0068) 
     
Observations 4,552 4,552 4,552 4,552 
R-Squared 0.7661 0.8141 0.7714 0.8320 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010). 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All models contain parent and year fixed 
effects, indicators of the child’s income range, education status and home ownership as well as the following 
parental control variables: # ADLs, # IADLs, # of kids, log of real wealth and log of real household income. 
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Table 3.6 Estimates of Correlation between Transfer Receipt and Informal Care Provision, by Respondent-reported 
ADL/IADL 




































Transfert 0.0018 0.0037* 0.0034* 0.0019 0.0048** 0.0048** 0.0044** 0.0038* 
 (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0020) 
Child Controlst-2        
Biological 
Child 0.0024** 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0012* 0.0078*** 0.0037*** 0.0022*** 0.0030*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Female 0.0026*** 0.0035*** 0.0033*** 0.0015*** 0.0061*** 0.0038*** 0.0010* 0.0028*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
Coresident 0.0117*** 0.0134*** 0.0095*** 0.0076*** 0.0362*** 0.0249*** 0.0074** 0.0164*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0058) (0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0040) 
Lives 10 miles 0.0034*** 0.0040*** 0.0039*** 0.0008 0.0088*** 0.0035*** 0.0016** 0.0033*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
         
Observations 52,209 52,257 52,251 52,185 50,012 48,996 51,189 50,001 
R-Squared 0.3748 0.3424 0.3552 0.4134 0.3894 0.3831 0.3749 0.3815 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010). 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All models contain parent and year fixed effects, indicators of the child’s income range, 










Table 3.7 Estimates of Correlation between Transfer Receipt and Amount of Informal 









Vivos Transfert 1.3504 -15.6186 
 (9.9608) (61.4038) 
Parent Controlst-2 
Age 1.2780 37.7133 
 (6.0922) (42.9364) 
Married -6.2072 19.1004 
 (21.8825) (150.8824) 
Poor Health 9.9475 85.6953 
 (15.0005) (100.8975) 
Formal Care 7.2915 -81.5441 
 (23.4902) (141.0685) 
Child Controlst-2 
Biological Child 18.8501 47.2562 
 (16.8959) (112.2037) 
Female 0.5727 7.5758 
 (4.7608) (34.2300) 
Age 0.0237 -0.1254 
 (0.4061) (2.4092) 
Married -0.9620 5.9870 
 (5.2394) (23.8136) 
Number of kids -0.6348 -11.9345 
 (2.0550) (18.0378) 
Work full-time -2.1266 -13.7190 
 (5.5532) (32.4915) 
Work part-time -4.8162 -34.3027 
 (7.2870) (43.5043) 
Coresident 6.8178 25.8907 
 (11.4130) (43.0033) 
Lives 10 miles 0.4184 -9.9315 
 (5.6708) (25.1990) 
   
Observations 770 741 
R-Squared 0.9096 0.9642 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010). 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All models contain parent and year fixed 
effects, indicators of the child’s income range, education status and home ownership as well as the following 
parental control variables: # ADLs, # IADLs, # of kids, log of real wealth and log of real household income. 
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Vivos Transfert 0.0106 0.0097* 0.0190* 
 (0.0097) (0.0058) (0.0102) 
Parent Controlst-2 
Age -0.0013 -0.0015 0.0014 
 (0.0044) (0.0027) (0.0076) 
Married 0.0047 -0.0035 -0.0107 
 (0.0122) (0.0047) (0.0284) 
Poor Health 0.0000 -0.0026 0.0077 
 (0.0062) (0.0023) (0.0076) 
Formal Care -0.0172 -0.0112 0.0103 
 (0.0134) (0.0070) (0.0322) 
Child Controlst-2   
Biological Child 0.0069 0.0045 0.0082 
 (0.0110) (0.0028) (0.0072) 
Female -0.0028 -0.0030 0.0091* 
 (0.0044) (0.0020) (0.0052) 
Age -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0008 
 (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
Married -0.0168*** -0.0086*** -0.0116** 
 (0.0056) (0.0025) (0.0058) 
Number of kids -0.0010 -0.0010 0.0027 
 (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0018) 
Work full-time -0.0084 -0.0046* 0.0042 
 (0.0067) (0.0027) (0.0068) 
Work part-time -0.0009 -0.0033 -0.0083 
 (0.0076) (0.0033) (0.0095) 
    
Observations 10,737 33,297 33,118 
R-Squared 0.5473 0.3349 0.4169 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010). 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All models contain parent and year fixed 
effects, indicators of the child’s income range, education status and home ownership as well as the following 
parental control variables: # ADLs, # IADLs, # of kids, log of real wealth and log of real household income. 
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Table 3.9  Estimates of Correlation between Transfer Receipt and Informal Care 

















Female Child  0.0120** 0.0023 0.0120** 0.0072* 
Subsample (0.0058) (0.0028) (0.0052) (0.0039) 
     
Male Child  0.0078 0.0035 0.0058 0.0013 
Subsample (0.0055) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0029) 
     
Married Child 0.0086* 0.0011 0.0080** 0.0062* 
Subsample (0.0046) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0032) 
     
Unmarried 
Child 0.0069 0.0032 0.0064 0.0017 
Subsample (0.0070) (0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0030) 
     
Near Child 0.0114 -0.0007 0.0096 0.0122* 
Subsample (0.0098) (0.0059) (0.0073) (0.0068) 
     
Far Child 0.0057* 0.0020 0.0057** 0.0006 
Subsample (0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0020) 
     
1 Bio Kid 0.0146 0.0056 0.0075 0.0128 
Subsample (0.0147) (0.0083) (0.0114) (0.0135) 
     
2-4 Bio Kids  0.0080* 0.0040 0.0081** 0.0031 
Subsample (0.0047) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0027) 
     
5+ Bio Kids 0.0067 -0.0009 0.0103* 0.0039 
Subsample (0.0054) (0.0021) (0.0054) (0.0033) 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010). 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All models contain parent and year fixed 
effects, the child’s age, number of kids, indicators of the child’s gender, marital status, income range, education 
status, work status, proximity to parent and home ownership as well as the following parental control variables: age, 
marital status, fair/poor health status, # ADLs, # IADLs, use of formal home care, # of kids, log of real wealth and 
log of real household income. 
“Near Child” subsample includes both children who coreside with the respondent and those who live within 10 
























Receipt of Inter- 0.0044 0.0031 0.0025 0.0003 
Vivos Transfert-2 (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0016) 
Parent Controlst-2 
Age -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0017 0.0001 
 (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0015) 
Married 0.0011 0.0067 -0.0025 -0.0036 
 (0.0118) (0.0107) (0.0100) (0.0058) 
Poor Health 0.0051 0.0025 0.0045 0.0005 
 (0.0036) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0019) 
Formal Care 0.0036 -0.0045 0.0065 0.0001 
 (0.0187) (0.0119) (0.0134) (0.0088) 
Child Controlst-2 
Biological Child 0.0113*** 0.0042** 0.0108*** 0.0028** 
 (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0014) 
Female 0.0112*** 0.0048*** 0.0087*** 0.0032*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
Age -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married -0.0011 0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0011) 
Number of kids -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0008* -0.0001 
 (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Work full-time 0.0016 -0.0006 0.0013 -0.0001 
 (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0015) 
Work part-time -0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0010 -0.0042** 
 (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0018) 
Coresident 0.0542*** 0.0238*** 0.0445*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0053) (0.0070) (0.0040) 
Lives 10 miles 0.0147*** 0.0050*** 0.0098*** 0.0049*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0013) 
     
Observations 45,814 45,547 45,550 45,533 
R-Squared 0.3587 0.3594 0.3687 0.3387 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010). 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All models contain parent and year fixed 
effects, indicators of the child’s income range, education status and home ownership as well as the following 
parental control variables: # ADLs, # IADLs, # of kids, log of real wealth and log of real household income. 
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Table 3.11 Estimates of Correlation between Transfer Receipt on Informal Care Provision, 

















Receipt of Inter- 0.0087*** 0.0034* 0.0082*** 0.0042** 
Vivos Transfert (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0017) 
Parent Controlst-2 
Age 0.0052*** 0.0018*** 0.0038*** 0.0022*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Married 0.0007 0.0096 -0.0026 -0.0041 
 (0.0080) (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0047) 
Poor Health 0.0058** 0.0014 0.0053** 0.0008 
 (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0014) 
Formal Care -0.0026 0.0060 -0.0016 -0.0086 
 (0.0138) (0.0091) (0.0105) (0.0078) 
Child Controlst-2 
Biological Child 0.0099*** 0.0042*** 0.0078*** 0.0026*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0009) 
Female 0.0115*** 0.0049*** 0.0089*** 0.0034*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
Age -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0006 
 (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
Work full-time 0.0008 0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0012) 
Work part-time 0.0013 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0019 
 (0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0016) 
Coresident 0.0581*** 0.0206*** 0.0473*** 0.0169*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0038) (0.0052) (0.0032) 
Lives 10 miles 0.0165*** 0.0044*** 0.0111*** 0.0062*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
     
Observations 75,192 75,190 75,184 75,175 
R-Squared 0.3046 0.3156 0.3083 0.2770 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010). 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All models contain parent and year fixed 
effects, indicators of the child’s income range and education status as well as the following parental control 
variables: # ADLs, # IADLs, # of kids, log of real wealth and log of real household income. 
*Child’s number of kids and home ownership are excluded since both include significant missing values. 
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Table 3.12 Estimates of Correlation between Transfer Receipt and Informal Care 

















Receipt of Inter- 0.0064* 0.0006 0.0073** 0.0043* 
Vivos Transfert (0.0036) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0022) 
Parent Controlst-2 
Age 0.0032** 0.0016* 0.0018* 0.0014* 
 (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
Married 0.0091 0.0096 0.0038 -0.0042 
 (0.0100) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0049) 
Poor Health 0.0055* 0.0018 0.0045* 0.0009 
 (0.0032) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0017) 
Formal Care 0.0049 0.0020 -0.0041 -0.0032 
 (0.0162) (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0079) 
Child Controlst-2 
Biological Child 0.0114*** 0.0047*** 0.0088*** 0.0029*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0011) 
Female 0.0108*** 0.0050*** 0.0079*** 0.0029*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0009) 
Age -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married 0.0007 0.0005 0.0002 0.0008 
 (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0010) 
Number of kids -0.0010** -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0003 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Work full-time 0.0011 0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0014) 
Work part-time -0.0010 -0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0032* 
 (0.0033) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0017) 
Coresident 0.0559*** 0.0210*** 0.0461*** 0.0156*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0046) (0.0065) (0.0039) 
Lives 10 miles 0.0147*** 0.0052*** 0.0095*** 0.0049*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0012) 
     
Observations 51,942 51,942 51,935 51,934 
R-Squared 0.3404 0.3413 0.3613 0.3277 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010). 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All models contain parent and year fixed 
effects, indicators of the child’s income range, education status and home ownership as well as the following 
parental control variables: # ADLs, # IADLs, # of kids, log of real wealth and log of real household income. 
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Table 3.13 Estimates of Correlation between Transfer Receipt and Informal Care 


















Vivos Transfert 1.6575*** 1.6067* 2.1723*** 1.8561** 
 (0.2752) (0.4507) (0.3983) (0.4489) 
Parent Controlst-2 
Age 1.0934*** 1.0875*** 1.0992*** 1.0955*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0138) (0.0105) (0.0142) 
Married 0.7761 0.5503* 0.7802 0.3741*** 
 (0.1914) (0.1926) (0.2234) (0.1193) 
Poor Health 2.0487*** 2.2601*** 2.4442*** 1.5299*** 
 (0.2064) (0.3898) (0.2944) (0.2295) 
Formal Care 0.8380 0.6876 0.6680 1.0168 
 (0.1885) (0.2156) (0.1831) (0.2983) 
Child Controlst-2 
Biological Child 3.5963*** 3.6169*** 4.3234*** 5.7707*** 
 (0.8982) (1.3734) (1.4624) (2.9487) 
Female 2.1731*** 2.5077*** 2.3325*** 1.7379*** 
 (0.1775) (0.3484) (0.2311) (0.2325) 
Age 1.0063 0.9985 1.0007 1.0259** 
 (0.0065) (0.0094) (0.0079) (0.0118) 
Married 1.1490 1.1458 1.0899 1.5563*** 
 (0.1092) (0.1911) (0.1227) (0.2633) 
Number of kids 0.9211*** 0.9583 0.9161** 0.9270* 
 (0.0264) (0.0442) (0.0325) (0.0404) 
Work full-time 0.9562 0.8997 0.8963 0.9162 
 (0.0931) (0.1381) (0.1058) (0.1488) 
Work part-time 0.8076 0.8173 0.7816 0.4229*** 
 (0.1310) (0.2018) (0.1505) (0.1367) 
Coresident 5.7872*** 5.9530*** 6.6331*** 4.7725*** 
 (0.7839) (1.2619) (1.0742) (1.1534) 
Lives 10 miles 2.8387*** 2.7574*** 2.9303*** 2.4277*** 
 (0.2496) (0.4052) (0.3041) (0.3434) 
     
Observations 52,260 52,260 52,253 52,260 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 4-10 (years 1998 through 2010). 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All models contain year fixed effects, 
indicators of the child’s income range, education status and home ownership as well as the following parental 




Appendix 3.1 Derivation of Comparative Statics for Chapter 3 
 As presented in the paper, each individual child faces the following maximization 















)   such that w(24 – LC - AC) + T = XC. (1) 
We then internalize the child’s budget constraint so that the child’s maximization problem now 
takes the following form 
    Max V=U(24w – wL – wA + T, L, Q(A))                             (2) 
where the child chooses both Leisure (L) and Informal Care (A). When solving this latter 
maximization problem for first order conditions, we find that UL (i.e. 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐿
) and UQQA are both 
equal to wUX, suggesting that the child equates the marginal utility of his/her time across all 
choices. 
  When deriving second order conditions, we end with the following four equations: 





UXX – wUXL - wULX + ULL         (3) 





UXX – wUXQQA – wUQXQA + UQQQAQA + UQQAA      (4) 





UXX – wUXQQA - wULX + ULQQA        (5) 





UXX – wUXL – wUQXQA + UQLQA        (6) 
 Based on the implicit function theorem, we know that the choice variables can be solved 
as a function of the exogenous variables; in other words, the utility-maximizing choices of both 
A and L are functions of T (i.e. the inter-vivos transfer amount that the child receives from the 
parent). When inserting these into the initial first order conditions and differentiating with 




    (3)*LT + (5)*AT –wUXX + ULX = 0    (7) 
            (6)*LT + (4)*AT –wUXX + UQXQA = 0.    (8) 
We can then rearrange these equations and put into the following Matrix form: 
    (3)  (5)      LT        wUXX - ULX    (9) 
    (6)  (4)      AT        wUXX - UQXQA 
 
Lastly, using Cramer’s rule, we are able to solve for the two comparative statics concerning the 
change in T (i.e. LT and AT), as can be seen below:  
          wUXX - ULX          (5)   (3)  (5)       
LT  =  wUXX - UQXQA  (4)   (6)  (4)    
 
 
(𝑤𝑈𝑋𝑋 – U𝐿𝑋)(U𝑄𝑄Q𝐴) + (wU𝑋𝑋 – U𝐿𝑋)(U𝑄Q𝐴𝐴) −(U𝐿𝑋−U𝑄𝑋Q𝐴)(wU𝑋𝑄Q𝐴) + ( U𝑄𝑋Q𝐴−wU𝑋𝑋)(U𝐿𝑄Q𝐴)
𝛥
 
           (3)   wUXX - ULX              (3)  (5)      
AT  =   (6)   wUXX - UQXQA     (6)  (4) 
 
  




In these equations, Δ equals (3)*(4) – (5)*(6), which we know to be negative from the second 
order conditions. However, the sign of the numerator in each of these comparative statistics is 
ambiguous, making it impossible to sign either partial derivative. 
 
= 
= 
= 
